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THE PHYSIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC MAN

THE late Wesley C. Mitchell, in discussing the social sciences, wrote:

> In the social sciences we are suffering from a curious derangement. We have become aware that the orthodox doctrines of economics, politics and law rest upon a tacit assumption that man's behavior is dominated by rational calculation. We have learned further that this is an assumption contrary to fact. But we find it hard to avoid the old mistake, not to speak of using the new knowledge. In our prefaces and introductory chapters some of us repudiate hedonism and profess volitional psychology or behaviorism. . . . In the body of our books, however, we relapse into reasonings about behavior that apply only to creatures essentially reasonable.[1]

This state of affairs, correctly perceived by Mitchell, is a consequence, in part at least, of our compartmentalized system of education. Not only is there the equivalent of a cultural lag of fifteen to twenty years between disciplines in our educational system, but there is a more subtle influence at work in the general frame of reference within which one gets accustomed to thinking. One might more appropriately perhaps call it a scientific atmosphere. Ideas, terms and concepts from a different science meet resistance and, if accepted, undergo a transformation in the process of absorption. I have witnessed numerous illustrations of this phenomenon in attempting to initiate medically trained men, and particularly psychiatrists,

[1] Mitchell, W. C., *The Backward Art of Spending and Other Essays* (New York, 1937), p. 177.

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into a psychological training program. The same thing occurs, of course, in the reverse direction. Similar difficulties arise in taking an anthropologist or a sociologist across the boundary into another discipline.

The need for correcting this defect in our educational program is generally recognized. The most recent attempt to do something realistic about it consists of a series of fellowships carrying stipends large enough to induce a person, well trained and with a recognized status in a given scientific discipline, to spend a couple of years undergoing basic training in another science. Thus a physicist might be induced to study sociology or a chemist to study psychology. Relatively few applicants for these fellowships meet the requirements and are willing to take the risk; and there are none, so far as I know, who would bridge the gap between economics and psychology. Such supplementary training would at best be a curative process, applied to an individual who lacks a well-organized education. What is needed is prevention rather than cure. Some university should pioneer in offering a well-planned course of training in economics which incorporates, as an integral part, the fundamentals of behavior—physiological, psychological and social. The nearest approach to such an innovation is the joint graduate program of social psychology, sociology, anthropology and statistics at Harvard University. Any foundation interested in the development of the social sciences would do well to support a program directed to such a fully rounded course of training for economics.

C. Reinold Noyes, an economist long associated with Wesley Mitchell and chairman of the National Bureau of Economic Research, has been keenly aware of the problems to which I have referred. In addition, he saw a need to go still farther afield so as to incorporate the physical and biological sciences into economic thinking. Both the subject matter and the methods of the physical sciences are, he believes, essential to an adequate development of the social sciences and particularly of the science of economics. The social sciences, like the physical sciences, should become more objective, more inductive in their approach and more quantitative in their evaluations. Noyes thus takes a firm position on a matter that is currently under active dispute.

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There are those who say that the social sciences have been led astray in their attempt to take the physical sciences as their model.

At any rate, Noyes has followed his own recommendations and has spent many years in the attempt to build for himself an adequate foundation in the physical, biological and social sciences for the study of economic man. His stupendous efforts are incorporated in his two volumes entitled *Economic Man: In Relation to His Natural Environment.*[2]

A satisfying review of these two volumes seems to me to be an impossible task. I take some comfort from a concluding statement by the author that "a study of this kind does not lend itself to any succinct summary. The conclusions reached are all tentative and strew themselves along the whole process of examining the evidence" (p. 996). One reviewer comments:

> The book should be reviewed by a committee representing neurology, physiology, psychology etc., as well as economics. It is, however, precisely Noyes' point that all these matters must be brought together in a single mind, and that their compartmentalization which brings it about that biologist and economist do not speak the same language, do not understand each other's jargon, is totally nefarious.[3]

The author states that as he surveys the problem of economic man in its entirety he finds it "a most ambitious project, one far beyond the reach of any single man" (p. 6). This is certainly true, unless it be approached via a thoroughly organized course of training, such as was suggested above, drawing from each discipline only what has been found to be essential for the purpose. To survey each discipline from scratch, so to speak, as the author did that of biology (or rather physiology) would take more than one lifetime. Moreover, in such an approach there is bound to be a deficiency of perspective which should tell the inquirer what is essential and what is not essential.

[2] *Economic Man: In Relation to His Natural Environment,* by C. Reinold Noyes. New York, Columbia University Press, 1948. 2 vols. xiv, iv, 1443 pp. $15.00.

[3] Crawford, R., *Scientific Monthly,* 1949, vol. 68, p. 355.

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Actually Noyes found it necessary to limit himself to one division of his topic, namely, the *behavior of an individual in a direct economy*—what he calls the biological division of the field. One might well ask why he chose the biological division. In analyzing human behavior one can choose any one of several levels of interpretation upon which he shall work. There is first of all the social level, the level of group action and interaction. This, I take it, is the more customary level of discourse of classical economics, where one works with the statistical data of behavior of populations (for example, demand and supply) and more recently with the data derived from the polling methods. Such data are the most immediately relevant to the everyday problems of economics.

Behavior of an individual can be interpreted on the psychological level, too, with little reference to social interaction and none to the physiological level except under some such a blanket term as "intervening variables". E. L. Thorndike's excursions into the field of economics were based primarily on such a psychological foundation, certain physiological underpinnings being taken for granted. His huge volume, *Human Nature and the Social Order*[4] which some economists have found both suggestive and valuable does not appear in Noyes's bibliography. Then there is the physiological level of interpretation chosen by Noyes, I suspect, because that is the highest level where the requirements of the physical sciences can be most nearly met. One could, of course, seek a still lower level of interpretation and explain behavior in terms of chemistry or even physics. There have been attempts to do this, but whatever advantages accrue in objectivity are offset by the remoteness of the raw data from the facts of human behavior.

Noyes's whole treatment of economic man rests upon the need of the living organism to keep its functions in a state of equilibrium, any deviation from which automatically sets organs, or the organism as a whole, into action tending to restore the balance. W. B. Cannon popularized this concept in his widely read book, *The Wisdom of the Body*,[5] where he introduced the

[4] New York, 1940.

[5] New York, 1932.

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term "homeostasis". This concept of homeostasis has by analogy been extended from the physiological level to the psychological and even to the social level of interpretation.[6] The requirements for homeostasis are generally named *needs* on the physiological level, and, when reflected to the psychological level as experience, they commonly acquire the name *wants* and sometimes *motives, desires* or *appetites*. Noyes uses the term *wants* for the physiological level.

The essence of dynamic psychology and, I presume, of dynamic physiology is that the organism is set into activity by response to these needs or wants. Such responses bring the organism into contact with its environment which offers resistances to the fulfillment of the needs. The organism, therefore, cannot be looked upon as a body which is inert until it is aroused into activity by external stimulation. It is itself a going concern whose responses are merely directed or oriented via sensory excitation. That is to say that the *stimulus-response* concept has given place to the *stimulus-organism-response* concept. Systems of interpretation vary according to the way in which the part played by the organism is elaborated. This may vary all the way from conceiving it as a set of bothersome "intervening variables" to the heavy burden of responsibility placed upon it by Noyes. The dynamic concept is not new in economics as witnessed by the book *Economic Motives* by Dickinson,[7] although its full implications have never been followed through.

What is new about Noyes's treatment is the dynamic physiology of behavior which he has worked out. This comprises some 600 pages of his two volumes, being chapter i through vi and an appendix to chapter ii of 200 pages. He has performed an immense task of assembling and organizing a wealth of evidence in a scholarly fashion, which should be highly stimulating to psychologists, physiologists and neurophysiologists. It will be of least value to economists, who, I suspect, will not read it and, if they do read it, will not understand it.

[6] See Poffenberger, A. T., "Some Unsolved Problems in Human Adjustment", *Science*, 1938, vol. 87, pp. 124-129.

[7] Dickinson, Z. C., *Economic Motives* (Cambridge, 1922).

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They cannot be expected to have the background in neuro-anatomy and physiology that is needed to follow so technical a discussion. The economists of the present generation must take the facts of wants as given and accept their machinery upon scientific hearsay. The discussion is, however, not to be considered a total loss to the economist. At the least, the research educated the author, and enabled him to write a summary of nine pages (1224-1233) which an economist can read through with profit. Furthermore, the meticulous documentation may afford a useful reference source for inquiry into specific problems.

According to Noyes's system of dynamics all behavior gets its motive force, its energetics, from the wants created by variations from the condition of homeostasis. The mechanism thus set into action has its neural seat in the hypothalamus, a subcortical nervous center. Thus, the responses not being of cortical origin are automatic, that is, not under voluntary control. Noyes says:

> In our system of energetics a state of variation from homeostasis leads to some form of activity. If and when this activity restores homeostasis, activity ceases. The initial state or tendency is then the cause of this activity, while the end-state, on the other hand, is the cause of inactivity in this respect. One cannot attribute as cause of an activity an end-state which does not arrive until the activity has ceased. We do not ascribe to a clock the "purpose" of running down. It runs because it is wound up; and it ceases to run when it is run down (pp. 38-39). . . .
>
> Variations from homeostasis are of one order, whether they involve taking in or giving off and whether, in individual instances, the resulting behavior is approach or retreat from some particular selected object which the observer is watching (p. 40).

Certain classes of these wants should be mentioned. There are the *present* or *immediate wants* and the *future wants*. Of the present wants there are two sorts: (1) the internal wants, which are responses to needs for fluids and substances mainly, and responses to needs for several kinds of elimination from the body; (2) a number of other primary wants called *quasi-*

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external wants. These are internal responses, but they are set off by environmental excitants. Among these are the fear reactions, such as to loud sounds and to the removal of bodily support. Of this second group of wants, Noyes says:

> We should attempt . . . to determine what are the causes of the other stereotyped and automatic reactions generally recognized as common to animals and men and to see whether these too can be ultimately ascribed to analogous mechanisms for the maintenance or restoration of homeostasis. . . . To distinguish them from the wants which arise directly from conditions in the internal environment, we shall call them quasi-external wants. . . . These additions to our list are as follows: Loud sounds, probably bright lights and perhaps any strong somatic stimulus produce the "alert" (i.e., opening eyes, pricking up ears and turning of head); these, when very strong and sudden, produce the "fear" reaction which may include "escape"; loss of equilibrium or support also produces the "fear" reaction, without "escape" but probably with "forced grasping" in primates; restraint and constraint of movement or posture produce the "rage" reaction, including attack; injury by external causes produces "pain" reactions, including "withdrawal" or even "escape." Translating these into terms of our original analysis, we may assume that the necessities of homeostasis in general include also freedom from strong external stimuli of any kind, freedom from loss of equilibrium or support; freedom from restraint or constraint of movement or posture (bodily freedom); and freedom from external injury. Variation from homeostasis in any of these respects leads to stereotyped and automatic behavior patterns suited generally to restore homeostasis—patterns which are analogous in every respect to the types of behavior produced by internal wants (pp. 75-76).

Two important aspects of the present wants are to be noted. The first of these is that they are graded in their intensity or power to produce response and can be arranged accordingly in an order of *prepotency*. The second is that, since it is the whole organism that is reacting, only one want can arouse a response at any given time and that is the want that is at the moment prepotent.

The neurophysiological processes and the energetics, conceived in support of these need-reaction phenomena, are fairly

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well covered by documentation of research. But the list of wants thus accounted for is a very limited one and is not such as has usually concerned the economist. How do the others arise? Noyes comments as follows:

> The list of present wants which we have found it possible to examine is merely a tentative and preliminary one. We have confined our attention to it because it has proved impossible as yet to expand it while continuing upon the same objective physiological basis. However, we may presume, at least until the contrary is proved, that all other present wants operate in the same way. Therefore, our definition, if not our list, of present wants covers all such causes of behavior (p. 236).

Generally, from this point forward in the argument, the author moves from the physiological into the psychological level of interpretation with his use of the functions of learning and memory, effort, volition, expressions of preference and other judgments of value. He employs speculation, pure inference and "ineluctable logic" (p. 968) and thereby conceives neurophysiological models that have little or no basis in current evidence. He says, in introducing Appendix II concerning evidence on central behavior mechanisms:

> I have chosen to be specific throughout. That involves mixing together hypotheses of all degrees of uncertainty, from the relatively well-established to the almost purely speculative. The reason for deliberately pursuing this policy is that it seems to me preferable, in a first attempt at a somewhat systematic, or schematic, synthesis of the important results of so much novel experimental and observational material, to risk being anatomically or physiologically wrong as to details . . . than to be so cautious that the parts of the scheme do not hang together. In any synthesis of a rapidly progressing body of knowledge this choice is unavoidable. If the skeleton of the scheme as a whole stands the test of time, it matters not, for this purpose, that its details should come to be modified, that the locus or precise nature of certain of the functions or relations turn out to be somewhat different from what now seems probable (pp. 1033-1034).

It is just this interweaving of the "relatively well-established" and the "almost purely speculative" that makes a

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critical evaluation of the whole a discouraging task. Speculation is certainly warranted, the only question being how far one should depart from the relatively well-established. Noyes has gone farther than most, if not all, neurophysiologists and psychologists have been willing to go. Hebb's *Organization of Behavior*,[8] speculative as it is, stays fairly close to the research evidence from such men as Lorente de No and seems to the reviewer a sounder basis for interpretation of human energetics. It carries speculation about as far as it is at present safe to go.

The list of present wants, internal and quasi-external, is extended through, first, *ancillary wants*, " those which are themselves satisfied by features or aspects of what is or has been the process of satisfying other wants " (p. 237); and second, *imposed wants*, those that are " provoked in some men or organisms by other men or organisms to procure the satisfying of the latters' wants " (p. 238). A third class of extraneous wants, says Noyes, seems

> particularly intangible and subjective, so much so that it is difficult to conceive that they have a physiological (peripheral) basis at all. Thus, from the standpoint of our approach, they are the most remote and inaccessible of all, lying far beyond those apparently physical wants which we mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, but which we admitted are still beyond our reach. Merely for example we may mention, " keeping up with the Jones's "; fads and fashions; love of power, success, admiration, prominence and publicity; family loyalty; sense of duty, patriotism, generosity; belief in a cause (p. 238).

Learning, as one might suspect, is the great extender of the list of wants. This matter is dealt with mainly under the head of conditioning which Noyes accepts both as a subcortical and a cortical function, and a physiological one, although it has long since been adopted into the realm of psychological thinking and research. Thus there may arise *surrogate stimuli* and *replicas* of wants, well known to psychologists under other names. All of these, it should be noted, get their motive power, so to speak, from the primary internal wants or the quasi-external wants.

[8] Hebb, D. O., *The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory* (New York, 1949).

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The *force of habit* is not recognized as such. To Noyes a habit cannot acquire its own driving power as the name just used would imply, although such a concept has become well established in psychological thought through the work of Woodworth and others and conforms well with common experience.

The great class of *future wants* is still to be commented upon. These wants, foreseen and provided for in the present, arise only in the future and hence cannot be energized as are the present wants of whatever variety. Speaking physiologically, these future wants are cortical in process rather than subcortical. They exist in the memory and have the same relative intensity as when they are present wants, though their absolute level of intensity is less. The source of energy for them Noyes finds in the frontal lobes of the cortex. Contrary to the case of the present wants, the future wants arising via memory differ sharply in respects other than in absolute intensity. One of the most important of these differences is that, of the present wants, only one can function at any instant, since that one engages the whole organism. A number of the remembered wants, however, can be in consciousness together, with the result that there arises a delay in response, with the process of deliberation and choice. The future want that then becomes prepotent does so by virtue of a process involving volition; that is, it is a rational operation.

The argument developing the energetics of the future wants is the most involved and the most speculative in the whole book (pp. 296-394 and 899-915). Although the author has gone into the neurophysiological literature with the greatest diligence, evidence for the process of volition, deliberation and choice is not there. He, therefore, draws heavily upon the pre-experimental, the logical and the speculative. The argument runs that, since certain behavior occurs, there must be correlated with it certain neural processes, and these must of necessity have a certain pattern. The justification for this procedure Noyes finds in the physical sciences, where in astronomy, for instance, the planet Neptune was hypothecated to account for the behavior of other heavenly bodies. Search of the heavens later found such a planet as predicted. The *Gestalt* psychologists have employed this argument extensively in designing neuro-

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physiological models. As Noyes says, only time will tell whether such models become facts.

A more naïve manner of dealing with the future wants, a far simpler one, and one that has at least some psychological support is to say that every action directed toward the satisfaction of future wants is energized by a present want. And the quasi-external wants lend themselves especially well to this purpose. One's payments for an old-age annuity are activated by a *present fear of poverty* in later years. One's savings for a home are to relieve a *present sense of insecurity.* The surrogate wants of pride, love of power, success and admiration could equally well furnish the energetics for future provision. Thus the model for present wants would serve equally well as the model for the future wants. This interpretation seems almost too simple in the face of the elaborate structure conceived by Noyes to the same end, but the "law of parsimony" would require that it be thoroughly canvassed.

There remain to be mentioned several points in regard to wants that are particularly interesting to a psychologist and that seem, to Noyes, to offer a challenge to economic theory. Space permits only a brief reference to them. These are the prepotency of wants, what determines it and how it is evaluated. An aspect of wants most heavily emphasized, and most frequently referred to, is that any want that is prepotent will, in the process of satiation, retain its full intensity until satiation is complete. That is, there is no gradual decrease of intensity; the condition is all or none. If there is a curve of satisfaction it has only two points, 100 per cent and zero. This single aspect of the behavior of a want makes untenable the whole economic structure that is based upon the concept of marginal utility (pp. 221-227 and 460-474). The argument here is mainly a logical one, a sample of which is that, if a prepotent want in the course of satisfaction gradually declined, it would at some stage in the process be equaled by the want next in order of intensity. Thereupon a dead center would be established and reaction would cease. For that reason too, no single want ever could reach complete satiation.

Two sorts of evidence other than the logical, however, can be

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drawn upon in attacking this question. The first is the evidence of experience. Are not such dead centers common in everyday experiences? To be sure, they are temporary, because the blocking is somehow resolved, and numerous mechanisms for accounting for such relief are available. The second kind of evidence comes from many years of animal research where the problem has been the measurement of the strength of motivation. No experiment has yet been designed to show directly the course of the satiation process, but one could be designed, and the matter is sufficiently important to warrant attempts to do so.

One experiment bearing at least indirectly upon the problem may be cited.[9] White rats were trained to relieve their hunger by pressing upon a bar thereby making pellets of food available, and to provide desirable darkness for themselves by pressing another bar which turned off a light. Now rats deprived of food for twenty-four hours were put into a lighted compartment equipped with the two kinds of bars mentioned above. The rats will get food for themselves, but not to the point of satiation. After eating some food, they will go to another part of the compartment and turn off the light, then return to eat in darkness. Therefore, one might say that when the hunger had been reduced to the point where the annoying light became prepotent, the response shifted from eating to a darkness-making reaction. Search of the extensive literature on animal and human motivation might reveal still more pertinent evidence. There is certainly as much as an even chance that research already done, or that could be done, would support the concept of gradual change in the intensity of a want in the course of its satiation.

Aside from those internal wants that are so biologically essential that their prepotency cannot be interfered with, the status of a want is a function of its intensity over against the *effort* necessary to satiate it. There is called for here some kind of evaluation of the effort involved. The concept of effort thus

[9] Tolcott, M. A., *Conflict: A Study of Some Interactions between Appetite and Aversion in the White Rat,* Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1948, vol. 38, pp. 83-142.

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employed is a logical construct, although there is a fairly extensive psychological bibliography on effort that might be pertinent to the problem. Experiments could be found which show that effort is peculiarly difficult to evaluate. For instance, Morgan [10] in 1916 showed that when a person was instructed to use his maximum effort in doing a task, his actual effort would vary over a very great range according to the magnitude of the task that he was set to do. He seemed to have no dependable means of evaluating his effort. Then there are such field studies as that of Vernon [11] who showed that a change of working schedule from longer to shorter hours was accompanied by an increase in output per hour, a change interpreted as the result of increased effort. But the attainment of a new level of effort required several months, as though there were no direct basis for knowing how much effort was being expended. The point that I wish to make here is not so much that the two studies cited damage the case made for effort by Noyes, but that a wealth of experimental evidence was not drawn upon in building his concept of effort.[12]

The final point concerns the evaluation of wants and preferences. Here is a field that has been actively cultivated by psychologists for over fifty years, and the literature contains a wealth of experimental evidence beginning with the work of Cattell on the *Order of Merit Method*.[13] Material that could have been drawn from these sources would have given a more substantial basis for the discussion of values and their estimation than the largely logical one employed by Noyes (pp. 395-532). The paper by Thorndike on "Science and Values" [14] makes a

[10] Morgan, J. J. B., "The Overcoming of Distraction and Other Resistances", *Archives of Psychology*, 1916, No. 35.

[11] Vernon, H. M., *The Speed of Adaptation of Output to Altered Hours of Work*, Industrial Fatigue Research Board (London, 1920), No. 6.

[12] A recent treatment of effort from the psychological point of view will be found in: Ryan, T. A., *Work and Effort* (New York, 1947).

[13] See Poffenberger, A. T. (ed.), *James McKeen Cattell, 1860-1944: Man of Science* (Lancaster, 1947), vol. I, pp. 388-426.

[14] Thorndike, E. L., "Science and Values", *Science*, 1936, vol. 83, pp. 1-8.

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convenient introduction for the economist into the psychology of values and their measurement.

The reviewer concludes this brief survey with a feeling of humility growing out of the magnitude of the task and out of his own incompetence beyond the narrow range of his specialty. Most of the criticisms may be minor ones, and are made with a sense of the modesty with which the author has presented his views. Noyes has offered them as tentative, subject to revision and refutation and at best as only one other way of looking at things.

One positive suggestion grows out of this survey. It is that the book as it stands is too difficult to read. It cannot have the influence it should have in stirring up economic thought, unless it is widely read and generally understood. Why should the author not emulate William James, that great psychologist whom he so frequently quotes (and who wrote a *Briefer Course* following his two volumes of the *Principles of Psychology*), and make available a 400-page book devoid of notes and appendices and presenting the argument in simplified form? The reviewer believes that only in that way will the fruits of the many years of labor and thought that were put into this work get the attention they deserve.

For the benefit of the practicing economists of today, this review concludes with a portion of a footnote from the final page of the text (p. 1006). Having in mind that he has dealt throughout with the behavior of individual man, Noyes says:

> . . . this combination of different individual patterns may mean that, just as the classical conceptions of physics and their analogue in physiology gradually emerge as larger and larger numbers are involved, so too we, in economics, may find that, subject to the effects of interdependence, certain features of the classical theory of demand will be approached when we add together the demands of innumerable individuals.

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DE GAULLE AND THE R.P.F.

IMMEDIATELY after the war it became evident that the Right, traditionally an important segment of French political opinion, had virtually disappeared. The reason for this, of course, was that during the occupation the Right had in a general way become associated with treason and collaboration. The Left, on the other hand, had become identified with the Resistance, and consequently it was to these wartime organizations that General de Gaulle turned, for the most part, in forming the Provisional Government of September 9, 1944.

The Right continued in virtual eclipse for several years, as was evidenced by the general elections of 1945 and 1946. During this period hopes were current that the ordeal of war had drawn the various strands of French political thought together and that in future France might be spared the confusion and instability in government that had been the curse of the Third Republic. But this, it soon became apparent, was not to be. Wartime enthusiasms and the sense of common purpose that characterized the first few years following the Liberation soon waned and the fundamentally divided nature of French political thought became apparent once more. De Gaulle resigned from the Provisional Government in January 1946, because, as he said in a recent speech, "parties, press, business, trade unions . . . were as a whole openly or secretly against . . . [my] projects." Coöperation between the Left and the Right, as represented by De Gaulle and his Algiers associates, proved impossible and the General, in disgust at "party bickerings", retired from the political scene.

Early in 1947, however, De Gaulle returned to public life as the leader of a supposedly "supra-party" organization, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* [R.P.F.], and in so doing effectively awakened the French Right from its post-war slumbers. This organization is today a very considerable force in French politics, and has become the object of much alarm on the part of both the Center and Left. The Right owes its new-

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found strength almost entirely to De Gaulle. The R.P.F. is his creation, its philosophy is his philosophy, its policies and programs are his policies and programs; De Gaulle and the R.P.F. are one and indivisible. By virtue of having restored the French Right to the traditionally significant place from which it slipped in the wartime period, Gaullism constitutes one of the most interesting political developments in post-war France, and one well worthy of examination.

Since De Gaulle *is* the R.P.F. for all practical purposes, any study of this movement and its ideas should properly begin with at least a cursory glance at the General's background and career up to the present time. Born at Lille in 1890 of a family in the scholarly tradition, Charles de Gaulle developed early the ambition to become a soldier and in 1910 entered the military academy at St. Cyr, where, significantly enough, his main cultural interest was history and especially the career of Napoleon. After the First World War he served abroad for a number of years in various military capacities and for a time was aide-de-camp to General Pétain. During the thirties De Gaulle became an ardent advocate of mechanization in warfare. Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939 he was appointed commander of the tank formations of the Fifth Army in Lorraine, receiving the rank of Brigadier General just before the German offensive of May 1940. In June, amid the chaos of defeat, Reynaud called him to Paris and appointed him Under Secretary of State for War. Determined to continue the struggle, De Gaulle almost immediately broke with Pétain and Weygand and on June 18, the day following the French request for the armistice, he arrived in England and set about organizing the Free French.

De Gaulle's exploits during the war are too well known to require reiteration here; nor are they particularly pertinent to the purposes of the present study. It may be recalled in passing, however, that he frequently displayed a penchant for unilateral action that on several occasions caused the Allies no little embarrassment.[1] These demonstrations of un-coöperativeness

[1] As for instance the St. Pierre and Miquelon incident. An excellent account of these wartime difficulties with De Gaulle is to be found in William L. Langer's *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York, 1947).

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which at times amounted to egotistical high-handedness were the first public manifestations of one of De Gaulle's most characteristic traits, and, together with similar experiences during his term of office in the Liberation period, have led a number of observers to fear for the future of France's external relations should De Gaulle be returned to power.[2]

With the liberation of Paris in August 1944, De Gaulle was received as a national hero. The Algiers governmental organization was transferred to Paris, and the General began a period of somewhat uneasy alliance with the leftist Resistance organizations. An outward merger of the two movements took place in the interest of restoring order. But De Gaulle took precautions to ensure that there should be as few difficulties as possible with the Left extremists, and as a result the transfer of effective authority from the Resistance groups to the Gaullist-predominated government took place with remarkable smoothness. The Provisional Government was proclaimed on September 9, 1944.

The apparent ease with which De Gaulle secured the assistance of the Left in these early stages was due to a number of factors, chief among which was his personal stature as the leading figure of the Resistance. Almost equally important was the universal desire for the restoration of order. But this early coöperative spirit soon weakened; in the year that followed, the Left began to break away from De Gaulle as it became increasingly apparent that he was definitely rightist in sentiment. The first serious clash between Right and Left appeared in the elections for the first Constituent Assembly in October 1945: between De Gaulle, at that time backed by the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* [M.R.P.], and the Communist-led opposition. Heretofore there had been, outwardly at least, a fusion; differences between Right and Left had been virtually suspended in the effort to reëstablish the Republic. But, inevitably, the October elections revealed these differences, and De Gaulle's support began to slip away as his rightist inclinations became ever more apparent. It is worth noting, however, that as late as the date

[2] In *Le Populaire* of November 4, 1948, Léon Blum asserted that De Gaulle is "Stalin's candidate for power in France", for similar reasons.

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of these elections both the contending forces were endorsed. While the Left obtained an overwhelming victory, in the referendum that accompanied the voting De Gaulle himself received an impressive vote of confidence. But in the next few months he proceeded to destroy much of this support, and further alienated the Communists by refusing their demands for one of the three key ministries and in denouncing them roundly in a radio address to the nation. In so doing he relinquished his rôle of symbolic leader of the whole of France and stepped into the arena of party politics as the leader of the anti-Communist faction—thus rendering his ultimate defeat inevitable; for the pivotal Socialists were forced to choose between De Gaulle and at least the semblance of leftist unity. De Gaulle resigned from the government in January 1946.

Some five months after this ostensible retirement from public life, the General on June 17 made known his views in a speech at Bayeux. These ideas were essentially the same as those advanced by the R.P.F. today, and center on constitutional revision. After denouncing the Communists, De Gaulle called for a régime in which political power would not depend upon the vagaries of party politics. He demanded effective popular sovereignty, the separation and "balance" of government powers, the "continuity of the state", and a federalized statutory organization for the French Union. In foreign affairs he looked forward to a federal association of all Europe, while on the question of the future of Germany he favored a loose federal structure of separate states which would form part of the greater plan for Europe.

In thus making public his ideas, De Gaulle gave renewed energy to his small band of devoted followers—the nucleus of the future R.P.F. Partly as a result of Communist successes in the June elections, and partly because of the adherence of the M.R.P. to *tripartisme* to which De Gaulle objected, the "Gaullist Union" was organized in August 1946 to perpetuate Gaullist ideas. This group, presided over by René Capitant, onetime Minister of Education, announced its adhesion to the principle of constitutional revision and to the ideas put forward in the Bayeux speech, also making patriotic reference to "the

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eternal principles of 1789." By the fall of 1946, according to M. Capitant, the Gaullist Union had obtained some 500,000 followers, had gained the support of twenty-two deputies, and was regarded sympathetically by some sixty others.[3] This support came from diverse political affiliations, including the *Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Resistance,* the M.R.P., and the *Parti Républicain de la Liberté,* while the movement's main opposition came of course from the Communist camp. In the elections to the National Assembly of November 10, 1946, the Gaullist Union obtained nine seats and 3.1 per cent of the total vote.[4]

This preliminary organization devoted to De Gaulle's ideas was established by his followers; De Gaulle himself took the next step. The R.P.F. was organized following the General's celebrated speech at Strasbourg on April 7, 1947. Reiterating the ideas he first made public in the Bayeux speech of the year before, De Gaulle called upon the people to " rally " around him for the salvation of France, asserting that the R.P.F. was not a political party but rather a rallying point for those who, like himself, felt that the constitution should be revised. He pointed out that the present constitution had been accepted by nine million voters, but was rejected by an almost equal number, eight millions, and that eight other millions had not even voted. Hence it could not be considered as an expression of the will of the people. De Gaulle demanded the creation of a strong presidency, and called on the people to abandon the " sterile game " of party politics.

Reaction in the party press was immediate. The Communist *L'Humanité* was as usual the most violent, and called for vigilance in defense of the Republic. The Socialist *Populaire* commented: " The régime desired by the President of the Rally of the French People is that of a single party, such as we have seen functioning on the other side of the frontier "; [5] while the M.R.P.'s *L'Aube* expressed a similar concern:

[3] *Le Monde,* September 14, 1946.

[4] *Ibid.,* November 12, 1946.

[5] Quoted in *The Christian Science Monitor,* April 15, 1947.

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> As regards the Rally of the French People, we will go on asking . . . exactly what its character is. . . . To invite all French men and women to join him in the R.P.F.—isn't this, in fact, the formation of a new party, opposing and substituting itself for all others, and which would eventually become . . . the only party? [6]

Although De Gaulle and his supporters continued to deny that they were forming a new party, an organization suspiciously similar to the usual pattern of French political parties rapidly developed. A central Executive Committee, nominated by De Gaulle, was set up in Paris; a National Council was planned; and departmental groups soon began to form. The usual hierarchical pattern emerged, with small local groups, or *ilots*, of five or six members (corresponding to the "cells" of the Communist organization) at the bottom of the pyramid. In the National Assembly a parliamentary "intergroup" of Gaullists took shape under a steering committee led by Paul Giacobbi of the *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines* and including representatives of other parties such as Godin of the Radical Socialists and Michelet of the M.R.P. This intergroup, calling itself "Action for a Real Democracy", soon totaled some fifty-five deputies, with four members of the Council of the Republic. It should be noted here that this parliamentary body did not obtain representation on the R.P.F. Executive Committee until the reorganization of that committee in June 1949; and it must be borne in mind that even today there are no R.P.F. deputies in the National Assembly, in the strict sense, since the last national elections were held in the fall of 1946, before the formation of the R.P.F. The "Gaullist party" in the National Assembly is merely a group of deputies (according to a long-standing French parliamentary practice) sympathetic to Gaullist ideas but elected as members of other parties, in accordance with the R.P.F. principle of double allegiance.

During the summer of 1947, dues-paying membership in the new movement mounted rapidly, reaching a reported million and a half by mid-August. The first Gaullist party organ, *L'Etincelle*, made its appearance.

[6] *Ibid.*

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The municipal elections of October 19 and 26, 1947 were the first tests of the R.P.F.—and the new movement made startling gains. Either on its own account or as part of various coalitions, the R.P.F. received 38.6 per cent of the total vote.[7] In the Paris municipal council, for instance, the R.P.F. gained some fifty of the ninety contested seats, while the Communists came out a poor second with twenty-seven. The Gaullist gains were largely from the Center and "classic Right" parties, with the M.R.P. and Radicals losing most heavily. Most interesting, however, was the apparent fact that a considerable part of the Gaullist support came from the Left. A French writer, Jacques Fauvet, has clearly described this unexpected development:

> The moderates, Radicals and M.R.P. taken together account for 33.2% of the votes. However, the R.P.F. received 38.6%. Where did the remaining 5.4% [actually, some 14% of the Gaullist vote] come from, if not from the Left, from Socialists and Communists who together lost exactly that percentage? This is the most striking aspect of the October elections. . . . It might have been imagined that the Socialist-Communist setback would consist of a dual transfer of votes: from the Communists to the Socialists and from the Socialists to the R.P.F. This did happen, but not in all cases. In many instances, the people of the suburbs of Paris, who had formerly voted Communist, voted for the R.P.F. This clearly shows that the working-class voters also feel the need for order and hard work.[8]

Fauvet goes on to point out that in these elections the Right, which in his view includes the M.R.P., the traditional "moderates", Left Republican dissidents, and Gaullists drawn from the three major parties, had become the predominant political force with approximately 43.1 per cent of the votes. The Communists and their affiliates remained, as before, the major opposition, although somewhat reduced in strength because of defections to the R.P.F., with some 29.3 per cent; while the Center was reduced to the weakest position of all, with only

[7] Jacques Fauvet, "The Supporters of the R.P.F. in the Recent Municipal Elections", *Une Semaine dans le Monde*, October 25, 1947. It should be noted that Fauvet is a Gaullist sympathizer.

[8] *Ibid.*

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some 28.7 per cent of the votes. "Thus, France still has three groups of which the weakest, this time, is the Center."

Desirous of winning mass support, De Gaulle continued his practice of making frequent public appearances. On January 4, 1948, he spoke to an assembly of workmen at St. Etienne, calling for stabilization and the restoration of order, retrenchment in government expenditures, and increased effort to step up production in all fields. As had become his unvarying practice, he called for new elections in order to allow the people to bring in a government "in harmony with their will." On March 7 he spoke at a political rally at Compiègne, affirming that the governmental régime was too weak to deal effectively with France's grave problems, and asking the United States to guarantee the military security of Western Europe, just as the Marshall Plan was intended to support economic recovery. Again De Gaulle appealed to the people to put him back in power. In March and April, René Pleven, onetime Minister of Finance in De Gaulle's provisional government, made several efforts to bring about a rapprochement between the parties of the "Third Force" and the R.P.F., but these efforts met with little support on either side. Characteristically, De Gaulle was opposed to political compromise and party alliances.

On April 16, 1948, some two thousand delegates assembled at Marseille for the first National Congress of the R.P.F. Marseille was chosen, in a gesture of defiance, as it was considered to be a stronghold of communism. Extensive precautions were taken by the police to forestall a possible outbreak of violence, as the Communists were holding a rally of their own a short distance away, but there were no disturbances. It is interesting to note that De Gaulle's major address, on April 17, drew an audience of some 100,000, while the Communists attracted only 15,000. As usual, De Gaulle called for new elections and in speaking of foreign affairs again asserted that the United States should join with Europe in a political and strategic guarantee—which he considered should be a "reciprocal" arrangement.

As time passed, the General's political opponents began to feel that the danger of R.P.F. success was diminishing. The Communist-inspired strikes had been defeated, the government

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was having greater success in establishing order and stability, and economic recovery was progressing favorably with the aid of the Marshall Plan. As the threat of a Communist *coup* waned, it was believed that De Gaulle's support would lessen. There was, nevertheless, some apprehension concerning his chances in the coming elections to the Council of the Republic —fears which subsequently proved to be well founded.

In July, De Gaulle began a speaking tour of the principal Resistance centers, seeking recruits. (It will be observed that he has consistently followed a policy of keeping himself before the public eye, in true Napoleonic tradition.) Shortly thereafter the R.P.F. virtually abandoned its pretensions of being non-political, in announcing on August 20 that it would present candidates, on a straight R.P.F. ticket, in the forthcoming elections. These, the municipal elections of October 17, 1948, again resulted in considerable gains for the R.P.F. As might be expected in local elections, independents played a large part: Socialists, independent socialists, and independent radicals taken together received some 47 per cent of the vote. The Gaullists did well, however, with 13 per cent; the M.R.P. receiving only 9 per cent and the Communists 10 per cent.[9] The R.P.F. announced, further, that the official figures as regards their showing "did not correspond with reality," in so far as many candidates sympathetic to Gaullism were elected as members of other parties under the R.P.F.'s policy of double membership.

The elections to the Council of the Republic, held on November 7, were a more clear-cut victory for the R.P.F., which almost gained a majority in this body. On November 16, after most of the overseas votes were in, the Gaullists claimed 140 of the Council's 300-odd seats.[10] This was followed on November 18 by a further minor triumph when Pierre de Gaulle, the General's brother, was reëlected Mayor of Paris.

With these successes the R.P.F. again demanded new elections which at that time appeared quite possible, since the price-wage situation was becoming acute. In line with the new R.P.F. policy of self-assertion as a distinct political entity, the National

[9] *The Christian Science Monitor,* October 18, 1948.

[10] *New York Herald-Tribune,* November 16, 1948.

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Assembly intergroup changed its title from the old "Action for a Real Democracy" to a more forthright one: "For the Rally of the French People". On December 7, when the Council of the Republic convened, an interesting incident occurred. As might be expected, the R.P.F. group was assigned to seats on the right of the chamber. Refusing to accept this interpretation of their political color, the Gaullists demanded a position between the Socialists and the M.R.P. and left the chamber, leaving one man to vote for them. This small but revealing dispute was settled two days later when in a conciliatory mood the Chamber allowed the R.P.F. a position in the center.

In his New Year's message of January 6, 1949, De Gaulle prophesied that 1949 would be a decisive year, and asserted that victory would come to the R.P.F. either by the ballot box or by the "impact of events", thus repeating vague allusions that he had begun to make in recent months. At a press conference on October 1 he had stated that "If the people are not consulted and if the country drifts into a state of collapse and illegitimacy, I reserve until then what is to follow." [11] This kind of statement was a new departure for the General, and, of course, gave renewed energy to his opponents' accusations of dictatorial tendencies. It led many to believe that he was counting on a major catastrophe to set the stage for a seizure of power, although such suggestions were of course rejected by the movement.

In January 1949 De Gaulle met with Georges Bidault, and it was hoped in some quarters that coöperation between the M.R.P. and the R.P.F. might result, but, as was the case in similar previous attempts, no agreement was reached. The seemingly endless state of confusion in the public finances, added to the fear of communism, continued to constitute De Gaulle's greatest asset, although by this time Communist influence was noticeably declining.

The second annual National Congress of the R.P.F. opened at Lille, the General's birthplace, on February 11, 1949. Jacques Soustelle, the secretary-general of the movement, pledged the

[11] *New York Times*, October 2, 1948.

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R.P.F. to a program of two main lines: intensification of the fight against the "separatists" (as the Gaullists call the Communists), and refusal to coöperate or make any truce with the parties of the Third Force, which were declared to be moribund. On the following day De Gaulle himself gave the major address of the Congress, and again hinted that he might be forced to take power by other than democratic means: that in some extremes "there would be only one thing to do—to drive out the usurpers."[12] He again called for power, affirming that the R.P.F. was the only bulwark against communism.

The next electoral test of the R.P.F. came in the departmental council elections of March 20 and 27. The government-bloc parties combined before the second round of voting in choosing a candidate most likely to defeat a Gaullist or a Communist, and succeeded in obtaining 544 of the 783 contested positions. The R.P.F., nevertheless, secured 219 seats, while the Communists obtained only twenty.[13] In winning these seats De Gaulle gained a personal success, as they were obtained against the best efforts of the Communists and combined government forces. At a press conference shortly thereafter De Gaulle naturally claimed this as a victory for the R.P.F.; at this same press conference he let drop an ominous sounding phrase: ". . . when the Rally of the French People is master. . . ."

In June there came a partial reorganization of the movement which added credence to assertions of the year before that the Gaullists were abandoning their pretensions of being nonpolitical and were preparing to accept status as a regular party. It was announced that some members of the Executive Committee would be replaced by Gaullist members of the National Assembly, thus affording the parliamentary group representation in the party's highest council, which was to be renamed the "steering committee". Furthermore, the principle of double membership was partially abandoned. As a Gaullist deputy put it, the R.P.F. would henceforth stress the "Rally tendencies over the party tendencies." For some time before this announcement other parties had begun to insist upon putting an end to double

[12] *New York Times*, February 13, 1949.

[13] *New York Herald-Tribune*, March 28, 1949.

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allegiance and to require their members to abandon their adhesion to what was believed to be merely another party.

On September 25, 1949, De Gaulle spoke at Bordeaux, dealing largely with foreign affairs. He affirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty had become greatly weakened by the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb, and pointed out that under the terms of the treaty the United States was not obliged to come to France's aid. He again demanded union around his person for the salvation of Europe, and belittled the efforts of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, asserting that that body had no mandate from the people. Interestingly enough, shortly after this De Gaulle's demands for new elections became gradually less strenuous and frequent. Announcements issuing from a three-day session of the R.P.F. National Council in October seemed to indicate that the Gaullists were now willing to wait until the date set by law for the next elections to the National Assembly (November 1951). But De Gaulle reaffirmed his readiness to take action and assume command if any eventuality should make such action necessary.[14]

The election campaign was apparently tacitly declared open, for early this year De Gaulle began on his most vigorous political tour, one in which he proposed to visit every one of the Departments. After the political crisis in which the Socialists walked out of the Bidault cabinet, De Gaulle, on February 11, 1950, offered to join a " caretaker " government, implying that this government should hold new elections as soon as possible by making clear that he could not participate in any effort to extend the life of the present régime. Bidault rejected the offer, recalling De Gaulle's uncoöperative characteristics. But the General had made this suggestion in tones quite different from his usual loud demands for dissolution. In this speech, at the Velodrome d'Hiver, De Gaulle was quieter and calmer, emphasizing the democratic aspects of his movement, and avoided castigating the Bidault government directly.

At the time of writing, De Gaulle is reported to feel confident that if elections were to be held in the next few months, the R.P.F. would obtain some 300 seats in the National Assem-

[14] *Le Monde*, October 4, 1949.

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bly. This figure may, of course, be partly discounted as political propaganda; but other estimates place his chances at somewhere around 200 seats,[15] which, in the National Assembly, are a sizable bloc. It would be insufficient to command a majority (which is unheard of in France anyway), but would be large enough to drive the Socialists and Communists together on many issues.

Evidently, then, the R.P.F. is a political force of very great importance in France today. It appears to be the French manifestation of the general trend toward the Right recently observed in many countries of the Western World. The overriding fear of communism, coupled with a universal feeling of insecurity, has led many moderate-thinking Frenchmen to adhere to a movement which is definitely rightist in sentiment. De Gaulle's followers come from all shades of political opinion, but the greater part of them have come, not only from the traditionally rightist elements, but from the center and right-center groups, notably the M.R.P. To quote again from Jacques Fauvet, after the municipal elections of 1947: "only a corps of the old popular democrats and young workers remained faithful to the Popular Republican Movement. All its other supporters went over to the R.P.F. where they found what they had been looking for in the M.R.P.: *a refuge and a bulwark.*" [16] De Gaulle has succeeded in large part in creating a "mystique", a dynamism of wide appeal which other parties, except perhaps the Communists, lack. His movement had also developed tendencies disturbingly reminiscent of some elements of fascism, tendencies which have not passed unnoticed by his opponents. Among these may be included De Gaulle's concept of his rôle as the savior of France and Europe; the development of an esoteric Gaullist vocabulary (in which, for instance, followers are called "companions"); the general fuzziness and unrealistic nature of many of his projects; and, of course, the continued appeal to the masses for support. On the other hand it may be stated with some certainty that De Gaulle, for all his authoritarian nature, is very unlikely ever to become a dictator

[15] *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 13, 1950.

[16] Jacques Fauvet, *loc. cit.* (italics mine).

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of the Hitler-Mussolini type. De Gaulle is primarily a patriot, with a patriotism that approaches fanaticism. As has been so often said of him, he is an enigma, a paradox. A closer examination of some of the salient features of Gaullism will help to support these generalizations.

Gaullist doctrine, as noted above, centers on constitutional revision. Party politics and weak, unstable coalition governments have always been the object of De Gaulle's major attacks. He feels, quite justifiably, that such governments cannot provide the strong leadership that France needs today. De Gaulle repeatedly stresses the idea that executive power should come as a mandate from the people and should not rest in the hands of cabinets which are the result of shaky political compromise. In keeping with these convictions the R.P.F. advocates a régime patterned after the American presidential system. On November 6, 1948, the Gaullist weekly *Le Rassemblement* published a table which compared the present French system with the American and outlined the R.P.F. plan which in many respects followed American practice. The President would be elected by the people and not by the Assembly, and would have the power to appoint and dismiss ministers. There would be two legislative bodies, with almost equal powers, as in the United States. Proportional representation would be replaced by the straight majority vote. As to the relations between the powers, the government would be responsible to Parliament and Parliament would be responsible to the people. In case of conflict between the President and Parliament, the President would have the power to dissolve the Assembly and refer the dispute to the people, which, of course, amounts to placing paramount authority in the hands of the executive. It should be noted that these proposals were expressed in vague and general terms, and appear to reveal a degree of confusion between the American presidential system and the English parliamentary one. For instance, the President is to be elected independently of the Assembly; then there is the statement that the government (that is, the executive) shall be responsible to the Assembly—and yet shall have the power to dissolve it if the two do not agree. There would seem to be an inherent contradiction here. And

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ultimate decisions in controversial matters are to rest with "the sovereign people", apparently not with their elected representatives. This of course reflects the Gaullist predilection for the plebiscite and referendum. The R.P.F.'s constitutional ideas appear to be somewhat confused.

In social questions the Gaullist program frequently appears unrealistic. Here the central idea is De Gaulle's "association" scheme, which is strongly reminiscent of Fascist corporatism, although this is stoutly denied by the General and his followers. The scheme is best summarized in De Gaulle's own (though somewhat complicated!) words:

> What do we mean by "association"? First, in any given group of enterprises, all those who are part of it, the leaders and the workers' representatives, would, under a system of organized arbitration, fix together, as equals, all working conditions, especially wages. They would fix these in such a way that everybody, from the employer or director down to the hand laborer, would receive, under the law and, above all, according to a scale based upon hierarchy, a remuneration proportionate to the total output of the enterprise.
>
> Thus, the elements of moral order which give dignity to every occupation, that is, authority in those who direct, love of work well done in the workers, and professional excellence in all, would be given their full value, because they would determine output. . . .
>
> Then, within each industry and profession, a new mentality would be born, one that is based neither upon the exploitation of one group by another nor upon the class struggle.
>
> Once French activity has been rendered coherent through association, its representatives should be incorporated into the State. . . .[17]

This last idea, that of incorporating the representatives of labor and industry in the machinery of government, aroused such widespread cries of "Fascism!" that it was subsequently dropped, at least from public view. Labor's reception of these ideas has been cool. Léon Jouhaux, a prominent old-line labor leader and head of the *Force Ouvrière*, commented that in con-

[17] Speech at St. Etienne, January 4, 1948.

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sidering the association scheme he did not know "whether to laugh or cry." Almost the only Gaullist idea in the labor field that receives any degree of support is the proposal to abolish political control of the unions.

Since his speech at Compiègne on March 7, 1948, De Gaulle has devoted increasing attention to foreign affairs. Briefly, here his major aim is to restore France to her ancient position of leadership on the Continent in taking the initiative in organizing a federation of Europe, of which federation Paris would be the capital city. The General feels the Council of Europe, as presently constituted, to be a "fable", and believes that the process of organizing a federation can be begun only with a vast referendum of the free peoples of Europe.[18] He has been bitterly opposed to the allied policy with regard to Germany, seeing the establishment of the Bonn government as a threat to France and Europe, and regretted that "the attitude of certain of France's great allies has prevented France's policy on Germany from being accepted." De Gaulle had proposed that Germany be organized as a loose confederation of separate states, as part of his larger plan for Europe. This organization of Europe, as he remarked in his speech at Lille on February 12, 1949, would of course "require that France herself be at the head of whatever is to be done." The General has generally supported the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact, but he feels the latter to be inadequate, having wished its terms to be "binding on all parties to act automatically in the event of aggression." There is a nationalistic tinge in all of De Gaulle's pronouncements on foreign affairs which is the inevitable outcome of his extremely patriotic nature. Many of his proposals in the international sphere have the same unrealistic and idealistic quality as do some of his social projects—notably the association scheme.

It has been frequently remarked that, aside from André Malraux, De Gaulle has not attracted men of outstanding stature and ability to his movement. Intellectuals have generally regarded the R.P.F. with indifference if not with outright hostility. This may in part be due to the long-standing fear, on the part of the French, of the plebiscite (much favored by

[18] Speech at Bordeaux, September 25, 1949.

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De Gaulle) as a political device—a fear harking back to the times of Napoleon III and General Boulanger. All too frequently De Gaulle's plans and ideas do not withstand critical analysis and for this reason, if for no other, can scarcely be expected to appeal to people of above-average intelligence and ability.

Curiously enough, the General's two right-hand men, Jacques Soustelle and André Malraux, both came to him from the extreme Left. Soustelle, the secretary-general of the R.P.F and De Gaulle's second-in-command, is an ex-professor (a Sorbonne-trained ethnologist) and onetime member of a pre-war leftist association, the "Vigilance Committee of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals". During the war he joined De Gaulle's Free French organization and became its Minister of Information. André Malraux, charged with Gaullist propaganda, is a writer and a true intellectual. A Communist before the war, he fought in the Chinese Nationalist revolution of 1927 and in the Spanish civil war, finally breaking with communism at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. Active in the operations of the French underground, he met De Gaulle in 1945 and the two became fast friends. Jacques Baumel, in charge of R.P.F. domestic policy, also played an important part in Resistance activities. Other fairly well-known figures of the R.P.F. include Gaston Palewski, in charge of foreign affairs; Pasteur Vallery-Radot, who looks after "intellectual questions"; and, in the parliamentary group, Paul Giacobbi of the *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines,* its president, and Edmond de Michelet of the M.R.P.

Whatever the intellectual qualities of Gaullism, whatever its shortcomings, it must be conceded that the R.P.F. is a strong political force in France today, and one that merits attention. Some of De Gaulle's projects, such as the desire to strengthen the executive power of the government and to eliminate much of the political confusion and instability that has troubled France for so many years, are praiseworthy; others, such as the association scheme and the plan to federalize Europe under France's lead, are impractical and visionary—at least at present. Then there are the undesirable aspects of the Gaullist movement: its

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authoritarian nature; nationalistic tendencies which are sometimes manifested in an anti-British and anti-American spirit; and, finally, the probability that, should De Gaulle be returned to power with the authority he demands, France's relations with her allies would suffer as a consequence of his assertive and uncompromising qualities.

A balance sheet of a sort can be drawn up for De Gaulle. On the credit side, he is in the great tradition of European civilization and is no brash parvenu. He is absolutely honest. He is a patriot, and his first concern is undoubtedly the welfare of France (and not personal power *per se*, as his enemies so often allege). But there is also a debit side, and here can be placed his defects of character which may be summed up as arrogance, stubbornness, and an excessive egotism. His almost sublime faith in his mission to "save" France has led to the development of a sort of mysticism which surrounds his movement and which, among other things, has tended to alienate people of superior ability.

The danger of Gaullism lies in the possibility that it may divide France into two, rather than the present and traditional three, major blocs. It is impossible to believe that De Gaulle will succeed in uniting the whole of France behind him. But should the Gaullists continue to draw support away from the Center, as they have been doing, it is not impossible that after the next elections two hostile and intransigent groups will face each other in the National Assembly over the negligible remains of the Center. And, with political feelings as sharp, and cleavages as deep, as they are in France, the results could hardly fail to be disastrous.

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CHILE: A COMMUNIST BATTLEGROUND

I

SINCE the formation of the Chilean Popular Front in 1936, the Communists have played a crucial rôle in the political life of Chile. Communists have come closer there than anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere to controlling a national government. Until very recently they have been steadily expanding their influence among Chilean voters, in government, and in organized labor. Gabriel González Videla, currently president of Chile, owed his election in 1946 to the support of the Communists, then the major ally of his Radical party. In need of their coöperation in Congress and in his new administration, González thereupon appointed three Communists to his cabinet. This recognition of their widespread influence climaxed a quarter-century of persistent Communist agitation and campaigning in Chile.

Since the Communists' triumphant ride into power, however, their position and the entire political complexion of the González administration have changed. Although outlawed in September 1948, the Communists continue to be a pivotal force in national politics. Since that time Chile has been the scene of attempted revolution, economic crisis, and widespread disturbances reflected in strikes, riots and violent demonstrations. In this colorful but tragic situation, many observers see the continued impact of Communist influence. To be sure, since 1948 the Communist party has lost the surface evidences of political power, but to equate these setbacks with a permanent decline in their actual or potential strength in Chile may be dangerously misleading.

In the years 1937 to 1946 the Communists achieved more formal political power and prestige in Chile than anywhere in the Americas.[1] Carlos Contreras Labarca, the architect of the party's victories, outshone his more celebrated counterpart in

[1] Communists have also been notably successful in Cuba and Brazil.

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Brazil, Luis Carlos Prestes. Before 1934 the party was of little practical importance. By 1946 it was the strongest party in the ranks of organized labor and one of the four leading political parties in the Republic. Communist progress in Chile assumed special importance to the United States when its relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate after World War II.

More than the result of pure coincidence, Communist triumphs were the fruit of years of hard work and skillful political maneuvering. President González was the third successive president to be elected with Communist help. For years the party has had representatives in the Chilean Congress.[2] Compared to the achievement of other Communist parties in the Western Hemisphere, the Chilean quota of 4 out of 45 senators and 16 out of 147 deputies in the Congress in 1941 was considerable.[3] In the municipal elections of 1947 the Communists polled 16.5 per cent of the vote. Actually their influence on Chilean politics has been greater than is indicated by these figures. Beside controlling the most strategic labor unions (copper, nitrate and coal), the Communists have been the center of most of the major political controversies. Other parties have frequently determined their own stand as a reaction to Communist policies. While the party has made striking gains, it has never had either the opportunity or the strength to carry through successfully a revolution in the Bolshevik style.

Like other political forces in Chile, the Communist movement is a product of the nation's own political and economic heritage. Led not by foreigners but by Chileans, the party believes its program is the solution to the problems growing out of this heritage. In this sense it is nationalist. Yet the Communist program itself is not based on original formulations of

[2] In the 1921 elections, 2 deputies (elected as Socialist Labor deputies, adopted Communist label in 1922); in 1924, none were elected; in 1925, 5 deputies, 1 senator; in 1932, Stalinites had 2 deputies, and the Trotskyites 1 deputy, 1 senator; in 1937, 6 deputies, 1 senator; in 1941, 16 deputies, 3 senators; in 1945, 15 deputies, 3 senators; in 1949, none were elected under the Communist label. Under the Constitution of 1925 a senator's term of office is eight years, a deputy's four.

[3] *Anuario DIC 1946,* Santiago, 1946, is the most convenient single source of statistics on recent elections. Because of a technicality the Communist party registered in elections under the name *Progresista Nacional* until January 1947. Actually, the party has consistently been referred to as Communist even in official publications.

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the national leaders, but on Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The party's tactics and objectives are part of a broad international pattern and, in this sense, it is internationalist. An examination of its origins in their national and international aspects will be helpful in understanding the rapid expansion of its influence and its unusual vitality.

Until the twentieth century, Chile was almost exclusively an agricultural country. Most of the land, divided among a few aristocratic families, was worked by the largest social group, the peasants.[4] At the turn of the century, however, mining ventures, promoted and owned by foreign capital, began to attract labor from the large estates. In the northern deserts, rich in copper and nitrate deposits, rapidly growing mining settlements transformed peasants into industrial workers, the *rotos*, thus producing a new social class. To this day the core of Chile's industrial proletariat is in the mining regions. In contrast to the security which the peasants had enjoyed in terms of something to eat and a place to stay, the *rotos* were completely dependent on their meager wages. Frequently jobs were scarce and unemployment widespread in the new mining settlements. When the workers did have jobs, the pay was low and their hours long. Discontented with their lot, many members of this new industrial proletariat sought desperately for a solution, however radical, to their economic insecurity and low living standards. Resentment against the existing social order, in which they had so little opportunity for effective political expression, was channeled into strikes and riots and into the formation of the Chilean Communist party.

Luis Recabarren, a printer by trade, a revolutionary at heart, Chile's self-styled defender of the "common man", and the leader of extremist groups in the north, became the founder of the Chilean Communist party. For years he had tramped up and down the northern deserts and the central valley of Chile, preaching hatred of the landlords, the church, and the foreign capitalists. For his efforts to incite revolt, which frequently resulted in bloody strikes and riots, Recabarren was punished by prison sentences and by exile to Argentina or Europe. Ironi-

[4] See George M. McBride, *Chile: Land and Society* (New York, 1936).

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cally, enforced exile in Europe enabled him to meet the leading revolutionaries of his day. Presumably, Recabarren had some direct contact with V. I. Lenin, the future leader of the Soviet Revolution, as early as 1908 at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels.[5] During the first two decades of this century, Recabarren and his followers were bitter and hunted revolutionaries, social outcasts isolated from the seat of national power and unable to form a strong and stable organization with broad and firm contacts with the masses.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, the repercussions of this event were felt even in distant Chile. Unsuccessful at home, Chilean revolutionaries gained new faith and hope for their cause from the victories of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Soon after the founding of the Communist International in 1919, the Chilean Socialist Labor party, as Recabarren's group was called, began to consider joining it. Attracted by the Comintern's program and by hopes for support, moral if not also material, the Socialist Labor party resolved to become the Chilean Section of the Communist International on January 1, 1922 in the city of Rancagua.[6] Shortly thereafter, Recabarren went to Soviet Russia to the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern. Beginning in 1922 these Chilean revolutionaries bore the name Communist, dedicated their energies to the cause of the Comintern, and went to the Soviet Union for training and to attend congresses of the Third International.[7] International communism led from Moscow provided Recabarren not only with a clearer formulation of his

[5] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* (*Works*) (Leningrad, 1935, 3d ed.), vol. XII, p. 352. Although Lenin does not mention Recabarren by name in this reference, Recabarren, who was the leader of the party mentioned by Lenin, was in Europe at this time. This and other evidence suggest that Recabarren had some contact with Lenin in 1908.

[6] *Federación Obrera*, Santiago, January 3, 1922, p. 1.

[7] Representatives of the Chilean party attended the Fourth (1922), the Sixth (1928), and the Seventh (1935) Congresses of the Comintern. Elías Lafertte was an early visitor to the Soviet Union (*Justicia*, Santiago, March 17, 1932, p. 1). Carlos Contreras Labarca spent nearly a year there (*Frente Popular*, Santiago, November 7, 1936, p. 2). A photograph of a homecoming from the Soviet Union, showing Elías Lafertte and Andrés Escobar, appeared in *El Siglo*, Santiago, July 10, 1941, p. 1. Pablo Neruda, the famous poet and Communist senator who fled from Chile in 1948, was recently honored in the Soviet Union (*Pravda*, June 9, 1949, p. 1).

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aims in Chile, but also with a concrete program for achieving them. Embracing these ideals was made easier because Recabarren and his supporters found them a convenient vehicle for promoting their political ambitions and the material interests of the group they represented.

II

In Chile, as in many other Latin-American countries, certain peculiar features of the economy provide convenient targets for Communist propaganda. The major industries, nitrate and copper, which furnish most of the exports, thereby providing foreign exchange for essential imports, are owned by foreign companies. When these industries are forced to restrict production as in the case of nitrate during the last depression, a large segment of the population is left without employment. Even more important, because these industries provide such a large part of the national income, especially with respect to foreign exchange, their breakdown brings prostration to the entire economy.[8] Rightly or wrongly, many Chileans blame the foreign owners for these economic dislocations. Since many patriotic Chileans would prefer to see these basic industries owned and administered by Chileans, the Communist campaign against " foreign imperialists " readily finds a sympathetic audience. In view of the recent Communist attitude toward the United States, it is especially significant that these companies are now controlled by North American capital.

In the second place, Chilean agriculture, which employs more Chileans than any other occupation, is controlled by a small landowning class, frequently referred to as the Chilean aristocracy.[9] Although there are some small independent farmers in Chile, there is no large and prosperous rural middle class comparable to that found in the United States, capable of serving as a bulwark against communism. Living standards are

[8] The total value of Chilean exports fell from a high of $276 million in 1929 to $35 million in 1932. *Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1938* (Washington, 1939), p. 224.

[9] In 1936—and there have been no sweeping land reforms since then—over 68 per cent of the agricultural lands were held in estates of 1,000 hectares and over. Alberto Baltra, *Política Económica* (Santiago, 1947), p. 292. See also McBride, *op. cit.*

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miserably low by United States standards. Sickness, malnutrition, a high mortality rate, and alcoholism are prevalent. Many workers and a few peasants are quite naturally influenced by Communist charges that "foreign imperialists" and the "feudal oligarchy" are responsible for this unhappy state of affairs.

These and similar conditions are common to many Latin-American nations where Communist efforts have failed. What distinguishes Chile most of all is her tradition of personal liberty. Chile has had a long and stable political development (especially before 1925), and, in comparison with other Latin-American countries, freedom of religion, of speech and of association has prevailed in large measure. Except for repression during the Ibáñez régime (1927-1931), which struck at Communist and non-Communist parties alike, Communist activity was allowed to develop within the legal framework until 1948. Another factor contributing to Communist success is the comparatively high cultural level of Chileans. Chile does not have to overcome any inertia such as that found among the repressed and primitive Indian masses of Mexico and Peru. Despite its low living standard, Chile's high level of literacy is surpassed in Latin America by only a few countries such as Argentina and Costa Rica.[10] Chileans are better equipped by temperament and education than most Latin Americans to participate actively in political life.

Equally important in explaining Communist achievements is the political strategy which has been followed by the party since 1935. The key to these successes is found in their willingness to modify their original, extremist, revolutionary program, to form alliances with other political parties, and to capitalize on divisions among opposing parties. The first two of these techniques formed the substance of the Popular Front program, and the third was a logical sequel to the success flowing from the first two.

[10] A graphic chart showing comparative literacy figures, based on official sources, is found in George Wythe, *An Outline of Latin American Economic Development* (New York, 1946), pp. 244-45. Argentine literacy is shown at 85 per cent, Costa Rican at 82 and Chilean at 76. Rates for Mexico, Brazil and Peru are below 56 per cent. Because of methodological variations these and other Latin-American statistics on population must be examined with caution.

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In the years 1921 to 1934, the Communists were in no way moderate or conciliatory. Then they constantly stressed the revolutionary character of the party and the violent means essential to the fulfillment of their goals. Dictatorship of the proletariat was a stock slogan. Party members appeared as desperate agitators and sinister revolutionaries. Not only did the party seek to socialize all private property, but it was bitterly anticlerical. A pamphlet by Recabarren entitled *God Does Not Exist* must have shocked and offended some of the very workers Recabarren sought to convert to his cause. During these years the party's extremism was one of the causes of its exclusion from the main currents of political action. It was not until 1935, the year of the adoption of the Popular Front program, that the old extremist, revolutionary slogans were silenced.

An about-face in party policy occurred in 1935 after the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in Moscow had proclaimed the Popular Front program as the goal of its member-parties. Without a secure place in the Chilean political community, denied to them by their extreme anticlericalism and their frankly revolutionary tactics, the Communists had been unable to secure mass support. The Popular Front program was the solution proposed for this discouraging state of affairs.

Now the Communists silenced their cries for bloody revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Now, instead of appearing openly as the bitter enemies of the established framework of Chilean life, they appeared as the defenders of the nation's political and social institutions. " Imperialists " and the Chilean landowning aristocracy continued to be the main targets of the Communist attack, but that attack was couched in more conventional terms. Communist methods were purposely made orthodox and unalarming. The Communist-controlled press referred to party leaders as " the incarnation of loyalty and honesty ", as the defenders of " honor, and the people's right to life, labor, health, and culture." [11] Now the campaign was being made in terms which the people, long accustomed to accepting established values, could understand. In earlier years the Communists had constantly referred to their place in the

[11] *Frente Popular*, Santiago, March 9, 1937, p. 5.

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world-wide revolutionary movement and to the brotherhood of the oppressed classes throughout the world. Now under the Popular Front the international connections of the Communist movement were minimized. After all, Chilean workers were primarily concerned with their own interests, not those of foreign peoples. Whereas nationalist sentiments had previously been considered a reflection of "bourgeois decadence", the Communist press now proclaimed that the party leaders "love our country, our flag, and our army".[12] This modified and relatively moderate program now allowed the Communists to expand their contacts with other political parties and increase their following among Chilean workers and peasants.

A second factor in the Communists' success in Chile, and an integral part of the Popular Front program, has been the formation of alliances useful in strengthening their strategic position. Under Chile's multi-party system, in which no single party controls more than a fraction of the total vote, coalitions among parties are essential for electing a president and securing congressional majorities. Before the adoption of the Popular Front slogans the Communists had been scornful of joining with other parties for electoral or other purposes. In the 1920's they did not form any lasting coalitions with non-Communist forces.[13] Contaminating alliances with "bourgeois" groups were regarded as a betrayal of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Secretary-General Georgi Dimitrov's appeal in 1935, at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, to Communists throughout the world to join with other parties in anti-fascist blocs was a complete reversal of policy.

In the early 1920's, as a result of their refusal to make alliances with other parties and to abandon their extremist program, the Communists had elected at best only a few congressmen. After 1927, when Carlos Ibáñez assumed dictatorial powers, the Communist party, as well as other political movements, was crushed, its meetings prohibited, and its leaders exiled. When Ibáñez fell from power in 1931, partly as a re-

[12] *Frente Popular*, May 1, 1937, p. 15.

[13] The Communists supported José Santos Salas, the presidential candidate of the "Wage Earners", and some Democratic candidates for Congress in the presidential and congressional elections in 1925.

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sult of the disastrous effects of the depression on Chile, a chaotic succession of elections and palace revolutions, in which the party played no significant rôle, further prevented the Communists from regaining even their former level of congressional representation. Developments in the labor movement had been equally disastrous for the party. Formerly the Communists had been in control of the major labor federation; now they dominated but one of the many fractions into which it had disintegrated.

The split between the Trotskyites and Stalinites in the early 1930's further militated against the successful development of Communist influence. After Luis Recabarren's mysterious suicide in 1924, no single leader emerged to guide the party. Manuel Hidalgo, the leader of the Trotskyites, was an old party war horse and an associate of Recabarren. Following the Trotskyite line, Hidalgo was unable to attract as large a following as the Stalinite wing led by Elías Lafertte and Carlos Contreras Labarca. Hidalgo and his followers finally joined the new Socialist party, also bitter enemies of the Stalinite faction. The Stalinites managed to secure and maintain control of the remnants of the old Communist-dominated labor federation and received formal recognition by the Communist International. Already crippled by the repressions of the Ibáñez régime, the party had suffered further damage from this split in its forces.

After 1931 the Communist party met with strong competition within the working class. A powerful and growing Socialist party, refusing to be associated with Moscow, sprang into the political arena. Bolstered by the support of the Trotskyites and other leftist groups, the Socialists rapidly expanded their representation in Congress and their control over organized labor. The Radicals were even more successful than the Socialists. Originally on the extreme left of Chilean politics, the Radicals had moved toward the center as a consequence of the rise of the Communist and then the Socialist parties. Although the Radicals claim widespread workers' support, generally they are considered as most representative of Chile's growing middle class. The Communists' refusal to join forces with other political parties and their uncompromising extremism had failed to make them strong; perhaps this attitude had even contributed to the

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rapid growth of the Radical and Socialist parties. Thus the Communists' own weakness explains in part the adoption of the Popular Front program in 1935, calling for an alliance of the party with the Socialist and Radical parties.

The achievement of an electoral pact between these three parties was by no means an easy task. The Communists were bitter enemies of the Socialists, not only because they competed with each other for the support of the same groups, but also because the Socialists had absorbed the Trotskyites. Similarly the Radicals were not favorably disposed toward the Communists' extremist record, and had long flirted with the rightist parties. At first the Radicals and Socialists saw little profit in an alliance with the Communists. Political developments in Chile, however, made the Popular Front a useful expedient for both these parties. Although the Conservative and Liberal parties no longer occupied the political arena almost alone, they still seemed at least an even match for the parties of the Left. After the chaos that followed the collapse of the Ibáñez dictatorship in 1931, President Arturo Alessandri, a Liberal, was determined to stabilize political and economic conditions in Chile. Zealously seeking an orderly government, Alessandri had taken several measures interpreted as repressive and excessively authoritarian by the Left. Alessandri had also alienated numerous Radicals formerly sympathetic to his régime. Radicals, Socialists and Communists alike interpreted these developments as a growing threat to the working class and to their political interests. The rightist tendencies of the Alessandri government actually provided common ground for a leftist alliance in the Popular Front formed in March 1936, and made the Communists' overtures acceptable to the Radicals and Socialists.[14]

Although the Communists were the most vehement champions of this left-wing coalition, because of their own weakness they were forced to accept a subordinate rôle in a Popular Front convention called in 1938 to nominate a common presidential candidate. Both the Radicals and Socialists were allotted a larger share of the votes, and the Communists wisely allowed them to reach an agreement alone on the Popular Front candidate. Pedro

[14] John R. Stevenson, in *The Chilean Popular Front* (Philadelphia, 1942), gives a detailed account of Chilean politics during this period.

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Aguirre Cerda, a Radical, became the joint candidate of the Radical, Socialist and Communist parties and was elected by a narrow margin over the candidate of the rightist coalition. For the first time in Chilean history the Communists were partners in a victorious coalition.

Membership in the Popular Front brought many benefits to the Communists. Active association with the Radicals and Socialists provided excellent opportunities for spreading Communist doctrine and attracting new followers. Previously isolated, the Communists had been unable to widen their sphere of influence. Now after the Popular Front victory their party grew by leaps and bounds. During the Popular Front campaigns many labor organizations were united into the strong, centralized *Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile* (the CTCH), led by the Socialists and Communists, and association in this new federation helped the Communists to tighten their control over organized labor, especially in copper, nitrate and coal. As the years passed, the Communists gained even greater influence in politics and within labor groups than the Socialists. Meanwhile, they more than doubled their congressional representation from 6 deputies in 1937 to 16 in 1941.

Membership in the Popular Front was also a guarantee of continued legal existence for the Communist party. Through bitter experience they had learned how a united opposition can crush the Communist movement by electoral restrictions, by refusing to admit deputies to the Congress, and by imprisonment and exile. By contributing to Pedro Aguirre Cerda's victory, they had reasonable assurance of the administration's sympathy. Less than two years after Aguirre took office, the Communist strategy was put to a test. Liberals and Conservatives were enraged by the Popular Front victory, and especially by Communist participation in the successful alliance. With the help of small center parties, the Conservatives and Liberals managed to push through a bill outlawing the Communists. President Aguirre came to the party's rescue by vetoing the measure.

Since 1935 the Communists have sought to maintain intact a leftist coalition including themselves as partners. After the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939 the Socialists and Communists became increasingly hostile as partners within

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the Popular Front. The Communists followed an unwaveringly pro-Soviet line, now championing a policy of nonintervention against the Axis as compared to their previous policy of a United American Front against aggression. Because the Communist stand on foreign policy was highly unsatisfactory to the Socialists and because the latter feared the continued expansion of the Communists in Congress and in organized labor, the Socialists dropped out of the leftist alliance and the Popular Front was dissolved. The Communists opposed this step and fought hard to reconstitute the coalition, fearing isolation. As long as the Communists had been willing to compromise their revolutionary program and minimize their international connections, the Popular Front was workable. It collapsed when they refused to compromise on the Nazi-Soviet issue.

The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 resulted in the reconciliation of the Radicals, and to a lesser extent of the Socialists, with the Communists. Now the Communists sought to promote a broad leftist alliance in order then to join with anti-fascist elements on the right in forming a united bloc in support of the United Nations and against the Axis. To insure harmony the Communists were finally forced, in the 1942 presidential elections, to give up the candidacy of González Videla and to support a rather conservative Radical, Juan Antonio Ríos, despite his past expressions of distrust of the Communists. Desirous of the victory of an anti-Nazi candidate, the Socialists finally agreed to withdraw their own candidate and to support Ríos, who seemed more sympathetic with the United Nations than the candidate of the Right. After Ríos' election the Communists sought to maintain the unity of the Radical, Socialist and Communist parties in the "Democratic Alliance" and thus to insure the administration's support for the United Nations. In sharp contrast to the Communists' previous emphasis on class cleavages in Chilean society, the leading party slogan during the war years, "National Union", meant the collaboration of the Left and Right in an anti-fascist bloc opposing the Axis. Encouraging Conservative and Liberal support for the war efforts of the U.S.S.R. and the United Nations, the Communists declared that strikes and other

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forms of violence should be the "exception and not the rule." [15] At the same time they sought to maintain the unity of the Left even to the extent of inviting the Socialists in 1944 to merge with them in the formation of a single Marxist party. Suspicious of the Communists' support of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact from 1939 to 1941 and their wartime flirtations with the Right, the Socialists refused. During the war the Communists' coöperation with other political parties promoted Chilean support of the U.S.S.R. and the other United Nations.

Most of the Communist gains in organized labor and in politics since 1938 have been facilitated by divisions among the opposition parties. On the left the Communists' chief enemies were the Socialists. Since the Popular Front administration the Socialist party has gradually deteriorated. Personal feuds among party members, often due to disagreements over the degree of coöperation with the Communists, have resulted in splitting it into a number of quarreling factions. At the end of the war there was no longer a strong and united Socialist party in Chile. Some of the dissident Socialists even joined the Communist party. As the scene was being set for the 1946 presidential elections, the Communists had gained control of the most strategic labor unions and were the strongest single Marxist party among Chilean workers. The Communists had filled the gap left by the disintegrating Socialist forces.

Not only did the Communists profit from the division of their bitterest opponents on the left, but they also took full advantage of the inability of the Conservatives and Liberals to form a united front in the 1946 elections. Failing to agree on a common candidate, both the Conservatives and the Liberals nominated candidates for the presidency. In 1946 the left wing of the Radical party, long friendly with the Communists, gained control of their party's convention and nominated their leader, Gabriel González Videla, for president. The Communists, who had at first backed González against Ríos for the nomination in 1942, immediately threw their support behind the Radical candidate. Unable to agree either on González, since he was backed by their enemies, the Communists, or on

[15] *Unión Nacional*, Santiago, 1943, p. 70.

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either of the Right candidates, the Socialists nominated a candidate of their own in an effort to avoid further splits within the party.

In 1946, election returns clearly show how the Communist minority capitalized on the divisions among their opponents: [16]

González (Radical-Communist)	192,207
Cruz Coke (Conservative)	142,441
F. Alessandri (Liberal)	131,023
B. Ibáñez (Socialist)	12,114

Judging from the Communist vote in the previous congressional election, it is estimated that the Communists threw about 50,000 votes to González.[17] Without their support he would not have won the election. As the election totals indicate, a combined Liberal-Conservative candidate clearly could have defeated González. Because González failed to receive a majority of the votes cast, the election was referred to the Congress. After the Communists had threatened to "carry the defense of their victory at the polls to its extreme consequences",[18] González was designated the new president in the Congress with the backing of the Liberals and Socialists, as well as the Radicals and Communists. Although the Communists were only the fourth most powerful party in the Congress, they emerged after the 1946 elections second only to the Radicals in the new administration.

III

Communists in Chile have long made clear their attitudes toward the United States and Russia. In a world divided into two blocs the Communists are outspoken in their sympathies for the Soviet Union and their antipathy to the United States. Chile's foreign policy has often received more emphasis than domestic problems. In fact, party strategy has frequently sacrificed programs of domestic reform in order more effectively to

[16] Dirección del Registro Electoral, *Elección Extraordinaria de Presidente de la República Effectuada en 4 de Septiembre de 1946* (Santiago, 1946), p. 26.

[17] The Communists received 46,133 out of 449,930 votes in the 1945 congressional elections. The total vote in the 1946 presidential elections, in which votes were cast for candidates and not for parties, rose to 479,310. See footnotes 3 and 16.

[18] *El Siglo*, Santiago, September 26, 1946, p. 1.

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influence Chilean diplomacy. Frequently, the Communists have modified or compromised on domestic planks in their platform but the party has never once surrendered its pro-Soviet position.

Communists have frequently made a point of expressing their friendship for the " working people " of the United States and their praise for the leadership of Browder (now discredited), Wallace and Roosevelt (during the war years). But their treatment of elected public officials, leading industrialists and big business men has been far from cordial. During World War II when Russia and the United States were allies, the Communists were generally friendly to the United States and soft-pedaled their critical views. Before and since the war the Communists have violently opposed the United States government for its alleged " despotism " and " imperialism ". The party's press has accused Wall Street bankers of promoting war on and colonization of Latin America, and Uncle Sam of covering his hands with blood and dollars. Probably no group in Chile since 1946 has published more abusive criticism of the United States.

In foreign affairs the Chilean Communists' policy has been identical with that of the Soviet Union. In the 1930's the Communists stood firmly in favor of China against Japan, of Ethiopia against Italy, and of the Loyalist government in Spain against Franco. When the Soviet Union sought the collaboration of the Western Powers against Germany in the League of Nations, the Chilean Communists modified their attacks on the Western Powers and directed their criticism mainly against the Axis. Until the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 the Communists favored every step the United States took to support Britain and France and to insure the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. After the pact was signed, the Communists denounced United States efforts to secure the united support of Latin America behind the Allies as an attempt to drag Chile into the war. Munich has always been condemned. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Communists became the most enthusiastic supporters of hemispheric solidarity behind the United Nations and of measures directed against the Axis. After the war was over, and when United States-Soviet relations became tense, the Chilean Communists again unleashed their attacks against North American " imperialism ".

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Just as the Communists have followed the Moscow line in foreign affairs, they have long been generous in their praise of the "Soviet Fatherland". Some Communists have even said that they "have the obligation of defending the Soviet Union against all attacks".[19] They were the champions of Chilean recognition of the Soviet Union, accomplished in 1944, and the bitter opponents of the break between Chile and Russia in 1947. President González, who broke with the Communists in 1947, believed that the party was intimately linked with the Russian government. In justifying the 1947 rupture he said that "the events which have disturbed public tranquility of Chile in recent months [for example the October coal strike in the south] were caused by the instigations of international Communism exercised directly or through Chilean groups . . . directed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."[20] Some observers believed that González' action was also prompted by a desire to whip up sentiment against the Communists at home and to help guarantee his administration the diplomatic and financial support of the United States. The Communists charged the North American "imperialists" with instigating the rupture. Although the Communists have attacked most governments, including their own, at one time or another, the Soviet Union has always escaped unscathed.

Many leading Chileans, especially those with a vested interest threatened by the Communists, are convinced that the party is directly controlled from Moscow. Actually, this is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove conclusively. Whenever this charge has been leveled at the Communists in recent years, their usual retort has been that they seek the "national independence of Chile", which for them means independence from British and American "imperialist domination". The Communists do not deny that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is their theoretical guide, but here they find nothing more novel than the comparable international influence exerted by the Catholic Church or the Masons. Since the Popular Front campaign, they have noticeably minimized their international connections.

[19] Andrés Escobar, *Las Finanzas del Partido* (Santiago, 1940), p. 4.

[20] *El Mercurio*, Santiago, October 22, 1947, p. 1.

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Nevertheless, the Communists were members of the Communist International from the party's foundation in 1922 until the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. From the very first meeting in 1922, later at a party purge in 1927, and frequently since that time Comintern agents have visited Chile.[21] Many of the top party leaders have made trips to Moscow.[22] Moreover, the party's rules are a faithful reflection of many provisions in the rules of the party in the U.S.S.R. Absolute submission of the minority to majority decisions as a part of the broader principle of " democratic centralism ", the principle of self-criticism, and the structural hierarchy (Party Congresses, Conferences, the Central Committee, and so on) are common features of both parties.[23] In view of this evidence it can be concluded that Moscow probably exerts great influence over the party. Whether or not Moscow has forced Chilean Communists to conform to the party line is less significant than the fact that the party has always done so.

The Communists' program since the Popular Front has been aimed at raising the living standards of the nation's workers and peasants, ostensibly at least, through social reforms. Like politicians everywhere, the Communists must also be motivated by a desire for power. At the same time, they seem genuinely convinced that their program is the best for saving Chile and the world.

Communist effectiveness has been especially notable in the field of propaganda. From its earliest days the party has published newspapers in many regions throughout Chile. Its leading paper was the Santiago daily, *El Siglo*. Party presses have also produced a deluge of political pamphlets, translations of Marxist-Leninist works, and a monthly magazine, *Principios*. Not only have the Communist bookstores sold books of all sorts

[21] Evidences of foreign visitors associated with the Comintern, such as Eudocio Rabines and Vittorio Codovilla, are found in the Communist press. Carlos Contreras Labarca, *Por la paz, por nuevas victorias del Frente Popular* (Santiago, 1939), p. 3. An article in *La Nación*, Santiago, April 30, 1948, pp. 6-7, allegedly by a former Communist leader, traces every important change in party policy to the influence of a Comintern or Cominform instructor, especially to Codovilla and Rabines.

[22] See footnote 7.

[23] *Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile*, Approved at the XIII National Congress in 1946.

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sympathetic to the Soviet Union and communism, but the party has written slogans on walls and buildings throughout Chile. Communists also seek to extend their influence by fractional representation within labor unions, municipal administration, youth organizations, and other associations. In seeking appointments to key positions, members of Communist "fractions" attempt to control each association's policy. Organizers and fractions have been most successful in industrial and urban areas, where most of the Communists' electoral strength lies. Little progress has been made so far among the peasants in the countryside.[24]

Communists have exerted an influence in Chilean politics out of proportion to their numbers because the party has been a highly centralized, unified, and well-disciplined organization. In contrast to other Chilean political parties, which have more in common with French political parties, the Communist party requires regular and energetic participation in party campaigns, absolute loyalty to the leadership and to Communist doctrine, and immediate and faithful compliance with the decisions of superior party organs. Whereas the leadership of other parties in Chile has constantly changed, the Communists were led for many years by Carlos Contreras Labarca (Secretary-General from 1931 to 1946),[25] Elías Lafertte, Ricardo Fonseca, and a few others. Since the Trotskyite split no significant internal party disagreements have been publicized. Although the individual members on the lower levels presumably enjoy some degree of participation in the determination of tactics, the continuity of central leadership for so many years suggests that the

[24] See, for example, Dirección del Registro Electoral, *Elección General de Congreso Nacional Efectuada en 4 de Marzo de 1945*. The statistical breakdown of this election shows very little Communist support in rural areas, in many of which no Communist candidates were presented.

[25] Carlos Contreras Labarca on being appointed to González' cabinet in 1946 was replaced as Secretary-General by Ricardo Fonseca on the grounds that he should not be expected to carry the responsibility of both jobs at the same time. Contreras, a member of the Chilean delegation to the United Nations Conference of April 1945, was criticized in the Communist press for his "lack of firmness in defending the foreign policy of the Party . . . at . . . San Francisco." *El Siglo*, Santiago, January 20, 1946, p. 13. Some observers said he was removed for not giving adequate support to Soviet-sponsored resolutions. Contreras remained, however, an active and loyal member of the party.

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leaders exert as much influence over the party membership as the membership does over the leaders—or probably more. A provision in the Party Rules specifying that the Central Committee shall determine the basis of representation at the National Congresses helps guarantee the continued exercise of this control.

IV

After the victory of González Videla in 1946, the Communist party became an official participant in the administration, controlling three ministries in the president's cabinet.[26] Nevertheless, the position of the party, and of the new president as well, remained precarious. The Radical-Communist combination did not have a majority in the Congress, while the participation of the Communists in the cabinet incurred the wrath of many powerful groups. In an effort to secure a working majority in the Congress, the President also included three Liberals in his cabinet side by side with the Communist members. Friction between the ministers of these two traditionally hostile parties soon developed. Both parties of the Right seized every opportunity for criticizing the new and inexperienced Communist ministers.

Meanwhile, Chile was suffering from mounting inflation and from acute shortages of essential imports of food, raw materials and manufactured goods caused by a shortage of foreign exchange. Unrest grew as prices rose and the masses felt the pinch. At the same time, as friction grew between the United States and Russia and most of the political parties supported the United States, the Communists remained steadfast in their support of the Soviet Union. After participating several months in the unsuccessful cabinet fusion of Left and Right, the Liberals tried, at first without success, to force the President to remove the Communists. Finally, the Liberals agreed to withdraw with the understanding that the Communists would be dismissed. After removing the Communist ministers, whom he praised for their "sincerity . . . patriotism and honesty",[27]

[26] Carlos Contreras Labarca, Minister of Public Works and Transportation; Victor Contreras Tapia, Minister of Public Lands and Colonization; and Miguel Concha, Minister of Agriculture.

[27] *El Mercurio*, Santiago, April 17, 1947, p. 1.

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González appointed a cabinet composed of Radicals and non-party members. In this way he retained, for the moment at least, the support of both the Communist and Liberal parties. Nevertheless, the Communists, shaken by this blow to their newly won prestige, maintained that "there was another way out of the crisis." [28]

Although González had only recently said that "fear of Communism leads to the persecution of the rights of the workers",[29] his break with the Communists burst into the open on June 14, 1947. At this time he declared that the leaders of the Communist party could not "elude responsibility" [30] for the shootings and riots connected with a bus drivers' and collectors' strike in Santiago. Then in October the coal miners in Lota and Coronel, a Communist stronghold, went on strike. Because González held the Communists responsible for the "disastrous consequences" of this strike and other disturbances, he began to use his emergency powers, granted in August, in an all-out campaign against them, supported by major sectors of the Conservative, Liberal, Radical and Socialist parties.

Apparently, the President felt that if he remained loyal to his campaign allies, his administration would continue to be crippled by the anti-Communist majority in Congress. González' campaign against the Communists united powerful groups behind his government and helped strengthen his hand at the expense of his former allies. At the same time this was a well-timed move in view of the widening breach between Russia and the United States, and more especially because of Chile's economic dependence on the latter. Armed with emergency dictatorial powers, the President imprisoned Communists and censored or completely suppressed their newspapers and other publications.

As in the years 1939 to 1941, the Communists refused to modify their pro-Soviet position, despite the fact that most of the Chilean parties shared the prevalent distrust of the Soviet Union. The Conservatives and the Liberals had always been hostile to the Communists because the Communist program struck at the very heart of their vested interests. Now the

[28] *El Siglo*, Santiago, April 17, 1947, p. 1.

[29] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1947, p. 1.

[30] *Ibid.*, June 15, 1947, p. 6.

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Socialists, riddled by internal dissension and suspicious of Communist infiltration tactics, struggled to salvage the support of workers not yet converted to the Communist banner. Rampant hostility toward Communist actions in domestic politics coupled with widespread disapproval of their intransigent pro-Soviet policy helps explain their isolation from the rest of the political community and the devastating attacks they suffered from all sides. In September 1948 the Congress outlawed Communist activity under any name whatsoever and provided heavy fines and imprisonment for Chilean citizens who continued to engage in them.[31] Communists were no longer permitted to operate in the open.

By outlawing the Communists González was forced to turn elsewhere for political support. Although he had been elected as the leading leftist candidate, in fact, as the only important candidate of organized labor, he has since had to rely heavily on the Right. In July 1948 he formed a cabinet based primarily on Radical and Liberal support and in a new cabinet of 1950 his leading ministers were Radicals and left-wing Conservatives. Although from time to time he has had support of some of the Socialists, they have not been included in his cabinet. Clearly, the political complexion of his administration is radically different from anything his supporters in the 1946 presidential elections would normally have expected.

In the March 1949 congressional elections the Communists had an opportunity, however restricted, to make a comeback. In the previous January the government had voluntarily renounced its emergency powers and released hundreds of Communists from imprisonment. Even so, some 25,000 Communists, a huge number for a small country like Chile, had been disenfranchised, and this factor alone raised grave doubts as to the validity of the election as a reflection of popular sentiment. The Communist party was not, of course, permitted to present candidates, none of the old-guard Communists were elected under other party labels, and only about two deputies, alleged to have Communist support, were elected.[32]

[31] *Diario Oficial*, Santiago, September 3, 1948.

[32] *El Mercurio*, March 8, 1949, p. 15.

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Since 1948, Chile has been plagued by strikes, riots and revolutionary plots, many of which the government has ascribed to the Communists. In November 1948 the government took decisive action against a group of army officers and civilians accused of plotting to overthrow the government by force. González placed responsibility for the attempted coup, not on the Communists, but on the Right. Although Generals Ibáñez (the former president) and Vergara were acquitted, many of the accused were convicted of conspiracy and sent into exile. In August 1949 a serious wave of strikes gripped the old Communist strongholds in the northern copper and nitrate districts and in the coal-producing areas of the south. González resumed his emergency powers and sent the army and navy to restore order. The government maintained that the riots were part of a revolutionary plan staged by international communism. Again in November a riot in downtown Santiago, resulting in many wounded and injured, gave further evidence of unrest. Communist leaders continued to be arrested as responsible for these disturbances. Actually, it is extremely difficult to apportion responsibility for these developments, especially since all Communist activity is now conducted underground. In any case, the government, on whose statements one cannot always safely rely, asserts that they are the result of Communist initiative. And it is true not only that they took place in areas of traditional Communist strength, but also that it is difficult to find any other groups on which responsibility may be pinned.

Communists have always survived previous efforts in Chile to destroy the movement through censorship, electoral restrictions, and imprisonment. It seems unlikely that the voters who have supported the Communists will change their views overnight merely as a result of anti-Communist legislation. Most of the economic and political conditions which have helped make the Communist program appealing to some Chileans remain today. Moreover, the Communists have explicitly shown their determination to continue the fight for political power in Chile, by violence, if necessary.[33]

[33] Interview with Ricardo Fonseca, Santiago, July 13, 1948. Mr. Fonseca was the last Secretary-General of the party prior to its being outlawed in September 1948.

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In any more or less stable political and economic situation the chances for the Communists to take over are slim. Under these circumstances the most important power positions are occupied by business, the army, and the church—all violently opposed to the Communists. Also the Communists may not forget Chile's dependence on the United States as the chief purchaser of her exports and the chief supplier of vital imports. Friendly relations with the United States are indispensable for maintaining a healthy economy on the established basis. A Communist-controlled administration would face the opposition of the United States government and the even more damaging hostility of American business interests.

In spite of the left-wing tendencies and reform pledges of recent Chilean administrations a comparatively small group retains control of the Chilean economy, and extremes of wealth and poverty still meet face to face. The great mass of Chileans, who have lived so long in squalor and disease, can be expected to seek to improve their lot. Under the stimulus of Communist and Socialist propaganda, they have become increasingly dissatisfied with their miserable living conditions and increasingly confident of their own abilities to solve their problems. In the event of an economic collapse or serious military disturbances, an explosive and destructive mass uprising might sweep an extremist group, such as the Communists, into power.

In the 1940's as the strength of the Communists grew, the influence of the Socialists waned. Even after the Communists were outlawed, there appears to have been no large shift of support to the Socialists. In the 1949 elections, for example, the Socialists made no significant gains. There is still no strong united party of social reform in Chile. As long as none exists and the masses have low living standards with little or no stake in the existing political and economic order, there is always the chance that the Communists will be able to capitalize on strong currents sympathetic to them. In view of their past record of applying flexible tactics in seeking mass support, it is quite possible that the Communists will some day reassert their former influence in the political life of Chile.

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HAROLD J. LASKI: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

TO all who are concerned with the scope and function of political authority the ideas of Harold Joseph Laski are of signal importance. Over the course of his lifetime Laski's ideas reflected in many respects the strength and weakness both of those who strive to maintain liberty as the main end of democratic government, and of those who see in equality the fountainhead of democracy which is secured largely through state action. Beginning his public career as an extreme critic of the state, Laski had been for many years prior to his death an outstanding spokesman for collectivism. This vigorous personality was one of the most controversial figures in the academic and political world of the twentieth century.

Elsewhere a review and analyses of Laski's different political philosophies from pluralism to Marxism have been attempted by this writer.[1] Here I wish to point out one significant result of Laski's treatment of the old and continuing problem of liberty versus authority in the particular circumstances of the twentieth century in which the problem is posed. For all his freely recognized scholarly contributions, his many services in the cause of democracy, his life-long devotion to equality, Harold Laski to some degree always failed the liberal democrat.[2] In particular I

[1] In a forthcoming publication of the University of Minnesota Press.

[2] By "liberal democrat" is meant one who believes that morally all men are equal as ends unto themselves. I am assuming that the liberal democrat seeks the ideal of the good life as it is conceived by the people who are all given a chance to share in its making; that the liberal democrat wishes to see practical manifestations of the ideal expressed in a society having responsible government which uses majority rule as the best tentative method for securing the common good. (Majority rule here is understood as the rule of numbers, each man counting equally, taken upon the basis of certain unalienable rights, namely, freedoms of speech and of person in the broad sense.) Finally, I wish to define the liberal democrat as one who believes that political freedom is the vital freedom in achieving the good life. Political freedom is the vital freedom in securing for the individual, who is the end for which government exists, those conditions of developing himself which are compatible with life in society that of necessity must be politically organized.

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desire to call attention to the several unfortunate results of Laski's failure during the years after he accepted Marxism.

Characteristic of liberalism is the assumption that antagonistic interests in society can be effectively adjusted and readjusted by methods of persuasion and negotiation. This assumption presumes the construction and support of institutions which assist in the task of peaceful adjustment. In his early days as a pluralist, Laski often discouraged the liberal's faith in the workability of democratic institutions. Later, as a modified pluralist, Laski was inconsistent and contradictory in his attitude toward the basic postulate of liberalism, and in his view of liberal institutions. Finally, during his Marxist stage, he frequently rejected the liberal postulate.

As a pluralist, Laski in his extreme devotion to liberty was essentially a philosophical anarchist who placed the demands of the voluntary associations and those of the state upon an equal plane. As a modified pluralist, his very suggestive democratic collectivism, largely secured under state auspices, was in turn accompanied by an incompatible assertion of the overriding principle of obedience to individual conscience. A careful observation of Laski's Marxism reveals, in spite of its generous liberal leavening, the acknowledgement of inevitable conflict in place of negotiation, and the acceptance of the need to abandon democratic institutions if necessary to secure the "right" end.

In making this general criticism it is of the greatest importance to underscore the difference in degree and in kind existing between Laski's failure to the liberal democrat as a pluralist and modified pluralist, and his failure as a Marxist. The assumption of the *sovereignty* of the individual's conscience, as well as the demand for resistance in accordance with its dictates, present in all three major stages of Laski's thought, is the primary reason for his failure in the earlier two periods. In his early stages he assumes the idea of peaceful adjustment through a healthy competition among social groups, themselves, and the state for the individual's loyalty. The atmosphere of political insecurity induced by his extreme assertions of the sovereignty of conscience, however, threatened the existence of constitutional government. During the later Marxist years the

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continuing axiom of resistance is but a supplement to a theory of the state which *fundamentally* believes conflict instead of persuasion to be the means of making important social change. At the same time Laskian Marxism uses the institutions of democracy to achieve the results predicted by this anti-liberal hypothesis. The use of the principle of moral compulsion to resistance is here narrowed to its application to the class struggle for possession of the state.

Against Laski as a pluralist and later as a liberal socialist who favored pluralism, a criticism of confusion and contradiction may be entered. Against Laski the Marxist the criticism may also be stated in moral terms. At times while actually denying the assumptions of democracy, he was willing to use liberal institutions to secure good ends—even at the cost of sacrificing the essentials of democracy.

Laski's devotion to freedom during his pluralist days was expressed in an inveterate suspicion of any kind of state. He insisted that the will of the voluntary group must be regarded as co-sovereign with the will of the state no matter how the state was organized. He insisted that the purpose of the groups was similar to that of the state. Such a view made the threat of anarchy more omnipresent than contingent. Under such a doctrine the rule of law of the liberal constitutional state was likely to be replaced by group anarchy.[3]

Laski's later compromise with the positive sovereign state in the twenties, which came about largely because of his desire for mass economic security, only increased his zeal for freedom. Then, as the socialist who stood with the liberal tradition, he attempted to foster greater opportunity for the exercise of freedom through the extension of equality largely through state action. His extreme individualism, however, was irreconcilable with his collectivist principle. Laski's "contingent anarchy" doctrine which made individual conscience the supreme arbiter as to what constituted good law was, in effect, contrary to his

[3] *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven, 1916); *Authority in the Modern State* (New Haven, 1919); *Foundations of Sovereignty* (New York, 1921). In his pluralist attacks upon state sovereignty Laski saw the object of his assault reflecting the claims of Hegelian idealism. He believed legal sovereignty to be undemocratic.

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acceptance of the positive liberal state. It elevated the individual conscience above the social conscience of the community. In marginal questions it assumed that it was morally right that the individual's idea of right purpose ought to prevail over the wishes of the community of individuals, even where the community's wishes were expressed through the democratic state.[4]

But whatever the inadequacies of his suggestive arguments during the first fifteen years of his public career, Laski's devotion to freedom and to equality never compromised the democratic philosophy. Man who does not voluntarily take out membership in that steadily increasing powerful organization, the sovereign state, could be grateful for such a champion as pluralist Laski. However much the elements of his later socialism of the twenties were contradicted by the individualism insisted upon at the same time, no denials were expressed concerning the validity of the liberal democratic philosophy. In each of these first two periods of his thought an extreme consent doctrine discouraged the possibility of a workable constitutionalism. But the acceptance of liberal assumptions of a certain good will among conflicting groups, and of the use of reason to achieve the good life, is evident—particularly the latter.

Laski's socialism before he accepted Marxism originated in a moral indignation against injustice. As a liberal socialist he was undogmatic in his views, fiercely devoted to the interest of all dissenters and to the free examination and choice of all beliefs, and hopeful for the successful negotiation of differences through parliamentary methods.[5] His view of Marxism and of Soviet communism was one of intelligent skepticism. Concerned with understanding, rather than denunciation, he brilliantly illuminated the appeal of the Marxist-Leninist faith while calling attention to its errors. He rejected Marxism as incompatible with democracy.[6]

[4] *A Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1925); *Liberty in the Modern State* (New York, 1930).

[5] *A Grammar of Politics; Liberty in the Modern State.*

[6] See *Karl Marx*, a Fabian Society brochure, published in 1924, and *Communism* (New York, 1927). In *Communism*, Laski was one of the first to underline the fact that the reasons for the acceptance of communism are not primarily materialistic.

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This devotion to liberalism and straightforwardness with regard to communism is often absent after Laski turned to Marxism. Despairing of the adequacy of liberalism and liberal institutions to secure that equality which he eagerly sought for the plain man, he attempted to marry liberalism to Marxism. Arguments that capitalists will not accept the peaceful victory of socialism, that it will be necessary to suspend traditional constitutional processes to secure a socialist victory, that parliamentarism can no longer work in our day, that capitalists in a democracy will turn to the Fascists to protect property interests against a successful socialist appeal to public opinion, are repeatedly put forth.[7] Indeed liberalism historically is viewed as an end product of capitalism.[8] In contrast to his liberal socialist views of previous years Laski, *on occasion*, served as an apologist for the monolithic state party of the Soviet Union. *Periodically*, too, he substituted adoration of the "Soviet Idea", for scholarly examination of communism.[9]

Nearly a quarter of a century ago he was saying to the world what is today becoming more evident; namely, that to the *faith* of communism, free men must oppose the *faith* of democracy. He warned that if the democracies did not inspire their people with an attachment for values of a free society, communism would persist and grow.

[7] The numerous publications which emphasize in greater or less degree these essential denials of (a) liberal political thought and (b) the adequacy of democratic institutions include *Democracy in Crisis* (Chapel Hill, 1933); *The State in Theory and Practice* (New York, 1935); *The Rise of European Liberalism* (New York, 1936); *Parliamentary Government in England* (New York, 1938). In World War II, when Laski was arguing that the crisis had brought a chance for a "revolution by consent" if Britain were made a socialist state *during* the war, these charges that the capitalist democratic state is really an executive of the owning class are repeated. The prediction is made that socialism could not come about through normal peaceful processes if its inception were made contingent on post-war electoral victory. *Cf. Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York, 1943), chapters iv, v, vii, viii, *passim*. Doubts that the capitalist democracy will satisfactorily protect working-class interests are expressed after the war in *The American Democracy* (New York, 1948), and *Trade Unions in the New Society* (New York, 1949).

[8] *The Rise of European Liberalism.*

[9] *Faith, Reason and Civilization* (New York, 1944) is a particularly extreme example of how Laski's rationalizations can turn a totalitarian state into a new kind of democracy which represents the hope of civilization. Written during the war when the Russians were bearing the main brunt of the Nazi onslaught, it represents an underlying faith in its author which had appeared previous to the war, and would reappear after the war. In "Leningrad Letter", written for *The Nation*, vol. 139,

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Yet, despite instances of his clearly fatal compromises of liberalism, Laski was regarded by many liberal democrats as a democratic socialist. Professor William Ebenstein, for example, in his anthology of modern political thought, *Man and the State,* has this to say:

> The Lockean-Jeffersonian theory of revolution has been vigorously reaffirmed in our own time by Harold J. Laski. His political thought has sprung from the rich heritage of the liberal faith, and his socialism is but an enlargement of his liberalism from the purely political into the economic and social aspects of life. His defense of the democratic socialist movements against the inroads of revolutionary communism, resumed by him with renewed vigor after the end of the Second World War, is inconsistent with the attempt to build up Harold J. Laski into a gauleiter or commissar. While no yogi, he never embraced the creed of the commissar.[10]

And not the least of the tributes is that of Max Lerner that "Laski's faith is that of a democratic socialist." [11]

From these verdicts one must, in view of the total picture, firmly demur. These are not times for equivocation on the basic differences between authoritarianism and a free way of life. In order to secure at home those ends in which he passionately believed and in his views of Russian totalitarianism and of international affairs, Laski frequently compromised the kind of

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July 18, 24, 1934, pp. 69-71, 100-101, Laski, despite some friendly critical observations, contrasted the vital progressive atmosphere of the coming democracy which he was certain was aborning on the banks of the Volga, with the dying democracy of the capitalist West. And in *The American Democracy,* there are several side remarks about the superiority of the Soviet Union in developing opportunities for individual self-advancement. This continuing faith in the great potentialities for a new democratic superior civilization existing within Stalin's monolithically run despotism reappears in parts of the introduction to the second revised edition of *Liberty in the Modern State* (New York, 1949). See also the particularly beguiling way in which Laski in his columns in the *Nation* since the war continued to suggest that the Soviet Union is a new kind of democracy whose dictatorship is only temporary. See especially "Getting On With Russia", *The Nation,* vol. 166, January 10, 1948, pp. 34-37. All of this, in turn, contrasts with the many published statements during the same period of time which show that Laski also believed that the Soviet Union is a ruthless totalitarian dictatorship!

[10] *Man and the State* (New York, 1947), p. 5.

[11] Max Lerner, "The Historian, the Novelist and the Faith", *The New Republic,* December 6, 1948, p. 20.

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socialism which may justly claim to be the modern expression of liberalism.

There is no doubt that Laski "never embraced the creed of the commissar"—if that entails an uncritical admiration for Stalinist communism. But as his record clearly indicates, *at times,* if unwittingly, he served as the commissar's subtle apologist. In the face of his many contradictory attitudes toward the Soviet Union, his statements concerning the irreconcilability of liberalism and socialism, his moody insistence on the inevitability of class war, his insistence too that the essential postulate of liberalism belonged to another age (which accompanied his requiems sung over parliamentarism) it is an error to state that "his socialism is but an enlargement of his liberalism."

If the contradictory elements in Laski's ideas here presented were the expressions from different periods in the development of his thought, there would be little point in criticizing. But these curious expressions appear during the same stage in the thought of this "liberal socialist".[12] They are the results of Laski's grim attempt to serve the demands of liberalism and Marxism equally and at the same time.

The results are plain. Laski's brilliant exposés of Communists' totalitarian morality and their conspiratorial tactics and organization, his unsparing sacrifice and devotion to the British Labor party, and his inspiring prose in praise of democratic

[12] Thus while gloomily predicting counterrevolution and the demise of parliamentary institutions, Laski could be an active leader in Great Britain and in the United States in seeking the adjustment of conflict through the traditional liberal methods. Thus, too, while acting as an apologist for Russian communism, he could expose the communist conspiratorial tactics within the British democracy. See *The Secret Battalion* (London, 1946). While making references to the new civilization and "democracy" in the Soviet Union, he could also indicate that he was under no illusions about the Soviet dictatorship. See *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time,* chap. ii. (The curious and dangerous contradictions in his dichotomy are strikingly indicated in this book. The early vigorous language, describing the totalitarian state, is contradicted in the later pages.) See, too, the second revised edition of *Liberty in the Modern State,* pp. 25-31. In many ways Laski's criticisms of capitalism, of the institutions of democracy, of the British Labor party, and so on, were constructive, and there is no intention of this writer to minimize them. Laski's appreciation of the appeals and the accomplishments of Stalinism are also suggestive. The point is that, at bottom, his overriding Marxist perspective made for a series of incompatible views being put forward concerning ideas and institutions about which the liberal democrat cannot equivocate.

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socialism illustrate his liberal side. Incongruously at the same time there appear assertions of the great promise of democracy under Stalin, and also criticism of the British Labor party and the "Fabian way", of the philosophy of liberalism itself, and of the formal institutions of democracy in what can be described as "neo-Marxist-Leninist" terms. Stirring pleas for equality and vigorous and helpful socialist criticisms of democratic institutions were frequently accompanied by a rather shocking disregard of the significance of the vital atmosphere in which the formal techniques of democracy operate.

The Lockean demand for resistance on the basis of conscience did reappear during the Marxist period. But this demand which from the start characterizes Laski's writings is really negated at this time. During this period it is not the previous ardent defense of any dissenter, who feels morally outraged by unjust law, that concerns Laski. Marxist Laski's interest in resistance centers in the need to oppose those who themselves are driven to fight the political manifestations of the inexorable development of the forces and relations of economic production. Morality itself having been fixed in an economic deterministic bed, the resistance of the capitalist, and that of the workers, each of whose ideas of right are basically traced to economic origins, mainly constitute the Laskian concern with dissent. Above all there is a persistent note that resistance really cannot be permitted to those who would oppose the "right" ideas concerning society's productive forces. So constitutional processes may have to be sacrificed. Historical justification is advanced for such action. The onus is placed on the conservatives.[13] One again asks the question: In light of the total record how could Laski be classified as the socialist heir of Locke and Jefferson?

That force for good which he did possess was greatly dissipated in the efforts at answering the demands of an economic determinism which in some important measure was with him from his earliest writings. As a Marxist Laski was compelled, despite his qualifying observations, to follow an economic determinism according to the precepts of what he had once charac-

[13] *Democracy in Crisis*, especially pp. 85 *et seq.*; also *The State in Theory and Practice*, chap. ii, *passim*.

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terized as a religious creed. The liberal force of his ideas was thus fundamentally secondary to the force of an intolerant absolute doctrine.

Under the influence of Marxism, liberalism becomes little more than the excrescence of capitalism. Identifying liberalism as the political expression of capitalism, Laski argued repeatedly that when this political philosophy could no longer serve the ends of capitalism it would be rejected by the owning class. The business groups could not accept changes which might result from the transfer of liberalism to all classes. For, in Laski's words, liberalism is " the philosophy of a business civilization." [14]

Having identified liberalism with capitalism Laski further argued that the twentieth-century man had to choose between liberalism and socialism.[15]

It was because of Laski's Marxist faith that he continued to regard the liberal state as being operated in the interest of the employer class. His Marxian economic determinism caused him to insist that the capitalist democratic state has not been one which could be captured and used by any group successfully appealing to the public. It would appear, however, that by means of the liberal state, capitalism has been increasingly modified, and continues to be modified for the benefit of the masses who have sought to limit the power of wealth. But for Laski these changes are only illustrations of capitalist largesse—grudgingly granted. Following an inexorable economic determinism, he argued that, since the capitalist economy is contracting, the process of concession-granting cannot continue.

Under the influence of this economic determinism the true significance of the " dry " revolution in the United States since the late twenties was largely neglected in Laski's mammoth postwar study, *The American Democracy*. In that volume the capitalist bogeyman is still the determining force in the United

[14] Laski thus aided those defenders of an outmoded *economic* liberalism who themselves consistently, if falsely, attack socialism as incompatible with the political doctrine of liberalism, and consistently, if falsely, *identify* capitalism with liberalism and democracy.

[15] See " Plan or Perish ", the *Nation*, vol. 161, December 15, 1945, pp. 650 *et seq.* Once again the opponent of liberal collectivism could look to Laski as a source for the conservative argument that liberalism and socialism are incompatible!

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States; the American society is still his creation, the American government his executive committee.[16] Under the spell of the same economic determinism Laski had also several times, of course, predicted that the British capitalist class would not accept a Labor party victory at the polls.

In the years after the war, despite evidence to the contrary, Laski religiously and periodically re-intoned the Marxist belief that liberalism is the social philosophy of a middle class and will be permitted to serve only that class's interests. The successes of the Labor party and the New and Fair Deal programs in Great Britain and America, respectively, did not change his continuing pessimistic prediction of capitalist counterrevolution, where a serious attempt is made to use liberalism against the interest of the owning class. Continually warning against conservative sabotage of the program of the " welfare state ", Laski after the war also argued that the capitalists had little to fear from the way in which the governments were expediting the mandates supported by the workers in Britain and America.

The belief in counterrevolution led Laski to argue that frustrated capitalism would seek to revive fascism and plunge

[16] In *Trade Unions in the New Society* the continuing call to American workers to beware the employer's state is repeated. The litany of government aid to employers *before* 1930 is recited once more. The gains of the last decade under government are admitted, but the permanence of the gains is questioned. Once, again, Laski gives us his underlying assumption that the state in a democracy having a capitalist economy is the instrument of the ruling (capitalist) class. In denying this assumption one, of course, does not have to deny the degree of truth in Laski's or anyone's observations that the employers will attempt to influence the government and the public to limit or subtract from the workers' gains. If by a successful appeal to public opinion the conservatives gain control of the government, they will have their day. Laski's assumptions, however, again despite his qualifications, do not account for the fact that in the American " employer's state " the labor movement has made gains in strength and in numbers that refute the Laskian Marxist thesis. The " employer's state " has been successfully contended for and won by forces which have drastically limited the former position of the capitalist. This exemplifies the essential postulate of the liberal position—that social conflicts can be successfully adjusted and readjusted by peaceful means. *Trade Unions in the New Society* also reveals that continuing dichotomy in Laski's thought. Having made it appear that the government of the United States is really the ally of business, Laski then appeals to the workers to organize a labor party to take over the government in typical parliamentary fashion! In view of his other writings, however, one might well suspect that, were a strong American labor party a major contender for the government, Laski would be arguing that in view of " owning class " reaction it might be necessary for the workers' party to suspend constitutional processes.

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the world into another war. In *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time,* written during World War II, he had argued that if socialism did not come to Britain during the war the likelihood was that after the war British and American capitalists would push the world into a new holocaust against the Soviet Union. During the last years of his life Laski felt that the greatest potential threat to peace was the danger represented in an imperialist America, influenced by the demands of capitalists seeking to preserve a dying economic order. What emerged from the sharps and flats, assertions and qualifications was substantially this: *At bottom,* despite all her admirable qualities, the United States is the greatest potential danger to world peace. *At bottom,* despite all her sins which Laski often was at pains to enumerate, the Soviet Union, if there is no war, points the way to a new and better world order.[17] For with Marxist Laski, capitalist America must be the potential force of reaction; and with Marxist Laski, the Soviet Union has been frequently identified as the leader of the progressive revolutionary forces let loose in the world as the result of two world wars.

In view of his total record it may be asked why it was that so many people could regard Laski as a socialist of a liberal per-

[17] See for example certain sections of the introduction to the second revised edition of *Liberty in the Modern State.* The assertions that the Bolshevik dictatorship would produce a democratic way of life, and that despite its temporary harshness it is the protagonist of a new and better civilization, continued in Laski's columns in *The Nation* in the post-war years in the same vein as had characterized Laski on this subject ever since the early thirties. The supplementary support given to this view of the new kind of democracy developing in Russia which appears throughout *The American Democracy* has already been noted in this paper. In chapter xi of *The American Democracy* the impact of Big Business upon the United States Department of State and the hostile attitude of both toward the Russian "socialist experiment" are underscored. The point of the chapter assuredly is that the attempt by Big Business to dominate the domestic United States and the world is the greatest source of a World War III. The repeated points that state sovereignty of capitalist countries is used to protect a set of productive relations which is approved by the dominant economic class and that this is the fundamental cause for war continue on into the post-war period. See "The Crisis in Our Civilization", *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 26, October 1947, pp. 36-51. In contrast, those who compare Russian post-war action to Nazi actions of the thirties, and say we cannot afford appeasement but must "fight it out", were declared by Laski to be "enemies of the human race". See "Getting On With Russia", *The Nation,* vol. 166, January 10, 1948, p. 37.

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suasion. Probably the most important reason for this belief is that in many ways Laski was apparently deserving of such regard. One side of his philosophy was liberal and it was vigorously asserted. Moreover, Laski, despite his Marxist criticisms of the "Fabian way" and the Labor party, always remained within a reformist political party. Where the unliberal and undemocratic elements of his ideas were exposed to careful public analysis, as for example in the course of the trial in the famous libel suit which Laski brought against the Newark *Advertiser* and other British newspapers after the 1945 elections, Laski's own interpretations of the "correct" way in which his ideas should be understood satisfied his followers. Few people who accepted the Left liberalism of Laski, it may be assumed, ever took the trouble to read the analysis of such "Marxist liberalism" which the liberal socialist Ernest Barker, Laski's onetime Oxford tutor, presented in the pages of his *Reflections on Government*.[18]

Indeed it is understandable why the liberal, who did not look too closely at the record, should have such a favorable view of Laski. Here was a man who on the basis of his work between the ages of 23 and 37 had justly merited a reputation for scholarship accorded to few people in a lifetime. Here, it seemed, was a vigorous consistent spokesman for the democratic cause who was continually fighting for equality. A gratitude was felt for one who gave cogent replies to those who challenged the compatibility of collectivism and liberty. Here was a champion who could effectively point out the weaknesses in the position of those who, denying the possibility of democratic socialism, at the same time insist in identifying capitalism with democracy. For Laski was one of the most brilliant and penetrating critics of capitalism which the first half of the twentieth century produced. Efforts of reactionaries and crypto-Fascists in Britain and the United States to intimidate him undoubtedly also had an effect in epitomizing him as a liberal socialist. Laski was at times the object of heavy-handed abuse by some pro-

[18] *Reflections on Government* (London and New York, 1942), pp. 179 *et seq.* Laski is cited as an example of a Marxist-democrat who advances the cause of class war and revolution under the claim of being a democrat.

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fessional red-baiters. He was, moreover, one who occasionally criticized communism and, in turn, was viciously criticized by the Communists.[19]

Other reasons why Laski was accepted in many circles as a true representative of liberal socialism probably include: the acceptance of the opiate of the poetic pen and soaring phrase (somewhat understandable in view of the mechanical expositions of most scholars); the great hunger existing among certain liberals for some assurance that there still exists in the U.S.S.R. the basis of the equal society which fired the imagination of many generous minds in the stirring days of the October revolution; the kindness of intellectuals who believe that Laski's Marxist ideas " must be taken broadly ", which has often really meant that one must accept him as a consistent liberal socialist; the honest concern with achieving a lasting peace (often exploited by Communists and fellow-travelers organizing front organizations) which in recent years made criticism of Laski's visions of equality in Russia appear to be mainly the results of " cold war " psychosis.

This list of reasons could be extended.[20] They obscure, however, the vital point. This is that, having accepted Marxism to aid him in his never-ending quest for an equal society, Laski came under obligation to a deterministic, absolute intolerant doctrine. This social philosophy he tried to accommodate to one which is fundamentally tolerant and experimental. In the process liberalism was so compromised that it was often a façade for securing the success of the inevitable revolution, or its basic assumptions were often (if with some reluctance) denied. The

[19] It may be noted, however, that unlike consistently liberal socialists Laski, before and after the war, was permitted to visit the U.S.S.R. and to make speeches. Evidently Laski was a particular kind of critic which the totalitarian state could tolerate for reasons best known to the Politiburo.

[20] The increasing menace of fascism throughout the world during the thirties and the suggestiveness of Marxist philosophy at the time are deserving of special mention. Laski was an early outspoken critic of fascism during those days when to many the political choice appeared to be either an extreme Right or an extreme Left. In addition Laski's Marxism was an additional attraction among liberal intellectuals looking for some explanation of the economic and political crises of the decade after 1929.

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upshot of this marriage of liberalism and Marxism was certainly disastrous to Laski's liberalism.

It also deleteriously affected his work as a scholar. To be sure in Laski's writings since the early thirties there is the suggestiveness which results from the use of dialectical materialism and economic determinism in explaining history and contemporary society. And Laski is all the more beguiling because of the liberalism which interlaces the Marxism in his thought. The value of Marxism, when it is used as one important analytical tool in the study of society, is undeniable. When, however, it is used dogmatically (and the Marxism of the true believer is a rigorously absolute creed), its diagnosis is easily open to challenge.[21] As we have seen, Laski's brand of "democratic Marxism" led him to give biased and oversimplified descriptions of complex phenomena, to make predictions, which, because they were based upon faulty hypotheses, were unsubstantiated later.

Despite the gloomy observations and prognostications by Laski, the liberal state, on the evidence, appears to be one whose government may be contested for by many different interests in society and may be used to serve the purposes of the community as those interests are expressed by whatever groups capture it upon the basis of periodic appeal to the people. Despite Laski, all classes in the liberal state have so far maintained their loyalty to the essential institutions of a free society. There has been no suspension of vital constitutional processes by the British socialist party for example, nor have the Tories, under the pressure of drastic alterations of property rights, resisted these important changes. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that *all classes* in Britain since the war are committed to a program of democratic collectivism. If in the past the record of capitalist democracies often showed governmental intervention and influence in the interests of industrial wealth, the record of the past twenty years particularly is one in which the balance has been significantly altered in favor of other interests. Despite Laski's continuing doubts, there is reason for believing that the gains of labor, for example, at the expense of capital are

[21] On this see Laski's *Communism* written in 1927 before he became a Marxist.

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permanent. Over the long pull, then, the evidence supports the validity of the assumptions of the liberal political philosophy, and refutes Laski's grim predictions.

Moreover, despite the admitted suggestiveness of Laski's "tit-for-tat parallelisms" in comparing the Soviet dictatorship and the Western democracies, the significant difference in kind and in degree of freedom existing in these different nations cannot be obscured. Despite Laski's continuing efforts, before, during and since the war, to suggest that the Soviet dictatorship is a temporary deformity from which could emerge a democratic way of life, the evidence is to the contrary. In every aspect of science and culture, conformity to the monolithic state party is required. These facts cannot be explained away by observations that the Soviet Union is not a democracy in the "Western sense" or that such strait-jacketing is due primarily to the insecure international situation. The primary reason, one suggests, is that these actions are the inevitable consequence of Bolshevism.

Laski's Marxist analysis that American imperialist capitalism is the greatest potential source of a third world war neglects to recognize sufficiently *at least* two facts. In the first place American capitalists are but one significant interest group influencing the policies of the capitalist democracy of the United States, while only one group, the State Party hierarchy, *does* control the policies of the Russian state. In the second place Laski's description omits the influence of the major shift of world communism toward an aggressive new line which took place in the spring of 1945 under the dictate of Russia disrupting the wartime coöperation and initiating the cold war between former allies.[22]

[22] An important consequence of this shift was the expulsion of Earl Browder, who stood for the tactic of continuing coöperation, from the American Communist party. American willingness for continued coöperation as indicated in the Yalta and Teheran treaties, and in the action of Army field commanders in permitting Russian troops to have the honor of liberating Berlin and Prague, was forgotten. A new "two camp" theory of a world divided between Russian socialist nations and American imperialist dominated nations was fashioned in terms of the "historical situation" of Bolshevik Marxism and Soviet strategy. In making this major shift the Soviet Union, some observers argue, was only taking measures to protect itself against the inevitable aggression of capitalist United States. It is, however, just this characteris-

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In Laski's thought, then, the dogmatism of the Marxist was not in the end conquered by the experimentalism of liberalism. The irreconcilable combination was, however, responsible for the strange dichotomies expressed during this period. Laski attempted to struggle against his bias, but always he yielded to it. If predictions proved erroneous there was always the future (already determined) to prove him yet correct. And so he went on before and after the war, despite the evidence, making his continual forecasts of possible domestic and international capitalist counterrevolution, and spreading doubts about the permanency of the new adjustments made by the liberal states.

After 1931 Laski was actually more the crusading pamphleteer than the scholar. His energies were devoted to hammering home repeatedly the same message of "socialism or disaster". It may be predicted, therefore, that Laski's deserved scholarly reputation will rest mainly upon his work as a pluralist and as a modified pluralist who was a liberal socialist.

In perspective Laski's political thought over the years is an expression of a continuous effort at reconciling liberty and authority. The way in which he presented his ideas, however, made that reconciliation impossible. In his earliest years he tried to build a theory of *government* upon what was really a theory of anarchy. The need for adequate and responsible authority lost out to his emphasis upon group liberty. Later, as a democratic socialist and pluralist, he tried in vain to reconcile a theory of positive government with a theory of extreme individualism. Here, in his anxiety to show that his socialism rested upon an abiding respect for freedom, he insisted upon an extreme individualism which really created an insoluble dilemma. As a Marxist, still in many ways an individualist, Laski attempted to join liberalism to Marxism. It has been the

tic of communism, namely, of assumption of conflict and no real lasting basis for adjustment of differences, which distinguishes it from liberalism. Most certainly liberal democratic nations can err and be unfaithful to their liberal heritage. But the force of that liberal basis is *a part* of the Western World. It is lacking in the Communist camp where the assumption of conflict as a means of settlement is basic. This same assumption of conflict is found in Laski's thought. Despite the evidence, violence and conflict are predicted, and the onus for the violence placed upon the opposition; for the "other side", according to dialectical reasoning, is responsible for the conflict which emerges.

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special task of this paper to indicate the unfortunate results which attended this effort. Ironically, in a quest for equality which would further extend freedom for all, Laski often permitted the very substance of freedom to be lost in his zeal for state planning. Especially in his curiously contradictory views of Stalinist communism did freedom lose out to absolutism.

Laski believed most earnestly that the central problem of politics is the problem of authority versus liberty. In his different attempts to solve that ever-continuing problem one may find the particular natures of the theorist's failure to constitutional government. From a chronic fear of the state as an all-absorptive unity Laski eventually went to the other extreme in his rationalizations for the positive state. But few men in our day gave themselves so completely to the struggle to solve the perennial dilemma, which in these times is mainly reflected in the relationship of liberalism to collectivism. One may also hazard the guess that few men in this century will provide so stimulating a challenge to thought upon this problem.

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THE DÜSSELDORF AGREEMENT: A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF POWER AND PLANNING *

I

ON MARCH 15, 1939, nearly six months after the Munich Agreement, the armies of Nazi Germany moved into Czechoslovakia. On the day after they entered Prague, the two great national industrial federations of Great Britain and Germany—the Federation of British Industries and the Reichsgruppe Industrie,[1] respectively—signed at Düsseldorf, Germany, an Agreement which pointed the way toward commercial collaboration between Great Britain and Germany.[2]

This Agreement between the Federation and what the FBI [3] spokesmen and British government leaders were wont to call its "opposite number" in Germany had, as its announced purpose, the guaranteeing of a "substantial and profitable export trade . . . vital to their [Great Britain's and Germany's] economic life." This end, the two federations asserted, would be attained as a result of the organization of the exports of the countries in such a way as "to ensure a fair return for the producers of those countries."

* The author's thanks go to Dr. Robert S. Lynd for patient and careful criticism during the course of this study.

[1] For an identification of the Reichsgruppe Industrie and its place in Nazi economy, see Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (New York, 1943), pp. 36-39; Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York, 1942), pp. 240-54. For the organization of the Federation, see Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-71; Nicholas E. H. Davenport, *Vested Interest or Common Pool?* (London, 1942), chapter 4, "'National' Government—for Cartels", for background data on the extensive cartelization of British industry during the 1930's.

[2] The full text of the Agreement is published in the Federation's official journal, *British Industries*, XXIII, 88-89, April 1939, and in House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 345, March 21, 1939, cols. 1113-15. Many provisions are quoted in numerous secondary sources.

[3] Hereafter the Federation of British Industries will be cited as FBI.

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In order that this "fair return for . . . producers" be ensured, it was declared "essential to replace destructive competition . . . by constructive co-operation" between the industries of the two countries. This goal of "constructive co-operation" would be reached by means of "industrial agreements" between individual industries of both countries. To remove the "unhealthy competition" between industries, the "aim [of the two organizations was] . . . to secure as complete co-operation as possible throughout the industrial structure of their respective countries."[4]

It is thus apparent that the concern of this and other statements in the Agreement was with the relations between Great Britain and Germany conceived in a broad sense. Elsewhere[5] the Federation stated that "The question of . . . uneconomic competition from Germany . . . has occupied the attention of the Federation of British Industries for some three years past" (presumably 1936-1938). In addition, the announced purpose of the talks was to guarantee a "substantial and profitable export trade . . . vital to their [Great Britain's and Germany's] economic life." The justification for the Agreement was generally, therefore, that the interests of the nation would be served.

The Federation explained the scope of its activity as follows:

> . . . His Majesty's Government . . . [desired to receive] some undertaking that some avoidance of uneconomic competition from Germany as affecting United Kingdom goods could be secured, both as regards the home and world markets.
>
> The Federation was consulted as to whether they, through their connections with the Reichsgruppe Industrie, would be prepared to bring about conversations between the individual industries concerned.[6]

If we disregard for the present the question (which is raised by the quotations) of the source of the initiative for the Agree-

[4] The British *Financial News*, critical of the Agreement, asserted (as quoted in *The New York Times*, March 21, 1939, p. 2) that "what is intended is nothing less than a full Anglo-German economic alliance—a complete reorientation of the whole of our commercial policy."

[5] *British Industries*, XXIII, 62, March 1939. [6] *Ibid.*

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ment, it appears that the Federation was purporting to act as the trustee of a major part of the foreign policy of Great Britain. One aspect of this policy was stated to be the raising of the volume of trade between Great Britain and Germany. The presumed hesitancy of His Majesty's Government to accomplish this objective by the reciprocal reduction of tariffs may possibly be explained by the German policy of granting subsidies to exporters. The net effect of such an agreement might have been to reduce the costs of the export subsidy program to the German government in so far as shipments to Britain were concerned, allowing Germany meanwhile to import those British goods which it desired. And such a program would not have directly lessened the competition of German goods in other markets, especially South European and South American.[7]

From the information available in the published statements of the Federation and in references made by British cabinet ministers, it appears that the plan was that the two national industrial federations develop a general agreement and statement of policy which was not to be binding upon particular industries. Within that statement of general policy, the separate industries of each country, organized in trade associations within each industry, would have worked out their respective agreements.

The Federation, in the announcement of the Agreement in its official journal, took special pains to make it clear that " the two main organisations arrived at certain principles which they considered should govern discussions between individual industries." The language of the actual Agreement on this point is carefully formulated:

> The two organisations are agreed that it is desirable that individual industries in both countries should endeavour to arrive

[7] See, in this connection, the remarks of Mr. Robert S. Hudson, Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, in the House of Commons at the end of 1938. *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 342, cols. 503-4; and *infra*, pp. 395-96. This speech was widely construed as presaging a reaction from the policy of appeasement of Germany unless Germany would make trade concessions in Southeastern Europe and eliminate features of German trade policy considered objectionable in Britain. Hans Staudinger, "The Future of Totalitarian Barter Trade", *Studies on War and Peace*, No. 7, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, The New School for Social Research, reprinted from *Social Research*, VII, 410-33, November 1940.

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> at industrial agreements which will eliminate destructive competition, wherever occurring . . . .
>
> The two organisations are of opinion [*sic*] that negotiations should be started immediately between those industries which are already organised for the purpose . . . .
>
> The two organisations have agreed to use their best endeavours to promote and foster negotiations between individual industries in their respective countries . . . .[8]

In response to questions in the House of Commons with regard to the Agreement, Sir Oliver Stanley, then President of the Board of Trade, centered his reply on precisely this point: "This agreement, of course, has no operative effect by itself, but is meant as a guide to the negotiations between individual industries, which were intended to follow. . . . This agreement, in a sense, never becomes operative. It is only a guide to subsequent negotiations between the undertakings by the individual industries."[9]

The question may then legitimately be raised as to how the proposed industrial agreements were to have been brought about. It is important to recognize in this connection that the policies of the government were firmly in agreement with those of the FBI. Robert S. Hudson, speaking in Commons at the end of November 1938, complained that Germany was establishing an uneconomic strangle hold over part of Europe by methods which destroyed the trade of the world. He continued as follows:

> We have made a survey of all possible methods [by which this competition could be met] and the only way we see is by organising our industries in such a way that they will be able to speak as units with their opposite numbers in Germany . . . . It is an essential preliminary that our own industries should be organised . . . . I have been engaged for several months past in doing my best to see that more and more industries are organised

[8] *British Industries*, XXIII, 89, April 1939. Compare here the *Report* of the FBI Committee on the Organisation of Industry, June 1935, pp. 6-7 (quoted in Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-63). It was suggested there that "public considerations" justified "coöperation" to achieve, among other things, promotion of greater unity among British industries in negotiations with foreign competitors, and increased stability in world trade conditions.

[9] *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 345, March 21, 1939, cols. 1111-12.

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> on this basis in order to meet this competition, and I am glad to be able to tell the House that we are meeting with success.[10]

This statement was interpreted by the Federation to mean that "the Government is behind the industries of the country in their efforts to organise themselves so as to be able to carry on negotiations with their foreign competitors. . . ." The Federation envisaged the trade association as the type of organization which would be utilized in order to accomplish the general program. This knowledge of the government's support "should serve", the Federation concluded, "to stimulate the development of trade organisations which it is one of the national functions of the F. B. I. to further." [11]

It appears obvious that the general result of the planning involved in the Agreement, as far as the domestic organization of industry is concerned, would have been to further the program of "self-government in industry" via the trade associations, with the sanction of a tolerant state.[12]

The major cartels and international trade agreements in existence prior to the Agreement probably would not have been disrupted or subject to major interference or rearrangement; for (1) these agreements were considered to be earlier planning devices which provided useful experience, and (2) the major corporations and other groups which most frequently entered into these international agreements generally participated in the formulation of the Düsseldorf Agreement. The Agreement is explicit on the first point.

> The two organisations have agreed to use their best endeavours to promote and foster negotiations between individual industries in their respective countries. They are encouraged in this task owing to the fact that a considerable number of agreements between individual German and British industrial groups are already in existence. There is thus available a large body of experience

[10] *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 342, November 30, 1938, cols. 503-4. See also *ibid.*, vol. 340, November 1, 1938, cols. 179-82, where Sir Oliver Stanley had earlier suggested the same program.

[11] *British Industries*, XXIII, 4, January 1939.

[12] See Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-88, where the general movement of British industry in this direction is discussed at length.

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which inspires confidence that an immediate extension of this policy is both practicable and advantageous.[13]

It does not appear therefore that the Agreement would have run counter to any such prior trade agreements and cartels.

II

It has been shown that the justification for the Agreement, as presented by the FBI, was that such negotiations would lessen "uneconomic competition" between the industrial structures of the two countries. The avowed position of the FBI was that it represented British industry in general in these conversations. Thus, the official bulletin of the Federation reported: "Informal discussions have recently taken place between officials of the Reichsgruppe Industrie, representing organized German Industry, and of the Federation of British Industries representing organized British Industry."[14]

Before the negotiations began it was stated that "it is hoped . . . that it will be possible for the representatives of certain individual industries to visit Germany at the same time as the F. B. I. official delegation with a view to meeting representatives of corresponding German industries."[15] Later, the text of the Agreement reported that "negotiations have already been started and are now taking place between ten industrial groups. . . . Approximately a further fifty industrial groups have already signified their willingness in principle to negotiate at an early date." These groups were not identified by the Federation, either in the official statement it issued to announce the conclusion of negotiations and the reaching of the Agreement or in the official announcement it made in March that such official negotiations were to begin.[16]

[13] For reference to the text, see *supra*, footnote 2. Also see *infra*, pp. 408-10, and footnote 37.

[14] *British Industries*, XXIII, 5, January 1939. Brady states (*op. cit.*, p. 164) that membership coverage of the Federation has long been regarded as inclusive of practically all British industry. The Federation has proclaimed itself "the largest association of manufacturers in the world . . . accepted by Government, Press and Public as the authoritative voice of British Industry." Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 160.

[15] *British Industries*, XXIII, 63, March 1939.

[16] *Ibid.*, and April 1939, pp. 88-89. The list of supplementary delegates was first picked up during an examination of British trade association journals, which were

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It appears, however, not only that representatives of particular "industrial groups" entered into negotiations with representatives of complementary German industries but also that some such representatives participated directly in the formulation of the general policy found in the Agreement. It was announced that

> Representatives of the steel tube and general engineering industries have accepted the invitation of the Federation of British Industries to accompany its delegation to Germany, to meet the Reichsgruppe Industrie in about a fortnight's time. The F. B. I. announces that, in view of the importance which it attaches to the talks, the following have been invited to be members of the delegation and have accepted: Lt.-Col. Lord Dudley Gordon, president of the British Engineers' Association and chairman of J. & E. Hall, Ltd.; Mr. A. C. Macdiarmid, chairman of Stewarts and Lloyds, Limited, the tube makers; and Mr. Roger Duncalfe, vice-chairman of the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers.[17]

These, then, were the industrial groups directly represented at the Düsseldorf meetings.[18] Other specific interests were undoubtedly present; apparently such groups (still unidentified) merely acted within the policy as it was being formulated by the major delegates.

It was undoubtedly realized by the Federation and by the government that criticism of such procedure would be raised.

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relatively inaccessible to the public at the time of the Agreement and are usually outside the range of attention of the general public. This is so because the circulation is generally limited to those directly interested in the affairs of the respective trade association and in items concerning the constituent members of such associations.

[17] *The Iron and Coal Trades Review*, CXXXVIII, 438, March 3, 1939; *The Colliery Guardian*, CLVIII, 396, March 3, 1939; and London *Times*, March 2, 1939. This announcement was not printed in the official FBI journal, *British Industries*, and did not receive more than a trifling amount of space in *The Times*. See preceding footnote. *Cf.* Paul Einzig, *Appeasement Before, During and After the War* (London, 1942), pp. 113-14, where it is observed that only a small number of important industries would have benefited from any trade agreements on the Düsseldorf pattern.

[18] Brady remarks that "the rise of peak associations has been generally paced by the movement of the business giants to the centers of the spreading webs of control." *Op. cit.*, pp. 13 and 174-76. He also observes that leadership within the circle of the giant corporations seems to be shifting steadily toward the heavy and "laboratory-baby" industries which would include steel manufacturing, engineering and chemicals. *Ibid.*, pp. 234 and 250 *et seq.*

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This probably accounts for the previously quoted statement of Robert S. Hudson that "more and more industries are [being] organised on this basis [that is, as units in trade associations]. . . ." It seems quite logical to assume, however, that any new associations would not have been in a position to challenge either the competitive positions of the major industries or their authority and importance in the Federation.

Following this discussion of the intra-industry relations as they affected the Agreement, it is in order to examine the links which existed among the three major bureaucratic structures involved in the Düsseldorf planning: the government, the corporations, and the trade and industrial federations and associations. In this respect, Brady points out the following:

> The influence of the FBI in governmental circles appears to have become exceedingly great. It is expressed directly via two routes. First, in the number of positions its members hold on governmental committees and the extent to which its representations before governmental bodies result in decisions and pursuit of policies favorable to its members and its general program; and second, the power possessed by its own officers, members of the Grand Council, Executive Committees, and various Subcommittees, on the one hand, and representatives of its leading companies and trade associations on the other, to influence governmental policies as Members of Parliament.[19]

Brady observes in reference to the first of these procedures that the FBI claims to be represented directly on several governmental bodies, including, with others, the Advisory Council and the Council for Art and Industry of the Board of Trade; the Technical Co-ordinating Committee on General Stores and the Motor Transport Co-ordinating Committee of the War Office. He states, however, that representation of the FBI is stronger than such a listing indicates, and he points out that "references are found scattered all through the literature, showing membership on *ad hoc* and smaller standing committees established not

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 176. This latter possible line of analysis will not be pursued. The reason for this is that none of the delegates was a member of the House of Commons; some perhaps were members of the House of Lords. In this connection see Robert C. Hall, "Representation of Big Business in the House of Commons", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, II, 473-77, July 1938; and Davenport, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-47, chap. 5 and Appendix I.

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only by the national, but also by numerous county, municipal, and other local governing bodies." [20]

We propose to indicate the links between the bureaucracies of the government, the corporations, and the trade and industrial federations and associations, using, as a point of departure, the individuals who were members of the FBI delegation to Düsseldorf.

The list of delegates from the FBI to the conference is analyzed below to ascertain: (1) the board chairmanships and directorships of corporations held by each delegate; (2) the positions held by each delegate in industrial trade associations, chambers of commerce, and so on; (3) the positions held by each delegate within the structure of the FBI itself; (4) the positions held by each delegate on governmental and quasi-governmental bodies.[21]

Members of the FBI Staff

SIR PETER F. BENNETT was president of the delegation to Düsseldorf. His membership was not entirely honorary, as is indicated by the following:

Corporate Positions and Affiliations: (1) chairman of the board and joint managing director of Joseph Lucas, Ltd. (electrical, lighting, ignition systems, and so on); (2) chairman of the board of C. A. V.-Bosch, Ltd.; (3) director of Imperial Chemicals Industries, Ltd.

Federational Positions: (1) president; (2) member of the Grand Council; (3) member of the Executive Committee; [22] (4) representative for Society of Motor Manufacturers, Ltd., in Sub-Group Three, Motor Vehicles, of Group Two, Mechanical Engineering; [23] (5) representative

[20] Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[21] Sources of the information reported were the following: (a) FBI, *Register of British Manufacturers,* 1938-39 (London); (b) *Directory of Directors for 1938* (London); (c) *Directory of Directors for 1942* (London); (d) *Who's Who,* 1945; (e) *Kelly's Handbook to the Titled, Landed and Official Classes: 1945* (London).

[22] Most of the executive and administrative powers of the Grand Council—the legally responsible governing body of the FBI—have been delegated to this Executive Committee. "As the inner controlling group in the Grand Council, the Executive Committee is in a position not only to control policy, but also to guide the detailed work of the Federation." Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67.

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for Joseph Lucas, Ltd., in Sub-Group Twenty-One, Motor, Motor Cycle and Cycle Accessories, of Group Two, Mechanical Engineering; (6) representative for Joseph Lucas, Ltd., in Sub-Group Three, Electrical Engineers to the Motor and Allied Trades, of Group Four, Electrical Engineering.

Government Positions and Affiliations: Sir Peter's recent government posts include the chairmanship of the Automatic Gun Board from 1941 to 1944, the director-generalship of Tanks and Transport of the Ministry of Supply in 1940. He was appointed at the outbreak of the war as Director-General of Engineering Production, to the Munitions Advisory Council of the Ministry of Supply.[24]

SIR WILLIAM LARKE was chairman of the delegation to Düsseldorf. His industrial connections were confined to the level of the trade association and he was not directly connected with particular corporations. But a list of his connections with trade associations and research associations indicates his importance as a representative of heavy industry, particularly steel.[25]

Associational Positions: (1) director, British Iron and Steel Federation; (2) president, Institute of Welding, 1938-1942; (3) member, Fuel Research Board; (4) past president, Institute of Fuel; (5) vice-president, Iron and Steel Institute; (6) past president, Junior Institution of Engineers (Inc.).

Federational Positions: (1) member of the Grand Council; (2) member of the Executive Committee; (3) chairman

[23] These groups and sub-groups constitute the functional method of classification of members of the FBI by trade and by industry. There are 24 major groups. *Ibid.*, pp. 164 *et seq.*

[24] This council consisted of industrialists concerned with arms manufacture. Other members were: Lord Weir (Director-General of Explosives; director of Imperial Chemicals Industries, Lloyd's Bank, Weir's of Cathcart and the International Nickel Company of Canada); Sir Andrew Duncan (Raw Materials Controller); Ashley Cooper (director of the Bank of England, Hudson's Bay Co., Compania Hispano-Americana de Electricidad, with electrical interests in Spain and South America). See Arthur Horner, "The War on the Home Front", *Labour Monthly*, XXI, 661-62, November 1939.

[25] See *infra*, footnote 37.

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of the Tariffs and Commercial Treaties Committee; (4) representative for the British Iron and Steel Federation in Sub-Group One, Pig Iron (Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese), of Section One, Production, of Group Five, Iron, Steel and Allied Trades.[26]

Government Positions and Affiliations: Most of Sir William's service with the British government appears to have been confined to service during and after World War I. He was a member of so "many war and demobilization councils" during World War I that *Who's Who* merely described his service by the above-quoted phrase. Perhaps his most important post then was that of member of the Disposal Board, the Ministry of Munitions and Disposal Board, and Liquidation Commission, 1915-1922.

SIR GUY LOCOCK had his major service confined—on the industrial level—to the peak federation. He became assistant director of the FBI in 1919 and director in 1923.

Associational Positions: (1) representative of the International Chamber of Commerce to the Statistical Conference of the League of Nations; (2) alternate industrial advisor to the World Economic Conference, 1933.

Federational Position: member of the FBI Mission to Japan and Manchuria, 1934.[27]

Government Positions and Affiliations: (1) private secretary to successive Under Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, November 1913 to January 1918; (2) Acting Assistant Director in charge of the Foreign Section of the Department of Overseas Trade, 1918; (3) member of the Government Committee under Lord Chelmsford and Sir Gilbert Garnsey on the British Industries Fair; (4) member of the British Committee on Empire Trade; (5) Board of Trade representative on the London and South-East Area Munitions

[26] Sir William was also an FBI delegate at the negotiations between the FBI and its French equivalent, Confédération Générale du Patronat Français, which took place in 1940 and were very similar to the Düsseldorf negotiations. See *infra*, footnote 49.

[27] Sir Guy was also a delegate at the 1940 negotiations.

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Board; (6) member of the Ministry of Supply Mission to India, 1941, and delegate to the European Group Conference at New Delhi; (7) FBI representative on the Central Joint Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet Production Executive, 1941; (8) member, National Production Advisory Council, 1942; (9) member, Reconstruction Joint Advisory Council.

ROY GLENDAY joined the staff of the Federation in 1918 and reached the important position of economic advisor to the Federation. The only industrial position he had held was that of chief research chemist, Magada Soda Company, Kenya Colony.[28]

C. F. I. RAMSDEN held the position of foreign director of the Federation. At one time he held the post of Third Secretary in the Diplomatic Service.[29]

V. WATLINGTON was a member of the Grand Council and of the Executive Committee of the Federation. He was also representative for the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers' Association, Ltd., in Sub-Group One, Electrical and Allied Machinery, of Group Four, Electrical Engineering.

F. E. JORDAN was representative of the FBI in Germany.

Special Delegates from Particular Industrial Interests

LT.-COL. LORD DUDLEY GORDON held but one major industrial position, that being the chairmanship of the Board of Directors of J. & E. Hall, Ltd., refrigerating machinery manufacturers and elevator engineers.

Associational Positions: (1) past president, British Association of Refrigeration; (2) past president, British Engineers' Association; (3) vice-president, Institute of Mechanical Engineering.

Federational Positions: (1) member of the Grand Council; (2) member of the Executive Committee; (3) representative for the British Engineers' Association in Sub-Group Five, General Mechanical Engineering, of Group Two,

[28] Mr. Glenday was a delegate at the 1940 negotiations.

[29] Mr. Ramsden was also a delegate in 1940.

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Mechanical Engineering; (4) president, 1940; (5) joint-chairman (in 1940) of the Anglo-French Industrial Council formed after the FBI-CGPF negotiations.

ALLAN C. MACDIARMID

Corporate Positions: (1) chairman and managing director, Stewarts and Lloyds, Ltd.; (2) director of Stewarts and Lloyds of South Africa, Ltd.; (3) member of Board of Directors of the following: (a) Islip Iron Co., Ltd., (b) Lancashire & Corby Steel Manufacturing Co., Ltd., (c) Lancashire & Corby Steel Selling Co., Ltd., (d) Prothero Steel Tube Co., Ltd., (e) Oxfordshire Ironstone Co., Ltd., (f) Scottish Tube Co., Ltd., (g) Tube Investments, Ltd.; (4) chairman of the Board of Directors of the following: (a) Newport & South Wales Tube Co., Ltd., (b) James Russell & Sons, Ltd., (c) United Tube (Holdings), Ltd.

Federational Position: member of the Anglo-French Industrial Council in 1940.

ROGER DUNCALFE was deputy-chairman of British Glues and Chemicals, Ltd., and vice chairman of the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers.

How were the Federation's policies regarding international trade as revealed in the Düsseldorf Agreement affected by the composition of the delegation. To infer from the preceding data an explanation of the Düsseldorf Agreement as regards either its timing or its content in terms of a crude theory of " vested interests " may not be legitimate. Needless to say, there are major difficulties in this type of analysis. Many of the negotiations of this general type are *sub rosa;* no published record is available of the day-to-day conference negotiations and of the numerous meetings which preceded the major conference; much of the published material was released by the negotiating organizations. Thus, the particular corporation or trade associations most heavily represented on the delegation may not have been the most influential in formulating the Agreement. It would appear, therefore, that the detailed theoretical questions of a sociology of knowledge must await a much more detailed

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analysis of corporate structure and political dynamics than could now be attempted with the limited data at hand.[30]

The data do indicate clearly, however, the extending ramifications of corporate organization within Britain (in this instance) into the positions within the governmental structure from which comes the direction of governmental policy. What has been called "synchronized monopoly" [31] is shown to be embracing governmental authority not only at the top level but also in many of the intermediate administrative and functional bodies.

III

Detailed analysis of the Agreement in terms of power dynamics involves inquiry into the source of the initiative and support for it coming from among the various institutional structures concerned. The Agreement was offered not only as the joint endeavor of business and the government but also as the natural and logical method of adjusting to economic trends in world trade. Acceptance of this position would, however, obviate the theoretical need for concern with particular methods of approach and negotiations of this or any other similar agreement. Our problem is to trace these elements in an attempt to analyze the support and contribution of the government to the Düsseldorf negotiations.

[30] See Robert A. Gordon, *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation* (Washington, 1945); Robert K. Merton, "Sociology of Knowledge", in *Twentieth Century Sociology*, edited by Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (New York, 1945). L. B. Namier, Professor of Modern History of the University of Manchester, has indicated that "the serious student . . . in tracing the collapse of appeasement, so far has no British diplomatic sources to draw on." *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939* (London, 1948), p. 62. This gap has recently been lessened by the publication of E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, editors, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series (1938), vols. I and II (London, 1949). These contain British diplomatic correspondence from March 9, 1938 to September 30, 1938. Also relevant is Raymond James Sontag *et al.*, editors, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry*, Series D (1937-1945), vols. I and II (Washington, 1949). The third volumes of these series will presumably cover the months most relevant to this study. However, "The obviously important files [of the German Foreign Ministry] concerned with Anglo-German relations from the spring of 1938 to the spring of 1939 are missing . . . [although] enough papers in other files . . . fill in the significant lines. . . ." Sontag *et al.*, *op. cit.*, I, ix. See Gordon A. Craig, "High Tide of Appeasement: The Road to Munich, 1937-38", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXV, 20-37, March 1950.

[31] By Robert S. Lynd in the Foreword, p. xiii, to Brady, *op. cit.*

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During 1938 and 1939 there were a number of economic and political agreements reached by Great Britain and Germany, either directly between governments or with the assistance of the governments. Our immediate purpose is to provide an outline of the economic agreements in order to indicate the extent of the British government's support of the Düsseldorf program.

The first major attempt to establish a rapprochement evidently occurred at the time of the Anglo-German Payments Agreement in July 1938 when an understanding was reached that the two governments would as soon as possible enter into negotiations for an increase in Anglo-German trade.[32] The Federation later reported that it was consulted by the government as to whether or not it would be prepared to bring about conversations between individual industries through its connections with the Reichsgruppe Industrie.[33] The conjunction of government and Federation policies and the location of the initiative for the beginning of negotiations are clearly shown by the following:

> Arising out of the proposed negotiations for a new Anglo-German Commercial Agreement, complementary to the new Payment Agreement of July, the Board of Trade conveyed to the Federation that the negotiations might be facilitated by inter-industry agreements for the elimination of uneconomic competition on a number of lines.
>
> For the past two years the Federation and the similar body in Germany representing organized industry, the Reichsgruppe Industrie, have facilitated meetings and agreements between individual industries. It was felt that the growth all the world over of uneconomic competition called for an extension of this class of agreement and an invitation was accorded to Reichsgruppe officials to meet F. B. I. officials.
>
> The consequent informal discussions which took place in London appeared to indicate clearly that a sufficient basis exists for discussions covering a wider area than has hitherto been in-

[32] *British Industries,* XXIII, 62, March 1939. See also *The New York Times,* July 2, 1938, p. 1; and *Board of Trade Journal,* CXLI, 15-16, July 7, 1938. It was later reported that subsequent preparatory trade discussions in the fall of 1938 covered not only Anglo-German trade but a division of the world markets as well. See London *Times,* December 20, 1938.

[33] *British Industries,* XXIII, 62, March 1939.

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> cluded. Subject to the approval of the Grand Council, more extensive discussions will take place in the Spring.[34]

Another step apparently was taken in December 1938 when Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, then President of the Reichsbank, visited Great Britain. At that time, Sir Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, told the House of Commons

> that while Dr. Schacht had not visited this country as a representative of the German Government, the opportunity of the visit was taken to inform him, for the information of the competent authorities in Berlin that the British Government favours amicable agreement between industries in the two countries on the sharing of markets which would enable both to carry on a fair trade at fair prices.[35]

In January 1939 representatives of the British and German coal industries signed a cartel agreement which provided, briefly, that selling prices would be fixed and that the ratio of British to German coal exports would be 65 to 35.[36] This agreement was

[34] FBI, *Twenty-Second Annual Report for the Period Ending 31st December, 1938* (London), p. 9. See also *Colliery Guardian,* CLVII, 1145, December 22, 1938, and CLVIII, 185, January 27, 1939. At the January meeting, the FBI Grand Council approved the continuation of the discussions and informed the Reichsgruppe that it favored an official conference. *The New York Times,* February 1, 1939, p. 28, and *British Industries,* XXIII, 38, February 1939.

[35] *Trade and Engineering,* XLIV, 3, January 1939. See London *Times,* December 20, 1938, for a statement by Schacht himself concerning this point. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, paid a return visit to Schacht in early January 1939. *The New York Times,* January 3, 1939, p. 2. Norman was reported to have favored a "Schacht plan" to "combine Jewish emigration [from Germany] with German export expansion and to finance both of them with a huge foreign loan . . . which would save Germany from releasing Jewish capital and would bring into Germany desperately needed foreign exchange." *Ibid.,* January 11, 1939, p. 11. This plan was rejected by the Intergovernmental Committee on refugees set up as a result of the Evian Conference. However, its American director, Mr. George Rublee, did visit in Berlin from January 11 to February 2, discussing a substitute for this plan with Schacht and, after Schacht left the Reichsbank, with Herr Wohltat. Wohltat was to become a central figure, in early summer 1939, in a rumored "Wohltat plan" for a large British loan to Germany to allow trade expansion. This plan precipitated a minor British government crisis involving Robert Hudson, Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade. For the "Schacht plan", see Sir John H. Simpson, *Refugees* (London, 1939), pp. 19 *et seq.*

[36] Frederic Benham, *Great Britain under Protection* (New York, 1941), p. 134. See, also, Ervin Hexner and Adelaide Walters, *International Cartels* (Chapel Hill, 1945), pp. 274-75.

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considered by the FBI to be a "valuable concrete example" to be followed in the later negotiations.[37] Mr. Robert S. Hudson, acknowledging government assistance in coal negotiations, anticipated the extension of the coal agreement into one covering all the coal-producing countries of Europe and considered the possible attainment of similar agreements in other industries as "one of the greatest preliminary steps to political appeasement that lay open to them at present."[38]

The British coal owners entertained their "opposite numbers" at a formal dinner in London. A distinguished group of business and government leaders, including Sir Oliver Stanley, Mr. Robert S. Hudson, Dr. Herbert von Dirksen, then German Ambassador to Britain, and Sir William Larke of the Federation, "in various ways expressed their satisfaction that an agreement had been concluded, and the hope that it would be followed by others of a similar nature."[39] Added significance to this meeting was provided by Stanley who "very properly emphasized the fact that the present stage has only been reached because we now possess a central organisation in the British coal trade which is able to speak with authority for the whole industry."[40]

The Colliery Guardian itself welcomed the government's collaboration and observed that

[37] *British Industries,* XXIII, 63, March 1939. According to one report, the international steel cartel as well as the coal agreement was considered by the Germans to be a model for the Düsseldorf Agreement. See *The New York Times,* February 22, 1939, p. 4. Some recognition of this is found in *Trade and Engineering,* XLIV, 1, March 1939. It was stated there that, "As director of the British Iron and Steel Federation, which has had for some years an important agreement with the Steel Cartel, Sir William [Larke, chairman of the FBI delegation to Düsseldorf] has had much experience of the kind of negotiations which are envisaged in the proposed discussions."

[38] London *Times,* February 4, 1939. See, also, *The Colliery Guardian,* CLVIII, 217-18, February 3, 1939; and *New Statesman and Nation,* XVII, 190, February 4, 1939. Each considered it likely that the coal agreement presaged the establishment of a general European coal cartel.

[39] *The Iron and Coal Trades Review,* CXXXVIII, 398, February 24, 1939. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News,* XVI, 29-30, February 11, 1939, for a supporting statement by Viscount Halifax. It had evidently been expected that Dr. Walter Funk, German Minister for Economic Affairs, and recent successor to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht as President of the Reichsbank, would attend this dinner. See London *Times,* February 22, 1939.

[40] *The Colliery Guardian,* CLVIII, 353, February 24, 1939.

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> . . . In this country it is inevitable that the interest of the State in the conduct of the coal industry should increase as the latter comes more and more to depend upon the statutory authority. We are happy to think that interest will not necessarily entail an abdication of judgement by the industry itself, but will on the contrary foster a broadminded view of social obligations which should prove the best guarantee that public rights will be respected.[41]

The general importance of this coal agreement lies in the fact that, as a prototype of the sort of agreements contemplated later in the Düsseldorf Agreement, it indicates what were to have been their restrictive potentialities, justified in terms of general social symbols by both private industrial interests and the British government. It would seem to represent the application of what Brady calls the "trustee relation" and "social harmony" as justifications for particular types of domestic cartel arrangements.[42]

During this same period at a meeting in London of the German Chamber of Commerce for the United Kingdom, Hudson, Emil Wiehl, Director of the Commercial Department of the German Foreign Office, and von Dirksen concurred in suggesting the importance of Anglo-German coöperation on trade. Von Dirksen, for example, observed:

> It ought to be possible—as it had been possible in the past—to find a practical way to satisfy the needs of the individual nations for the exchange of goods without getting entangled in theoretical discussions about the merits or demerits of this or that economic system. . . . In that respect the conversations between representatives of their industries would prove to be a valuable contribution.[43]

Direct government support of the Düsseldorf negotiations was provided by a visit to Berlin of Mr. Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin,

[41] *The Colliery Guardian*, CLVIII, 353, February 24, 1939.

[42] Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 259 *et seq.* *Cf.* Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, 1949).

[43] London *Times*, January 24, 1939.

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director of the economics department of the Foreign Office, member of the 1938 Runciman Mission, and reputed confidant of Chamberlain. This was for consultations and " preliminary investigations " relative to the Düsseldorf negotiations.[44] Especial importance was attached to his visit inasmuch as both the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Field Marshal Hermann Goering received him while he was in Berlin.[45]

Perhaps the most important contribution planned by the government was the " virtually unprecedented " [46] visit to Berlin by two British government ministers, Sir Oliver Stanley and Mr. Robert S. Hudson. Sir Nevile Henderson, then British Ambassador to Germany, later provided an account of the purpose of this intended visit, as follows:

> Their journey . . . was officially stated to be a private one, the ostensible occasion for it being a banquet which was to be given in Berlin to representatives of certain British industries who were discussing trade agreements with their German competitors. But behind the façade of privacy, the real intention of the visit was patent; and, though the primary object was a modest one, it was legitimate to hope it might lead to more general and concrete trade discussions. From economics to politics was no great step.
>
> . . .
>
> If the Czechs had been a little more prudent and if the Stanley-Hudson visit had taken place ten days earlier, i. e. before the Czechs overthrew the Slovak Government of Father Tiso, March might after all have gone out like a lamb and the evil day have been at least postponed.
>
> . . .
>
> . . . As the contemplated visit of Oliver Stanley and Hudson indicated, the outside world, and Britain in particular, was pre-

[44] *The New York Times*, February 18, 1939, p. 3.

[45] *The New York Times*, February 22, 1939, p. 1, and February 25, 1939, p. 26. According to one report, Dr. von Dirksen returned to Berlin toward the end of February following a lengthy conversation with Viscount Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, presumably about the plans for trade negotiations and a general political settlement of Anglo-German differences. *The New York Times*, February 27, 1939, p. 4; also The German Foreign Office, *Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War* (New York, 1940), p. 259.

[46] *The Economist*, London, CXXXIV, 382, February 25, 1939.

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pared to help her [Germany] to overcome her financial and economic difficulties.[47]

The announcement of the Düsseldorf Agreement, coming as it did in close conjunction with the German march into Czechoslovakia, touched off a barrage of criticism. As a result, the proposed visit to Berlin of the two government ministers was cancelled, and the government support of the Düsseldorf Agreement was temporarily renounced.[48] One species of criticism revolved about the timing of the Agreement; another was concerned with the possible effects of it upon British political and economic relations with other countries, particularly the United States; and the last had to do with the concepts of planning embodied in it.[49]

The response of the government and of the Federation to the criticism essentially followed these lines: support of the Düsseldorf Agreement was reneged because the events of the moment —the occupation by Germany of Czechoslovakia—rendered the

[47] Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission* (New York, 1940), pp. 191, 196, 206. According to the Berlin correspondent of *The New York Times*, February 22, 1939, p. 1, "The project is receiving a political significance far exceeding the framework of mere trade talks." See, also, *ibid.*, February 27, 1939, p. 4; and Einzig, *op. cit.*, pp. 110 *et seq.*

[48] That the government support of the Düsseldorf negotiations had been wholehearted was clearly indicated by numerous public statements of various members of the British cabinet. See, for example, the following issues of the London *Times* for statements by the person indicated: February 4, 1939 (Lord Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs); February 8, 1939 (Sir Oliver Stanley); February 11, 1939 (Mr. Robert Hudson); February 17, 1939 (Sir Oliver Stanley); February 23, 1939 (Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air); February 28, 1939 (Sir Oliver Stanley); and March 11, 1939 (Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary).

[49] In addition to previously mentioned references, see the following: *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 343, February 7, 1939, cols. 729-30, and vol. 345, March 21, 1939, cols. 1109-13; *The Metal Industry*, LIV, 337, March 24, 1939; *Iron and Steel*, XII, 367, April 1939; *The Economist*, CXXXIV, 382-83, February 25, 1939, and March 25, 1939, p. 607; *The Chemical Trade Journal and Chemical Engineer*, CIV, 284, March 24, 1939. See also the interesting reaction of *The Economist*, CXXXVIII, 484, March 16, 1940, to another agreement very similar to the Düsseldorf Agreement. In March 1940, the FBI signed an agreement with its French "opposite number", the Confédération Générale du Patronat Français, which embodied many of the same concepts. *The Economist* supported this latter agreement; its opposition to the earlier Düsseldorf program, however, was vitriolic. See, also, in this connection, Corwin Edwards *et al.*, *A Cartel Policy for the United Nations* (New York, 1945), pp. 53-54.

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agreement inopportune. The government did not alter its position either because of a sudden realization of the possible attitudes of business groups and governments of other countries or because the concepts of planning involved had become repugnant to them. A joint statement of the Federation and the government read as follows:

> The President of the Board of Trade thanked the F. B. I. Representatives for their Report and expressed the opinion that although the political developments of the last few days had created a situation which, while it lasted, made further progress impossible, the F. B. I. Delegation, in obtaining the agreement of the Reichsgruppe Industrie to the joint declaration of principles, had performed for British industry a valuable piece of work which, but for these developments, might have served as a basis on which the individual industries of manufacturing countries of the world could have solved a great many of their difficulties. It was agreed that only the future could show whether at some later date and in changed circumstances the valuable preliminary work thus far accomplished might be developed by individual industries to the national advantage.[50]

As late as June 1939, Sir Oliver Stanley observed in the House of Commons that "In the present state of tension they [the Düsseldorf negotiations], of course, had had to be suspended until a restoration of confidence would allow negotiations to be resumed."[51] It would appear that all criticisms of the Düsseldorf Agreement other than "political inopportuneness" were of no avail in so far as the government's and the Federation's reaction was concerned.

IV

It may be argued that these gentlemen and the corporate groups which they represented usurped authority from the formal institutional centers of control, or acted otherwise in an

[50] *British Industries*, XXIII, 89, April 1939. See also *The British War Blue Book* (New York, 1939), pp. 16-17, for Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's concurrence in the course of his famous Birmingham speech on March 17, 1939, and *ibid.*, p. 23, for his similar statement in the House of Commons on March 23, 1939. See *The Colliery Guardian*, CLVIII, 724, April 21, 1939, for the defense of the Agreement by Sir Peter Bennett, president of the FBI.

[51] London *Times*, June 10, 1939.

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extra-institutional manner by assuming authority. The Federation of British Industries has a formal structure which involves delegated authority based on representation of the member bodies by officers, a governing board and similar agents. But where problems of " constitutionality " of executive action have not been subjects of controversy and anxious delimitation, a large area of free scope in the exercise of authority is likely to exist. And it is here that the common law of the organization is hammered out in day-by-day practice, within the tolerance of the undefined procedures of administrative action. *The need to take action* serves as the most convenient occasion for such extensions of power. The justification when something of this nature takes place is that "We had to meet an urgent situation." The study of the dynamics of power should include within the range of the concept, then, changes that have taken place in the structure, functioning and effective powers of such organizations, as well as changes in formal institutional organization per se.

Changes in power may also occur with an increase in the range of application of authority exercised from the existing formal institutional centers of control. In the latter type of situation there need not be an alteration of formal intra-institutional arrangements. A shift of new personnel, representing limited groups, into the positions of decision-making, and the legitimizing of new policies and acts within the terms of traditional symbols stretched to meet *ad hoc* situations, may create a factual transfer of power, although the institutional façade and its familiar institutional accompaniments remain unchanged. In given circumstances, new institutional arrangements may be justified by recourse to the supposed " spirit " of the symbolic structure. In that situation, the result of the new institutional arrangements may be to alter the effective content of the symbolic structure ultimately beyond recognition. Other situations may possibly provide shifts in effective power even though some part of the traditional arrangements—institutional and symbolic—may not be changing.

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THE UNITED STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

IN the closing months of World War II the struggle among United States policy-makers between regionalism and universalism in the approach to international organization came into the open. Contention behind the scenes had been going on for some time, but the period of decision was clearly at hand. Supporters of the universalist approach argued that peace in the foreseeable future depended ultimately on the continuance of the wartime coalition of the three Powers: Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The world organization then in formation should be granted as much power as practicably possible in order to perform the indispensable, double function of instrumentality for collective "big-three" operation and insurance that this operation would be within the broad framework of justice and equity.

On the other hand were those who, while sternly repudiating the ostrich-like tendencies of the nineteen-twenties, tended to view any world organization as useful backdrop to the strengthening of American ties with specific regions and countries. Advocates of this policy included, among others, an increasing number distrustful of Russian ambitions: those who, having placed on ice their deep fear and antipathy for the Soviet Union during the brief spell of wartime, comparative amity, now hastened to the deep-freezers to thaw out their sentiments; some nationalists and erstwhile isolationalists seeking an ideological blanket; and militarists confident in the new power of American arms.

Confusion in the public mind was increased by the fact that spokesmen for each policy stated their case in terms most likely to appeal to common aspirations which supporters of both factions shared rather than in terms of concrete issues and alternate programs of action.

The past four years have witnessed the break-up of the wartime coalition. They have also seen the removal of Great

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Britain from the limited ranks of the "super-powers". Disregarding the perplexing question of cause and effect, we may also say that by 1950 the second of the policies mentioned has gained almost complete acceptance over the first; although official pronouncements today, like those of 1945, continue in large part to weld the objectives of the first with the actions of the second. Perhaps, therefore, it is not too early to assess in preliminary fashion some of the implications of the choice made or forced upon us in so far as United States relations with the Western Hemisphere are concerned.

I

The inter-American system as constructed after World War II rests upon three basic instruments. All three, of course, are products of hemisphere relations dating back into the nineteenth century but particularly to the pre-war good-neighbor period of 1933 to 1942. However, the three instruments, taken together, represent a determined effort to achieve a unity only dreamed of in the nineteenth century and only foreshadowed by the pre-war decade. The Act of Chapultepec, signed at Mexico City in 1945; the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Quitandinha, Brazil, in 1947; the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota in 1948—all contain specific statements of the compatibility between the regional, hemisphere system and the world organization. As such they appear to follow the universalist impulse of American policy and could have served that policy had it ever been deemed possible to make it effective.

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace assembled in Mexico City before the surrender of either Germany or Japan and before the San Francisco Conference created the United Nations Charter. Powers under the Act of Chapultepec were therefore expressly limited to the duration of the war, and the contracting states agreed only to "consider" the conclusion of a permanent treaty after the war. The details of the Act establishing procedures for dealing with actual or potential threat to the integrity of any American state need not be enumerated. For present purposes it is the portions of the

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Act defining the relation of the inter-American system to the world organization which are significant. Part III, consisting entirely of one lengthy, rather involved sentence, stated that "this declaration and recommendation provide for a regional arrangement for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this hemisphere and said arrangements and the activities and procedures referred to therein shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established." In addition, the sixth of the "whereases" that preceded Part I of the Act declared that "the furtherance of these principles, which the American States have practiced in order to secure peace and solidarity between the nations of the continent, constitutes an effective means of contributing to the general system of world security and of facilitating its establishment."

Slightly more than two years elapsed before delegates finally convened to draft the treaty embodying for peacetime practices the principles accepted at Mexico City. In the intervening period attempts had been made to organize the conference, but all had met with failure. Ostensibly the delay was due to the oft-repeated determination of the United States to sign no new instrument with an Argentine government patently unwilling to honor its earlier commitments. One might, however, adduce an additional reluctance on the part of policy-formulators to commit the United States formally to the sort of rigidly designed regional system that any treaty based on the Act of Chapultepec would certainly be. These misgivings, if ever present, had vanished by mid-1947, at which time the United States was prepared to accept shadowy gestures of the Peron régime as indications of its substantial good faith.

Great care was taken by the drafters of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to connect the Treaty to the Charter of the United Nations. Article 10 consists entirely of the statement that "none of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations"; while Article 24 follows the requirement of Article 102 of the

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Charter in providing for registration of the Treaty when the requisite number of ratifications shall have brought it into force. Finally, a declaration paralleling that in the Act of Chapultepec appears in the preamble to the Treaty:

> the High Contracting Parties reiterate their will to remain united in an inter-American system consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have concluded concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action.

Behind these general statements of compatibility lies the relationship between the regional system operating under the Treaty and the actual provisions of the United Nations Charter. Article 3, paragraph 1 bases any collective action undertaken in accordance with the Treaty on " the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." Paragraph 4 of the same article places a potential limit on regional action: " measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." As required by the Charter, the signators to the Treaty agree in Article 5 to furnish the Security Council " immediately . . . complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security." [1]

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance dealt with the most dramatic facet of regional arrangements: preservation of peace. It remained, however, to erect the institutional framework of the system itself, within which the Treaty and other aspects of hemisphere relations as well could be conducted. This was done at the Ninth International Conference of Ameri-

[1] Perhaps it is unduly captious to inquire whether the word *or* has any special significance, such as to indicate activities of the regional system *beyond* those authorized by the principle of self-defense. A grammarian's interpretation would seem to indicate such a possibility, but, if so, on what express clauses of the Charter would these other activities rest?

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can States, held at Bogota in 1948 and carried to a constructive conclusion despite the revolutionary turmoil that struck the city in the midst of the delegates' deliberations.

The Charter of the Organization of American States is a lengthy document of some one hundred articles. Like the two instruments previously mentioned it abounds in references to the United Nations, designed to make clear the consistency between the two systems. Only the more important references need here be considered. Article 1 makes the bald statement that " within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency "; and Article 102 is a repetition, *mutatis mutandis*, of Article 10 of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The Charter, like the Treaty, is to be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. One of the duties of the Council of the Organization, made explicit in Article 53, is " to promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of American States and the United Nations."

In the more abstract realm of idealistic aspiration two references to the United Nations should be mentioned. The preamble to the Charter dedicates the signatory Powers " to persevere in the noble undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles and purposes they solemnly reaffirm." Moreover, Article 4, which proclaims the basic purposes of the Organization, relates their attainment not only to the principles of the Organization itself, but also to " its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations ".

With the attendant risk of repetition, some attention has been devoted to the statements regarding the United Nations contained in the three basic instruments of the inter-American system in order to make clear the following facts. First, there was uniformly an asservation of the consistency of the regional and the world organizations. Second, the drafters went beyond claims of consistency in an attempt to tie the two organizations together in a functional relationship. This was especially true in the case of collective action to be taken under the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Third, as set forth in the instruments themselves, the relationship appeared to be that of a part to the whole. To put the same idea a little differently, the relationship

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claimed as existing between the two organizations was that between one of a number of smaller circles (states and regional systems) embraced by an inclusive circle (the United Nations). The latter was larger than the former and included it together with a number of other integers as well.

II

When placed in their proper perspective these three instruments can be seen as actually representing the increasing strength of the second, conflicting impulse in American policy, which was mentioned at the outset of this discussion.

The Latin-American republics came to Mexico City determined (a) that the inter-American system would be strengthened and placed on a sound institutional foundation, and (b) that the world organization as envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would not be constructed in such a way as to weaken the regional organization. On neither of these two points was the United States in opposition to the Latin-American countries. Its delegates did not gain, because they did not seek to gain, a blanket endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Instead they agreed to the preparation of a document synthesizing Latin-American comments on the Proposals and its circulation to the prospective participants in the San Francisco Conference in advance of the convening of that Conference.

In so far as the strengthening of the inter-American system was concerned, the United States was an enthusiastic supporter of Latin-American desires. Objection of its delegates to the Act of Chapultepec as originally presented was merely that it would infringe on the constitutional prerogative of Congress to declare war. The United States endorsed the Act when the objection was removed by limiting its operation to the wartime period only. Resolution IX, "Reorganization, Consolidation, and Strengthening of the Inter-American System", which was direct predecessor to the Bogota Charter, was itself the product, in part, of the work of the United States delegation. As Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller, then in charge of Latin-American relations, said after the conclusion of the Conference: "for many years the United States had realized that its future

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security was rooted in the unity of the Americas. Because of this fact and to dispel the growing fear [that the United States would turn its back on Latin America] we, ourselves, introduced a resolution to reorganize and strengthen the Pan American Union."

While the inter-American system therefore came potentially strengthened from the Mexico City Conference, the issue of its relation to the emerging world organization was still in doubt. In fact the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had accorded regional groupings a very minor place. Consequently the issue at San Francisco was basically and in its simplest form whether the regional arrangement or the world organization should have primary power and responsibility for the enforcement of collective security within the region itself. The answer given by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to this question was clear: primary responsibility was to rest with the world organization. Paragraph 2, Section C of Chapter VIII, Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security Including Prevention and Suppression of Aggression, read: " the Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, *but no enforcement action should be taken under regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council*" (italics mine). This clause could mean only that the American republics could not place into operation the Act of Chapultepec or any post-war, permanent instrument to quell aggression within the hemisphere until and unless the Security Council permitted them to do so. And the permanent members of the Security Council, among whom was to be the Soviet Union, could with one negative vote block any such authorization.

On the other hand, Latin-American desires on this subject, desires supported by the United States, had been made a matter of record at Mexico City. The Act of Chapultepec, it will be remembered, stated that its procedures " shall be consistent with the principles " of the world organization. If the Act, already a formally approved document when the San Francisco Conference assembled, should be found to be in conflict with *proposals* for an international organization, consistency would be achieved by modification of the proposals, not of the document.

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With the active assistance of members of the United States delegation, Latin-American states were successful at San Francisco in reversing the hierarchy of power over enforcement action envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to conform to their own previous action at Mexico City. It is true that, despite the determined and prolonged attack by many small and medium-sized states, no alteration was made in the voting procedure in the Security Council. It is further true that the paragraph of the Proposals cited above was written into the Charter of the United Nations as Article 53, to which was added an exception in the case of action against an ex-enemy state. However, in the Charter was included the all-important Article 51, which had no parallel in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. This Article reads:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual *or collective* self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, *until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.* Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security [italics mine].

Other additions to the Charter from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals emphasized the primacy of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes.

Now that the shoe was on the other foot the American republics could tighten the hemisphere regional system as much as they pleased, secure in the knowledge that there would be no unwelcome interference from the United Nations. This they proceeded to do. In their successful endeavors they were aided by policy-makers in the United States, among the most prominent of whom were Senators Connally and Vandenberg. The former symbolized Congressional participation in policy formulation designed to facilitate legislative endorsement of international agreements, while the latter exemplified the nonpartisanship of foreign affairs designed to the same end.

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Both distinguished Senators were staunch advocates of a strong inter-American system. When the State Department in 1946 repeatedly put off the projected conference to make permanent arrangements for the maintenance of collective security in the hemisphere, Senator Vandenberg publicly chafed at the delay. Nor did he accept the excuse of Argentine untrustworthiness as sufficient. " I think ", he told the Cleveland " Report from the World " Forum in January 1947, " it is past time to hold the Pan American conference which we proposed in 1945, and there to formally renew the joint new world authority which is the genius of our new world unity. . . . We face no greater need than to restore the warmth of new world unity, which reached an all-time high at San Francisco." [2] Both Senators used their powerful positions on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to delay confirmation of Spruille Braden as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American Affairs because of the latter's outspoken antipathy for the Argentine régime and his determination to force Argentine compliance with its inter-American commitments as prerequisite for the convening of the conference.

Without the positive support of the United States it is hardly conceivable that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance would have ever come to fruition in its present form. Juridical equality of all the American republics could not disguise the fact of overwhelming power possessed by the North American member. Had that member opposed this treaty, there would have been none negotiated. But at Rio de Janeiro the United States sought and obtained an agreement of a strength unequaled in previous hemisphere relations. It fought Argentine attempts to weaken the agreement and, with the backing of most Latin-American states, voted them down. Thus was disapproved an Argentine proposal to limit collective action to attack by a non-American power. More important yet was the inclusion of a provision that sanctions could be ap-

[2] Possibly the Senator was referring to the successful efforts made by the United States and Latin-American delegations to gain admission to the Conference for the delegates of Peron's régime over heated protests by representatives of certain other nations, led by those of the Soviet Union.

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plied with a two-thirds vote, as against the Argentine proposition that unanimity should be required.[3]

As written at Rio de Janeiro, therefore, the Treaty was an instrument of United States policy and as such enthusiastically endorsed by policy-makers in this country. Senator Vandenberg smoothly piloted the Treaty through the Senate. He called it, in Senatorial verbiage, "a milestone of incalculable importance upon the highroad to a happier and safer world". It was the "finest flower that has yet stemmed from the peace hopes planted in the United Nations Charter" and as such could serve as a model for the rest of the United Nations. The vote on the Treaty was overwhelming. Three months after it was signed—an insignificant period in treaty history before the Senate—ratification was approved with only one dissenting voice.

The vote on the Treaty must also be interpreted as concrete endorsement of the regional approach to American security, which by the end of 1947 had won all but complete acceptance over the universalist approach. Senator Vandenberg left no doubt as to the primacy of the regional arrangement. It was to the phrases of formal compatibility that he referred when he declared: "this pact is not a substitute for the United Nations. It is a supplement to the United Nations and part of its machinery." But it was to the reality of inter-American exclusive power over collective action within the hemisphere that Vandenberg referred later in the same speech: "the jurisdiction of the 'region' will cease whenever—but not until —'the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security' as required in its Charter. I underscore 'necessary measures'."

Final recognition of the fact that the Rio Treaty, together with the Charter of Bogota, formed the accepted foundation of the American search for international security was accorded when policy-makers sought to apply the same basic principles to another "region"—the "North Atlantic Community". Scarcely one month after the conclusion of the Bogota Conference Senator Vandenberg secured the adoption in the Senate

[3] Military measures, however, need not be undertaken by a state which has voted against them.

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by the decisive vote of 64-4 of the vitally important resolution which bears his name. Reaffirming its faith in the United Nations, the Senate advised the President that it believed the United States should move toward "2) Progressive development of the regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter", and "3) Association of the United States, by constitutional processes, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security."

There can be no doubt that the close ties forged with Latin America, after the war, inspired the Resolution. The State Department made this plain in its own document, issued in the spring of 1949 and entitled *Collective Security in the North Atlantic Area.* The pamphlet begins by citing the Vandenberg Resolution and goes on to correlate the Treaty of Reciprocal Defense with the North Atlantic Pact, negotiations over which were then being concluded.

> The Treaty of Rio [4] is a notable example of how these articles [51 and 52] and other related provisions of the Charter may be put into practical effect. That Treaty . . . provides for collective action by the American republics in the event of an armed attack against a Western Hemisphere nation, whether from within or without the Americas. A similar agreement embodying essentially the same principles has been entered into by several nations in Western Europe. This arrangement possibly means as much for security in the Western Hemisphere as does the Treaty of Rio.[5]

III

The greatly strengthened inter-American system which the United States has been actively seeking since 1933 places serious

[4] While the official title of the instrument signed at Rio de Janeiro is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, it is interchangeably cited as the Rio Treaty and the Rio Pact.

[5] The moral of course is that in the interests of hemisphere defense the United States should lend its strength to the Brussels Pact. The Brussels Pact nations are only a minority in the North Atlantic Treaty, so that this reasoning makes the latter an extension of an extension of an extension of United States arrangements to promote its own security.

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responsibility upon this country. For assistance in mitigating the effects of continued disequilibrium of the natural, European market, Latin America looks of necessity to the United States, and the same practical dependence exists on the political and military levels as well. In a sense it is ironic that the United States should have taken the lead in removing from the inter-American system appearances of North American domination at the very time it was strengthening, with Latin-American aid, hemisphere ties, which in practice could only result in greater North American power.

The Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota, makes the inter-American system as independent of the world organization as it may wish to be. To be sure the members of one are the members of the other; many of the agencies of one are affiliated with agencies of the other. But the American republics have taken the important step of expressly removing all curbs on subjects to be discussed by the system. There is some evidence that this step will be followed by increased reliance on the machinery of the system for contemplation and even solution of the manifold economic, social, educational, and even political problems of fundamental concern to the American republics. Thus will be matched functional independence with the freedom already achieved in questions of security.

Invocation of the Treaty of Reciprocal Defense in the event of threatened or actual aggression would provoke discussion by the American republics collectively of the procedure to be followed. Productive discussion would not take place in the United Nations. Should the inter-American system decide to protect itself by action under the Treaty, the United Nations would not be able to nullify or to countermand that action. Should the system, on the other hand, prefer to look the other way, the United Nations would perforce do the same thing unless invited to proceed. As guarantor of this independence of the inter-American system stands the veto power which one of its members, the United States, possesses in the Security Council of the United Nations.

The protection which the United States provides the security

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structure of the Western Hemisphere does not stop with its permanent membership in the Security Council. Action or inaction by this country will determine whether the Treaty of Reciprocal Defense is an effective instrument or another forensic flower in the lush garden of inter-American rhetoric. Does one American state attack another or threaten such an attack? Two thirds of the other American republics could vote nonmilitary sanctions against the guilty party. If the one-third minority included the United States, is it conceivable the matter would ever come to a vote? Does the attack cause a full-scale war of such a type as to indicate the advisability of force against the aggressor? Is it conceivable that the other American republics would supply that force themselves without the active assistance of the United States? Such a foolhardy course might embroil the whole continent in the flames of what was originally a localized conflict. Moreover, the rivalries and tensions which unfortunately all too frequently characterize relations between Latin nations would render difficult indeed concerted action in which the United States wilfully assumed the rôle of spectator.

At Rio de Janeiro the American states drew in exact geographic terms the line of the inter-American security zone. It stretches from pole to pole and includes Canada, Alaska and Greenland, in addition to a segment of Antarctica. A Power attacking the hemisphere from outside that line has, according to the Treaty, to reckon with the combined weight of all the American republics. This diabolical schemer for world dominion, fortunately hypothetical, would in assessing his chances of success, however, evaluate the strength, not of El Salvador, and Uruguay, or even of Argentina and Brazil, but, having committed all his fortunes to the struggle, would attach importance to the actions of the United States and possibly Canada, which is not even a member of the inter-American system.

Thus is the skeletal outline of the gigantic responsibility which the United States has assumed. It alone has the resources materially to aid Latin-American economies. It alone has the stability to promote the success of the Organization of American States. It alone has the military strength to preside over the

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arbitration of inter-American conflict of serious proportions and to discourage foreign aggression. To this country, then, Latin America must look for action. In such circumstances, with such responsibility, there can be no such thing as a policy of passivity. Anything which the United States does or does not do has a profound effect in Latin America.

The writer does not suggest that the United States had a practicable choice in fostering or refusing to foster post-war hemisphere unity. The policies of the Soviet Union since 1945 have demonstrated that the best will in Washington could not have preserved the war coalition with honor to the United States. Certain American attitudes and acts may have deepened Soviet hostility, strengthened Soviet intransigence. The only attitudes and acts completely acceptable to the Soviet Union, however, would have been endorsement of all its original demands, secondary demands made as a result of achieving the first, and so on ad infinitum.

If world security based upon bipartite agreement under an international organization was impossible of attainment, the United States was of necessity driven back upon something less than the best. At this precise point were encountered growing demands by Latin-American republics for a strengthening of the inter-American system. Latin America was affected only indirectly by Soviet-United States relations unless they deteriorated into open military conflict. In such event the history of Nazi aggression had taught the advantage of United States commitment to hemisphere protection and the concurrent advantage of a united hemisphere behind the United States. Latin objectives therefore coincided with those of the United States. Only Peron's Argentina possibly deemed itself capable of playing a lone hand in the politics of the post-war world, and even Argentina at Rio formally abandoned its minority position.

Although advantages to the other American republics of a tightly knit regional system independent of any dictation from a world organization are fairly evident, not so apparent are the dangers to United States policy. One must not fall prey to the delusion that Latin America in itself can contribute directly to our own security. Material resources to the south of us are as-

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sets to the industrial potential of the United States. Furthermore American policy derives considerable benefit from the knowledge that the overwhelming majority of Latin-American countries will support this country in an emergency. In terms of military security, however, Latin America is a liability, not an asset. Sixteen small, weak countries must look to the United States for their safety. The four remaining are somewhat larger but show themselves also to be helpless in the pitiless light of modern war. They too must look to the United States for protection. Under the Treaty of Reciprocal Defense we are pledged to their defense. It is morally correct and to our concrete advantage that this is so. But it is dangerous to believe that the Monroe Doctrine has thereby been inter-Americanized in all its meanings and implications. The Doctrine has been inter-Americanized only in the sense that Latin America now officially recognizes the necessity of contributing to its own defense, and the United States for its part now officially acknowledges the value of the Latin contribution.

The regional arrangements created between the American republics since the war may eliminate some, but by no means all,[6] of the dangers to the United States within the locality. Nonetheless it should be plain that security within the hemisphere is only part, and a minor one at that, of the type of world security that United States policy seeks. Policy-makers well know that the crucial focus of American relations lies in Europe and Asia, not buried in the jungles and mountains of Latin America.

Knowledge, however, is not enough if it is followed by attempts to achieve true world security by the piecemeal application to other so-called "regions" of the principles applied within the inter-American system. The problems confronted in Europe and Asia are not those to be found in the Western Hemisphere, if only because the individual states on those great continents have had no continued experience with American

[6] None of the basic instruments of the system are competent to meet the techniques of internal penetration of minds and institutions which is practiced by the Soviet Union. Condemnation of the techniques, as in Resolution XXXII of Bogota, is in itself ineffective unless implemented by a positive social, economic and political, as well as ideological, program designed explicitly to meet and defeat communism on the levels of its greatest appeal.

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power and have not been and are not now as defenseless economically, politically, militarily and psychologically as the small Latin-American countries. Where the problems are different, the techniques of statecraft must adapt themselves. Within the inter-American system United States policy, it is submitted, stands to gain from the positive encouragement of such independence as is compatible with the reality of proximity to American power. In its relations with other so-called regions, because the facts of American power in application to those regions are profoundly changed, American policy should have as its ultimate objective the promotion of true independence and freedom of action.

Finally, it should be fully appreciated that progressive additions of security arrangements with various "regions" cannot add up to the type of world security which the United States seeks. This concept was basic in the minds of those who sought the establishment of a strong United Nations. The failure to date of the United Nations to operate in the effective manner envisaged by the advocates of the first-mentioned alternate American policy should not lead us to believe that by piling regional blocs on top of one another the United States can easily climb to the apex of world security. Even if the crushing difficulty of defining a "region" for such purposes is ignored, the total is truly infinitely greater than the sum of its parts. In this light such regional arrangements as the United States has made or will make must be viewed, not as ends in themselves, but as expedients, enforced means to a greater goal. In a world that finds man endowed with the instruments to make his civilization if not himself extinct, the end of United States policy can only be the effective operation of a world organization gradually assuming increasing responsibilities. The doors to such an end must be left open—must be constantly reopened if seemingly closed from the other side—to all the nations whose cooperation is indispensable to the attainment of that goal.

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THE LESSON OF A JAPANESE REVOLUTION

THE conflict in Korea directs our attention once more to a culture area with which we are almost totally unfamiliar and yet with which we must now treat on the most intimate terms. That such ignorance comes high in the military and political arenas, to say nothing of the ideological, events have already sufficiently demonstrated. It appears that here, and elsewhere, decisions of diplomacy are all too often based on either unsound or misread historical data, or on both. The facts point to serious flaws in our appraisals of foreign cultures and serve to underline, in a sense, our historic tendency to interpret affairs outside our borders with an egocentrism at once confident and naïve.

Always, for us, foreigners have played their political dramas after the American prototype. The Great Revolution in France was a repeat performance—in another language—of our fight of 1776. The German struggle for nationhood only duplicated the trials of our Confederation years. Even the stirring revolutions of the first decade of the twentieth century that convulsed China, Turkey, Mexico and Russia drew their inspiration from the United States—this time, it seemed, from the Progressive Movement. The world, we were sure, was being made over with methodical certainty in the image of a benign Uncle Sam.

Now that the mid-century finds us with world-wide commitments more extensive than ever before, it is worth our while to consider a past episode in which there was a serious misappraisal by the State Department of Oriental affairs—the so-called Restoration of the Emperor Meiji to the Japanese throne in 1867. This great event had abiding consequences not only for Japan but for the Occident as well—something that could, perhaps, not have been foretold contemporaneously but that should not have been so lightly dismissed.

The story as now understood is in itself a fascinating one.[1]

[1] The outstanding studies, superbly executed, are E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), and the same author's *Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origin of Conscription* (New York, 1943).

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By the middle of the nineteenth century, feudalism in Japan was in real crisis, just at the moment when Commodore Perry was making his insistent demand that Nippon open her gates to American commerce. This feudalism dated from the seventeenth century when the Tokugawa family had ensconced itself in the hereditary military dictatorship, known as the shogunate, that wielded almost absolute power. Of course it made due obeisance to the Emperor at Miyako, now Kyoto, but he was relegated to a position as embroidered with sanctity and honor as it was devoid of power. Shoring up the system was a rigid class structure that gave the samurai, or warrior class, dominance over the commoners. Such an arrangement could prosper only so long as Japan remained sealed against the wiles of foreigners. It was natural for this feudalism to strengthen its position by frowning sternly upon trade as a means of livelihood, an attitude which served further to reinforce the opposition to the commercial Portuguese and Spanish who were barred from the country.

The Tokugawa had not achieved hegemony in Japan without a struggle, and the vassals or *daimyo* were divided into those who had originally supported the family (*fudai*) and those who had opposed it (*tozama*). To make certain that both groups remained loyal to the shogunate, it created an insidious device known as the *sankin-kotai* which forced the *daimyo* to leave their families behind them as hostages at Yedo, now Tokyo, when they went to their fiefs. This traveling to and from the shogun's capital served the dual purpose of instilling humility and of draining surplus cash away from potentially subversive activity.

Yet, despite the vigilance of the *bakufu*, as the shogun's government was known, the *tozama* of four southwestern provinces, Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa, retained a virility and a resentment that would not die. These clans by virtue of their geographical position were far more interested in sea-borne trade and industry than in the sterile agriculture of the north. Nevertheless, the forces arrayed against the *Satcho Dohi,* as the four recalcitrant provinces were called, were considerable, for the shogun had at his beck and call the samurai of the loyal *daimyo* who spent their lives training for war.

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However, there was another side of the shield: to support such a parasitic class meant increasing the burden on the producers of society—the peasantry. Since there was a limit beyond which the land could not support these idle retainers, some samurai slipped into the cities to become *ronin,* that is, warriors who had been freed from or had abjured, out of necessity, their feudal bonds. These men later supplied the manpower for the urban anti-shogun movement, armed as they were with Western technical knowledge most of which they picked up clandestinely.

Meanwhile, the Japanese world did not remain as static as the *bakufu* would have had it. The despised merchant and moneylender, often of *ronin* origin, found increasing areas of activity as accelerated manufacturing created unwonted demands among the *daimyo* and as the periodic trips to Yedo necessitated borrowing on an unprecedented scale. The burden, in a good Oriental tradition, was passed on to the peasant who in turn borrowed in order to meet obligations and, therefore, frequently found himself without land. In such circumstances, the samurai grew more and more resentful of a system which demanded intense loyalty and offered decreasing economic rewards in return. The result was the expected one: samurai were willing to yield up their prestige in exchange for marriages into merchant families. A by-product was the creation of a Trojan horse of such families within the ancient clans.

A dissatisfied samurai class, a suppressed merchant class, and a miserable peasantry could be joined with the southwestern clans and the Emperor's court in a common cause. The slogan " Revere the Emperor! " proved to be a sturdy cement for these divergent groups—useful as an appeal to patriotism and useful in undermining the shogun as a usurper of the imperial power, since the theory of the shogunate had been based on the assumption that the Emperor, who was the ultimate repository of sovereignty, did not rule because his person was too sacred. Shortly another propaganda slogan " Expel the foreigner! " became, in the hands of the anti-shogun forces, equally devastating because it repeated, to the shogun's great and obvious chagrin, his own sentiments of two hundred years standing, just at the moment when the *bakufu* was physically weakened to such a degree that opposition to the Westerner was impossible.

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The *tozama* were interested in an exclusion policy only to the extent that it would weaken their antagonists. By a continuous series of deliberately precipitated incidents with Occidentals, the shogunate was kept in a perpetual state of perplexity and fear by its determined internal enemies.

In the end, the leadership of the rebellion devolved upon the samurai who were able to lead Japan into a new era that saw the shogunate destroyed and the Emperor Meiji "restored". More important, though, the nation was brought to build modern arms and to effect the transformation from the feudal to the industrial age with enormous speed. In the process, a capitalistic superstructure was welded onto a militaristic-bureaucratic base with all the danger that that portended.

But how were these incidents reported by American officials in Japan in the 1860's? Our representatives were fulsome in the quantity of their reports, and the "Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs" attest to the diligence of their work. Our first accredited envoy to Nippon was Townsend Harris of New York, whose qualifications for that post were of the highest. He arrived in Japan in 1857 and soon wrote Secretary of State Lewis Cass a description of Yedo which contained the striking word sketch of the samurai he saw there: "They haunt the streets in great numbers, frequently in a state of intoxication and being always armed, are not only prompt in taking offence, but ready to seek it." [2] Harris clearly comprehended that Yedo was not a commercial city and that opposition would be engendered there by any untoward attempt to expand trading facilities. However, Harris did not realize that Yedo, as the shogun's stronghold, was an atypical Japanese city. Besides, with no qualms he passed on a copy of the *bakufu's* plea to him to use his influence to postpone the opening of additional ports to trade, in the face of lower-class sufferings resulting from a price rise blamed on the opening of the country.[3]

The New Yorker never caught up with events. When the

[2] 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, *Message of the President of the United States. . . ,* "Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1156), p. 793. Hereafter cited as "Foreign Affairs".

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 795.

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Japanese authorities, the *bakufu,* attempted to apprehend Japanese assailants of the British Legation in July 1861, he joyfully informed Secretary of State William H. Seward that this was the first evidence that the government desired to protect foreigners in Japan—a statement only partially true. In the same dispatch he maintained that a party opposed to foreigners, which he did not identify further, had come into being.[4]

Washington, meanwhile, was embroiled heavily in the larger consideration of civil war at home. Yet the busy Seward took time to pen words of advice and encouragement to Robert H. Pruyn, also from New York, who had succeeded Harris as minister in 1861 but who did not arrive in Yedo until 1862. Under the impact of the American war the Secretary asked:

> But what will be the influence of the news of our divisions among the semi-barbarians of Japan, magnified and painted, as they will doubtless be, by strangers, enemies of the republic, its prosperity, and its power? Will the government of Japan retain the fear which, perhaps, was the best guarantee of its good will towards us? Will the misguided faction in Japan, so hostile to all foreigners, suffer the government to remain in friendship with a nation that will seem to them to have lost the virtue of patriotism so essential to command the respect of other nations? [5]

Pruyn does not appear to have given his superior a satisfactory answer, if indeed one was possible. His most candid observation was that everything "is so enveloped in mystery here that it is extremely difficult . . . to arrive at the truth." [6] He felt himself to be in an uncivilized area of the world and complained that contacts with the Japanese were not unlike American relations with the Indian tribes! [7] Shortly afterwards, better judgment returned, albeit uninformed; for Pruyn wrote to the Department that, while it seemed to him that the party in favor of the exclusion of foreigners (actually the pro-

[4] 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1117), p. 437.

[5] 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs", p. 817.

[6] 38th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1181), p. 1028.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 1035-36.

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Emperor group) appeared to be stronger than the " party of progress ", he believed that in the final accounting the latter would win.[8] That the " party of progress " was the party of the *status quo* our minister never found out. So it is ironic to learn that subsequently Seward blithely expressed the wish that Pruyn would " advance the cause of civilization in the Japanese empire." [9]

In the beginning of 1863 two representatives of the shogun called on the American representative to discuss affairs of state. They told Pruyn humbly that public agitation against foreigners had abated somewhat. The difficulty, they said, lay in the fact that two unfriendly *daimyo*—obviously *tozama*—had aroused the Emperor against the opening of Japanese ports, but that the shogun through representations to Miyako expected to " remove these prejudices from the mind of the Mikado." Of course, it was pointed out to Pruyn, any attempt to punish these stubborn *daimyo* would precipitate a civil war. What, they inquired, would be the American attitude in the event of such a conflict? Pruyn could only reply that he expected that we would support the shogun.[10]

The opportunity to test these sentiments presented itself sooner than expected. In 1862 an unfortunate Englishman named Richardson had run afoul of Japanese protocol by refusing, out of ignorance, to draw to the side of a road as a procession of the Lord of Satsuma passed by. With little hesitation the enraged samurai cut him down. The British, as one might imagine, demanded satisfaction. This was a source of immediate and desperate embarrassment to the shogun. To yield would be destructive of his position in the country. To refuse to yield would be equally disastrous because it would almost certainly bring on armed retribution. When *nothing* was done about it, the British bombarded Kagoshima, Satsuma's capital city. In the face of this pressure, the shogun submitted and agreed to pay an indemnity. Two things had happened: the

[8] 38th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, " Foreign Affairs " (ser. 1181), p. 1041.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 1053.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 1066-69.

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shogun's military debility was fully revealed; and Satsuma learned the potential usefulness of arming along Western lines.

Pruyn, despite his support of the shogun, could not see these consequences. That was patent the following year when the Lord of Choshu ordered the Inland Sea closed to foreign ships. Almost immediately an American merchant vessel was fired upon as it attempted to navigate the Straits of Shimonoseki. Other countries were soon similarly involved. As a result, a joint punitive expedition was assembled by the British, French and Dutch which the United States was invited to join. Pruyn assented without hesitation although the best that he could do at a time when we were involved in the American Civil War was to improvise a warship by dressing up a chartered merchant ship with a gun. The shogun was helpless, and the outcome of the expedition was a foregone conclusion. Bombardment of Shimonoseki, the principal Choshu city, brought about the desired chastisement of the malefactor. By the time the expedition got under way it seems no longer to have been interested primarily in securing the fulfillment of treaty obligations but in crushing an obviously dangerous and disturbing enemy of the shogun. However, when the smoke had cleared, the *bakufu* was saddled with an indemnity bill of $3,000,000, with the United States share amounting to $785,000. In view of the insolvent condition of the shogunate and our stated desire to support it in a civil war, this was strange diplomatic behavior.

The American minister convinced himself that the shogunate was powerful enough to hold its position despite the forces disposed against it. It may have been wishful thinking on his part, but Pruyn felt that only in that way could there be brought about " the most marvelous changes " he hoped to see in Japan.[11]

Pruyn sent home a copy of a letter purporting to be from the Mikado to the shogun, in which the former urged immediate banishment of foreigners from the country. Seward's reaction was a firm insistence that no abrogation of treaties be countenanced.[12] In April 1863 the much-heralded meeting of

[11] 38th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, " Foreign Affairs " (ser. 1181), pp. 1066-69.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 1099.

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the shogun and the Emperor was scheduled to take place in Miyako. The American was optimistic that the shogun would emerge the victor.[13] The tension mounted steadily. Meanwhile, a *ronin* uprising, which took place in Yokohama, went unpunished, to Pruyn's great displeasure. But, while he busied himself lamenting the violence, he allowed the significance of it to escape him, since he defined *ronin* merely as "two sworded men without means of support."[14] Soon Seward received a dispatch from Nippon that a more amenable shogun had been selected by the Emperor to carry out the exclusion policy.[15]

Japanese society befuddled Pruyn to a point where he informed Seward: "Time alone can disclose whether this government is acting with duplicity in their intercourse with the foreign representatives, or in their relations with the leading daimios."[16] He felt that the ideas that poured into Japan as a result of Perry's visit were far more important than the trade that opened. "The mercantile class, and the people generally, are beginning to learn they have rights", he thought.[17] Seward, thousands of miles away, of course, concluded that the struggle in Japan really was the same as the one that went on in other countries. He wrote: "Thus we seem to have now found out that the Mikado is a spiritual power, while the Tycoon is purely a temporal authority; that the aristocracy, while revering the spiritual authority, control it, and employ it to embarrass the temporal government."[18] The simple solution, agreed upon by Pruyn, Seward, and apparently President Lincoln, was to obtain the Emperor's consent to the treaties with foreign nations—the very bone of contention.[19]

All of this is not to say that Pruyn's mission to Japan was a failure. On the contrary, his contributions were of a high order,

[13] 38th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1181), p. 1074.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 1100.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 1104-6.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 1108-9.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1218), p. 589.

[19] 39th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1246), pp. 230-31.

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from the immediate point of view. He successfully discouraged other foreign representatives in Nippon from pressing indemnity claims which would only have weakened the shogun still further. His willingness to employ force against obdurate clansmen brought new respect for the United States. What is fundamental, though, is that he significantly underestimated the weakness of the shogun. Furthermore, in insisting upon the fulfillment of the treaty obligations entered into by the Japanese, he further enervated the faction he sought to bolster.

In December 1865, President Andrew Johnson sent still another New Yorker to the minister's post in Japan; this time it was Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, ex-Congressman and Civil War officer, who never was prepared for the labyrinthian maze of Japanese affairs. The upshot was that when the shogun died in August 1866 and was succeeded by one pliable to the wishes of the southwestern clans, our minister simply reported to Seward that the latter "have not only sent in their adherence to Hitotsbasi [the new shogun] but have sent their contingents of troops to aid him." [20] The shogunate was *in extremis*. A major revolution had taken place, unknown to the State Department.

Van Valkenburgh had so far misjudged the course of events as to conclude that the Prince of Choshu represented a state rights party and the shogun the central power.[21] The Japanese civil war had blurred in his vision into the American War of the Rebellion! He only gradually became aware that governmental authority in Japan was returning to the Emperor after a long absence; for by 1867 the outline of Japanese events was unmistakable. The Emperor died and was replaced by a minor who was easily dominated. The revolution was almost complete, the antiforeign outlook no longer served a purpose, and visits by Japanese officials to the legations were sanctioned—all of which was regarded by Van Valkenburgh as evidence that the Nipponese were making progress in civilization.[22]

[20] 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1282), pp. 219-20.

[21] 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, "Foreign Affairs" (ser. 1323), pp. 18-19.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

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That this minister took a myopic view of the basic changes in Japanese life should have been expected. After all, he understood himself to be charged only with the responsibility of maintaining treaties, originally entered into by his predecessors, and of expanding trading facilities. That he did well. Had he not called Seward's attention to the fact that the Japanese silk industry could be brought up to the level of the French and Italian by the expedient of introducing necessary machinery and knowledge?

Luckily for us, our inadequate knowledge of the Japanese side of the Restoration story did not, at the time, imperil us. Choshu and Satsuma, having learned their Western lessons through bitter and costly experience, seized the opportunity to come to power. They mobilized and armed the peasantry which, employing Occidental military tactics, destroyed the hostile samurai. Then that peasantry became the instrumentality of Asiatic expansion. The feudal structure was retained; and it pleased and profited the merchant class to serve it. After 1868 the government was only too willing to coöperate with foreigners in order to avoid the grim fate of China. Throughout our own Civil War generation, and at least until the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, we looked upon Nippon as a country that was rapidly "Westernizing", and since we examined only externals, we rejoiced mightily. One day we were cruelly called to account for our sanguine judgment of Japanese development.

This example of American misunderstanding of Japan has an impressive timeliness today, at a moment when we are being urged to invest capital in the so-called backward areas of the world, and are girding to protect them from aggression. Once more, as in the 1860's, we will come face to face with alien traditions. Past Japanese-American relations bid us look at non-Western civilizations, not as we would like them to be, but as they are, *sui generis*. A great Power can, perhaps, afford to err occasionally in formulating policy; for it to act habitually out of misinformation regarding foreign cultures may be to court total disaster.

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NOTE ON "DID LABOR SUPPORT JACKSON?: THE BOSTON STORY" *

THE article by Edward Pessen in the June 1949 issue of this QUARTERLY, "Did Labor Support Jackson?: The Boston Story", brings up an interesting problem in the use of election returns in the examination of certain historical hypotheses. There is no doubt that it is useful to look at the returns when we are making statements about how people voted, and it is a refreshing sign of the times that Mr. Pessen has dug out of contemporary documents the voting figures and some information about the areas from which the votes came. The problem for Mr. Pessen, and for the historians and political scientists who are increasingly turning to vote distributions as indications of the opinions of the populace, is how to use these statistics once they have been gathered. It is unfortunate, since his idea is so good, that Mr. Pessen has not used the most appropriate method.

In this study, apparently one of a series on the Jackson period, Boston was chosen for analysis, and Boston is a city which *as a whole* was pro-Whig and anti-Jacksonian during most of the period studied. Mr. Pessen's figures show, for instance, that in the 1828 Presidential election Boston split its vote 21 per cent for Jackson to 79 per cent for the Whig candidate, and in 1832 (considering only the two parties' vote) the split was 27 per cent to 73 per cent in favor of the Whigs. In both of these elections, of course, the Democrats won decisively in the country as a whole.

With the whole climate of opinion so much in favor of one party we would expect that any section within the city would still tend to lean toward the Whigs, regardless of its social composition. If the twelve wards in Boston are ranked according to assessed valuation per capita, we can see that even the poorest wards were apt to be pro-Whig. It is pointed out that in 1828 "in only one working-class [low-evaluation] ward did he [Jackson] receive more than one third

* The idea for this Note came from Paul F. Lazarsfeld of the Bureau of Applied Social Research. Under his direction, the Bureau has conducted a number of studies applying new techniques developed in the social sciences to old questions of political behavior. For two statements of the problems involved, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Raymond Franzen, "Prediction of Political Behavior in America", *American Sociological Review*, vol. X, April 1945, and Robert T. Bower, "Opinion Research and the Historical Interpretation of Elections", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall, 1948.

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of the vote" (p. 265). From the fact that in many of the Boston elections, local and national, the Whigs won out in "working-class" areas, Mr. Pessen comes to a general negative answer to the question posed in the title of his article.

It is not too illuminating to discover that even relatively poor areas often voted over 50 per cent Whig in a predominantly Whig city. We should expect also that a very pro-Jackson city would show considerable support for the Democrats even in its richer wards. There is no argument with Mr. Pessen over the choice of the city, but if he is to solve the question "Did Labor Support Jackson?" he must use some tool of analysis that will neutralize the effect of the general level of voting in the area and allow us to see to what degree voting Whig or Democratic is related to the socio-economic nature of the wards, regardless of how the city as a whole voted.

This can be done by disregarding the absolute size of the vote and devoting attention to the *relative* size of the vote as it varies from ward to ward in correlation with the richness or poorness of the wards.

Even a casual glance at the material from this point of view reveals a clear relationship between Democratic voting and the social characteristics of the areas. To take a case where the relationship is particularly striking, we might rearrange the order of the wards according to the degree to which it is of a working-class nature (measured by assessed valuation) and see how the Democratic vote (as a proportion of the Democratic and Whig vote combined) in 1836 corresponds:

Ward No.	*1835 Assessed Value per Person*	*1836 Democratic Vote as % of Total*
12	171.04	51
3	214.93	49
1	234.06	53
5	240.61	36
2	356.06	65
11	367.80	35
10	469.28	29
4	617.95	40
6	712.34	34
9	739.59	29
8	868.08	20
7	1,188.78	23

Many areas are out of line, but the general tendency for the working-class wards to give more support to the Democratic party is unmistakable.

Relationships such as this are commonly expressed in terms of a *coefficient of correlation.* This is a measure ranging from *zero,* indicating no relationship between two series of numbers, to *one* (plus or minus), indicating a perfect co-variation. The Pearson correlation

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coefficient for the example above is .73.[1] It is important to note that if we added 20 per cent to the Democratic total in each ward to simulate conditions in a much more pro-Jackson city, or subtracted 20 per cent to simulate a more anti-Jackson situation, the coefficient of correlation would remain exactly the same. Thus the relationship between number of workingmen and Democratic voting can be measured even in a region that is atypical in total vote.

If we examine, first, the three Presidential elections from 1828 to 1836, we find that the laboring-class districts tended to be pro-Democratic even in 1828, which Mr. Pessen assures us "was not a contest between rich and poor."

Year	*Correlation Coefficient*
1828	.53
1832	.56
1836	.73

The Bank issue of 1832 appears to have made little difference as far as the alignment of workers went. In 1836, however, we see a marked increase in the tendency toward voting along socio-economic lines, and there is good evidence that the workers gave their support more overwhelmingly to Van Buren, Jackson's aristocratic Democratic successor, than they did to Jackson himself.

In the state gubernatorial election we also find a clear tendency for the working-class wards to support the Democratic candidate to a greater degree than the richer wards.

Year	*Correlation Coefficient*
1829	.30
1830	.37
1831	.48
1833	.58
1834	.64
1835	.70

It is interesting to note again that the split in voting between economic groups widened steadily during these six years. The workers were apparently coming more and more to consider themselves Democrats, both in state and national affairs.

[1] A description of the Pearson coefficient of correlation can be found in most statistics texts. See, for instance, Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, *Applied General Statistics* (New York, 1939), pp. 667-673. The signs of all the coefficients used here are minus, since Democratic voting is negatively correlated with assessed valuation. Level of significance has been disregarded here, since the main purpose is to demonstrate the application of a technique rather than settle the matter of labor's support for Jackson.

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Three of the four local elections for which Mr. Pessen gives us figures revealed the same pattern of voting along economic lines. The "Workingmen's" party, the authenticity of whose name Mr. Pessen doubts, apparently was a party composed largely of workingmen, for we get a correlation between the vote in 1830 and the economic index of .73. It received only about a fifth of the total vote in Boston, but most of this came from the working-class wards. For 1835 and 1836 the correlations with Democratic voting are .64 and .65 respectively. Only in 1831, with the "Independents" running against the Whigs do we see very little relationship with the economic factor. The correlation coefficient here is .10, indicating a slight tendency for workers to vote more for the Independents.

There is not a single election during this period in which the appearance of a Democratic candidate did not cause a split along economic lines. The conclusion, in so far as these data go (and disregarding the danger of generalizing from so few cases), is that Jackson and his political allies *did* get their support from working-class groups.

The fact that Mr. Pessen may have been a little hasty in his interpretation should not blind us to the value of such reëxaminations of historical hypotheses. In fact this analysis of the Jackson era suggests another study that might be done, if the appropriate election returns are available, which could prove very illuminating. The popular explanation of historians of the "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too" election of 1840 is that Harrison won over Van Buren by stealing the thunder of the Democrats in appeals to the masses. If this theory is correct in a local area such as Boston, we should find a complete disruption of the relationship between Democratic voting and low economic status that we have found building up during the Jackson period. If someone familiar with the appropriate methods would analyze the 1840 returns, we might have evidence to support or refute this theory.

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REVIEWS

The Case of General Yamashita. By A. FRANK REEL. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949.—vi, 324 pp. $4.00.

Mr. Reel, while a Captain in the United States Army, served as one of the American defense counsel for General Tomoyuki Yamashita who, from October 29 until December 7, 1945, was tried in Manila by a United States Military Commission. The "tiger of Malaya" was found guilty of having violated the laws of war between October 9, 1944 and September 2, 1945 while Military Governor of the Philippine Islands and Commander of the Japanese forces there. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 6 to 2 decision (Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision), denied application for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition, and the death sentence was carried out on February 23, 1946.

In this book, Mr. Reel presents his own version of the historic case. The ever-repeated thesis of the book is that the trial and conviction of Yamashita are a stain on the shield of American justice.

There can be no disagreement with the author that, however immense be the crimes dealt with in any trial, and whether the defendant be friend or foe, justice must never sink to the level of revenge and hypocrisy. If Mr. Reel were to prove his extraordinary accusations there would, indeed, be cause for concern. In the opinion of this reader, he has not done so.

Mr. Reel has chosen to write a "popular" book. Large portions are dedicated to highly biased anecdotes and to "human interest" vignettes, few of which bear directly on the important aspects of the case but most of which are calculated to deprecate the trial. The author states that the majority and minority views of the Supreme Court deserve careful analysis, "but not in a book of this type". Yet, the rather complicated technical questions of procedural, military, constitutional and international law which are dealt with in those decisions are discussed at length in the book. Too often, however, the treatment is categorical, and there is a tendency to derive arguments from anecdotes and irrelevant side issues.

Mr. Reel elaborates on three points: (1) that the rules of evidence under the Pacific Regulations were unfair; (2) that the doctrine of

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" command responsibility " (better described as the doctrine of " commander's duty to supervise ") under which Yamashita was convicted is unfair; (3) that counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare their affirmative defense.

As to the rules of evidence, the Commission declared admissible (in addition to " orthodox " evidence) such evidence " *as in the Commission's opinion* would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man " (p. 194). Mr. Reel considers this " free evidence " rule as " unbelievable " and unheard-of, especially in Anglo-Saxon procedure. Yet, the fact is that essentially identical rules are contained, for example, in the British Royal Warrant of 14 June 1945, Regulation 8 and have been habitually applied by British Military Courts, such as in the " Belsen Concentration Camp Trial " (Luneburg, 7 September-17 November 1945), in the " Killinger Trial " (Wuppertal, 26 November-3 December 1945), and in the " Golkel case " (12-21 May 1946). The same is true of the Australian War Crimes Act of 11 October 1945 and the Canadian War Crimes Act of 31 August 1946.

An American lawyer, of course, may dislike the " free evidence " rule; he may discard the fact that it has worked for decades, as Professor Quincy Wright says, " in many civilized countries " to general satisfaction. But there is no rule under international law which compels the application of any *particular* municipal law in the trial of foreigners under international law. Just as a combatant may not be punished for violating in the conduct of war the domestic substantive rules of the enemy, but only for violations of international law, so he may not complain if he is tried under procedural rules which may, or may not, differ from those of his municipal law. In fact, Japanese criminal procedure, being influenced by German law, is based on the free-evidence principle. Mr. Reel (and the two dissenting Supreme Court justices) overlooks the fact that " international law cannot apply the technicalities of any system of municipal law but must discover the general principles underlying all civilized systems of law and the customs inherent in international practice as evidenced by conventions, diplomatic discussions, and opinions of international tribunals and text writers." [1] It is also a somewhat insular view to believe that foreigners will consider all American procedural rules as fair or " natural ". For example, in various civilized countries it is considered a basic right that the defendant's main examinations in court be made by the impartial tribunal itself; and that he must *never* be

[1] Quincy Wright, " Due Process and International Law ", *American Journal of International Law,* vol. 40, No. 2, April 1946, p. 402.

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examined *under oath.* A verdict reached by American-style examination would invariably be quashed because it would be considered violative of basic rights of the defendant, as *they* see it.

Mr. Reel, in agreement with the two dissenting justices of the Supreme Court, emphatically endeavors to stipulate that foreign soldiers must be tried, *not* under *general* (international) standards of fair trial, but under the specific rules of the enemy. Strangely enough, he maintains that otherwise the rights of American soldiers in the future may be jeopardized. But the fact has escaped him that the general principles of fair trial may give *more* protection than would the procedural rules of the country conducting the trial. We only have to remember the "rules" of Nazi and Japanese "judicial procedure" to realize this.

However, Mr. Reel himself invalidates his attacks on the "heretical" evidence. He fails, it is true, to quote the statement of the Opinion that 286 (!) witnesses were heard in the trial "most of whom gave eye-witness accounts of what they endured or what they saw." But he agrees throughout that, in essence, the unbelievable atrocities as revealed by the witnesses, did occur, and were proved.

The author's second principal objection is against a *doctrine* that was expressed in the indictment, accepted in the decision, and found to be correct by the Supreme Court majority; namely, that a commander's failure to protect the population and enemy prisoners under his jurisdiction against outrages, *when the outrages are widespread,* constitutes a violation of the laws of war, if all circumstances of the case are duly considered. Mr. Reel argues that the very magnitude of the crimes committed by Yamashita's troops reveals the injustice of the decision. This is strange reasoning. While no judgment may be based on a desire for revenge, a judgment may be absolutely fair, even if the revelations made during the trial *could* have excited the revengeful. The only question is whether the decision is correct under the law.

Now, the doctrine under which Yamashita was convicted is by no means as new, far-fetched or dangerous as the author maintains. It is regrettable that he gives the nonprofessional reader an impression which the professional reader would not accept. He insists indignantly that Yamashita was punished "simply because he was somebody" (p. 179). This is misleading, to say the least. He was convicted because he was found to have failed to do what he was under affirmative legal obligation to do. It is not a new-fangled doctrine that criminal offenses can be committed by omission as well as by commission, particularly

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if the omission is in itself a violation of a positive legal duty to act. A large literature exists on this topic.

Nor is this a new theory under American military law, as the majority decision of the Supreme Court pointed out. The same principles were laid down, even before 1944, in Article 347 of the American Rules of Land Warfare. There it was stipulated that a commander is responsible for crimes committed by his troops, irrespective of whether they were ordered by him or by another.[2] Three United States Military Tribunals, sitting in Nürnberg, applied the doctrine of "commander's duty" in decisions which were confirmed by General Lucius D. Clay.[3]

In Mr. Reel's own view, it is "elementary" that he who fails to exercise the degree of care necessary under the circumstances is responsible for the consequences of his dereliction of duty; but, he asserts, this elementary principle can, "of course", not apply to the military because they *always* deal with "dangerous instrumentalities" such as guns, bombs and armies (p. 165). Such theory has never, to the knowledge of this reader, been proposed before. It would mean that the more dangerous an instrumentality a person has to handle, the smaller is his responsibility; that every American soldier ever convicted of careless handling of ammunition was wrongly sentenced; and it would do away with the laws of war, if they are violated by what the Supreme Court called an "uncontrolled soldiery" (p. 262).

We come, then, to the third principal complaint of Mr. Reel. Evidently, the defense counsel did not rely on the theory that commanders can never be responsible for mass barbarities of their troops and officers, because armies are "dangerous instrumentalities". Furthermore, the defense saw no chance to shake the evidence revealing the widespread nature of the offenses, since the cumulative effect was so overwhelming. Mr. Reel omits the following passage from the decision: "The accused made no attempt to deny that the crimes were committed, although some deaths were attributed by Defense Counsel to legal execution of armed guerillas, hazards of battle and action of guerilla troops favourable to Japan." Hence, the main argument which the defense endeavored to prove affirmatively was that con-

[2] *Cf.* Judgment of U. S. Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, in the case of U. S. *vs.* Otto Ohlendorf *et al.* ("Einsatzgruppen case"), transcript p. 6751.

[3] Medical Case Judgment, p. 70 (it is affirmatively quoted in the Einsatzgruppen Judgment, cited above, on transcript p. 6795); United Nations War Crimes Commission, *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals* (London, 1949), vol. XII, p. 76; *ibid.*, vol. VIII, p. 89.

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ditions, during the entire period when the offenses occurred, were such that Yamashita was not negligent when he failed to counteract, to prevent or even to know them.

As said before, the Japanese general was convicted under the "he knew or had to know" rule of negligence, characteristic of the crime of omission of which he was accused. Therefore, the Commission did not have to establish whether he knew of the criminal orders of his subordinate commanders and the criminal acts of his troops, but whether he *would* have known *if* he had fulfilled the duties positively imposed upon him by international law. In this respect, the defense claimed that Yamashita's situation was so extraordinarily difficult that he cannot be blamed for not having learned of the true situation. That was the essence of its case. Now, it is essential to point out that, on this point, the defense *did* persuade the Commission. It won its point as far as the facts were concerned, but lost it as far as their *weight* was concerned—an important distinction stressed by the Supreme Court. The Commission declared: "The defense *established* the difficulties faced by the Accused with respect not only to the swift and overpowering advance of American forces, but also to the errors of his predecessors, weaknesses in organization, equipment, supply . . . training, communication, discipline and morale of his troops" (p. 264). As the majority decision of the Supreme Court says, if the Commission nonetheless found that Yamashita failed to take the measures "required by the circumstances", this constituted weighing of the evidence with which the Supreme Court could not concern itself.

But since such jurisdictional rules do not apply to the writer of a book, Mr. Reel would have had the opportunity to show the reasons why, in his opinion, Yamashita was unable to learn of, or even to suspect, the misbehavior of his subordinates. (It appears that, in the view of the defense, suspicion on his part would have warranted affirmative action.) This would have been particularly important because some of Mr. Reel's passing remarks are bound to raise questions in the mind of the reader. For example: (1) Yamashita emphasized that the guerillas constituted one of his major problems (p. 110). On 11 October 1944, two days after assuming the command, he issued his order for "the 'subjugation' of '*armed* guerillas'" (p. 106). But the guerillas constantly grew, because of the manner Yamashita's order was carried out by, what Mr. Reel calls, "bloody mass executions and 'punitive expeditions'", "deliberate forays . . . decreed and at times even supervised by officers of locally garrisoned echelons" (p. 104). Only in the Philippines did the Japanese encounter such

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guerillas. Why did Yamashita see no need for finding out the reason? (2) But at one point, he "cautioned" his officers (p. 109). Why did he do so, if he did not suspect the "fanatical thoroughness and ferocity" of his troops? (p. 104). (3) In November 1944, Yamashita told Filipino President Laurel that "undoubtedly there would arise . . . difficulties" between his troops and the population, and expressly asked Laurel to report them to him (p. 156). (4) Thereupon, "Some time later, Laurel . . . told Yamashita . . . of complaints of overzealousness on the part of the military police" (p. 156). How is Yamashita's assertion that he never had reason for suspicion reconciled with this formal *démarche* by Laurel, made at Yamashita's own request? (5) Following this protest, Yamashita "immediately cautioned" his subordinate, the chief of military police, and General Muto ordered an investigation, but "It would have been a very difficult and very long process indeed to get the real truth about what was going on inside the Kempetai [military police]" (p. 156). But Yamashita stated that, had he heard of crimes, he would have punished them (p. 25); and, since the "overzealousness" went on in Manila, where Yamashita then had his headquarters, why was it necessary to find out what went on *inside* the police? (6) Apparently, the steps were not very energetic because "when President Laurel complained again . . . General Yamashita took firm and immediate action." He recommended the "immediate removal" of the police chief—a very "serious and drastic step." But if all this happened, why is it "ridiculous to suppose that he would be told about" the atrocities? (p. 161). (7) It took eight weeks to remove the police chief, and it was during that period that the worst brutalities happened. Why did Yamashita, after Laurel's formal warnings, take no steps to protect the population during that eight-week period, or to learn about a situation which was so widely known?

It is possible that the defense would have had answers to these and many other questions, but, if it had, Mr. Reel does not disclose them.

In his anger, Mr. Reel goes, however, much further than attacking the doctrines and procedures which were followed. The book is replete with very serious accusations against the Commission and, especially, General MacArthur. The Commission "we assumed was prepared to find him guilty and to order him hanged" (p. 180). The decision was "its inevitable verdict of guilt" (p. 120), "the final touch of retribution" for Pearl Harbor (p. 167). He declares that it was "more undiplomatic than incorrect" to state that "General MacArthur has taken the law into his own hands" and that the Commission "has violated every law in the world" (pp. 194-95).

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Such accusations either are made as flat statements, or are derived from hearsay evidence, such as the following: "a newspaper reporter quoted Kerr [the chief prosecutor] as saying . . ." (p. 34); "According to an Army chaplain, an American general . . . announced . . ." (p. 245); "General MacArthur is reported to have remarked . . ." (p. 246); "It had been rumored that . . . [but]. . . . We did not know whether those astounding rumors were true . . ." (p. 86). The accusations against General MacArthur and others are interwoven with the reiteration that the doctrine of the "Commander's duty to act" has the most dangerous implications.

The alarm of the reader is bound to increase on account of other erroneous expositions of the law of warfare. For example, only by misinterpreting Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 can he praise Yamashita as "a military man with no attempt to put a humanitarian gilding on the harshness of war" (p. 152) when he declared that the *law* prevented him from saving Manila by declaring it an open city. It is also stated that the charges against Yamashita were "ex post facto" offenses (pp. 243-45). But the bayoneting of babies and the other illegal acts dealt with in the trial have at the least been outlawed since 1907; and the doctrine that crimes can be committed by omission has long been a general principle of criminal law, as the American decision of 1904 shows.

In fact, the book comes close to arguing that, since modern war is so destructive, the law of war ceases to apply. "To say that a soldier in a war of blockade and bomb—atomic and otherwise—is 'charged with protection of the weak and unarmed' is somewhat less than realistic" (p. 235). To imply that a commander of occupied territory need do nothing against mass torture of women and children by his troops, because present-day war is sanguinary, is a complete *non sequitur*.

The argument which is reiterated with the greatest insistence is that we were hypocritical in trying Yamashita, because we used the atomic bomb. He states: ". . . we do not try Mr. [Henry L.] Stimson" who recommended the use of the bomb. "Why must we judge our enemies by a different standard?" (p. 247). The argument is unjustified and has often been repudiated. The bomb was used in combat action; the Philippines atrocities were post-combat acts, done in territory already occupied. They were specifically forbidden by the law of war. The atom bomb as combat weapon was, as such, not forbidden. The dropping of the atom bomb cannot "justify" or exculpate crimes. The offenses which, the decision says, Yamashita had the duty to prevent or to punish were deliberate and avoidable offenses, not connected

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with, or easily disconnectible from, legitimate military action; the civilian losses caused by the bombs were most unfortunate concomitants of a legal combat action.

Mr. Reel is right when he says that the power of destruction which technology has given into the hands of wartime leaders is enormous. But this makes it all the more imperative to hold these men under legal restrictions, and to insist that, at the very least, the absolute barriers erected by the laws of war be observed. The war crimes trials were designed to reaffirm this simple fact. Certainly, a book concerned with the purity of American justice should not even suggest the contrary. The war crimes trials have raised many complex problems, legal and moral. It is regrettable that Mr. Reel, with his rich experience in the Yamashita case, has written a book which inflames more than it informs.

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Germany's Contribution to European Economic Life: Le Rôle de l'Allemagne dans l'Economie européenne. By PERCY W. BIDWELL, TADEUSZ LYCHOWSKI, R. G. HAWTREY and J. VAN HELMONT.—147 pp. 200 Frs.; $1.25.

Contrôle de l'Allemagne: Control of Germany. By LOUIS F. AUBERT, WILLIAM DIEBOLD, MICHAEL ZVEGINTZOV, and others.—144 pp. $1.25.

Education in Occupied Germany: L'Education de l'Allemagne occupée. By HELEN LIDDELL, EDMOND VERMEIL and BOGDAN SUCHODOLSKI.—148 pp. $1.25.

Les Églises en Allemagne: The Churches in Germany. By EDMOND VERMEIL, K. J. HAHN and GABRIEL LE BRAS.—118 pp. 200 Frs.; $1.25.

These four volumes are published by Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie., Paris, 1949, and are distributed in the United States by Columbia University Press, New York.

These volumes of selected papers from the symposium on Some Aspects of the German Problem held by representatives of eight institutes of international affairs during 1947 and 1948 bring into direct confrontation the views of scholars of many nations on certain care-

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fully delimited German issues. They raise points which are as interesting for the establishment of an international framework for general political discussion as for the question of Germany. The German problem is international not only in the sense that it is a common concern of many nations but more explicitly in the sense that the object of policy is felt to be the integration of Germany into an international system. These studies may be viewed as an attempt to set up a universe of discourse on the basis of which the fundamental value-problems of such a system may ultimately be resolved. The attempt proceeds first by using Germany as a focal point and then by selecting from this field certain limited economic and cultural issues on which scholarly investigation and analysis might be expected to provide a common basis and an agreed method. To measure the efficacy of such an effort the following questions must be asked: What is the relationship established between the specific issues under discussion and the larger problems? To what extent does the research on the specific issues transcend the national attitudes usually brought to bear on the larger problems? Is there a homogeneity of research techniques to serve as a common ground?

Despite their publication under four special headings, these papers actually deal with the subjects of the German economy and German re-education. These, moreover, are treated in a context so broad as to make the one embody the problem of the German state and the other the problem of German society. As has been the case in the abstract discussions of these larger questions, these essays agree on the broad principle that the German state must be integrated into a general political and economic system and that the German people are to be brought into the democratic current of the Western World, but conflict on the nature of that system and that democracy as well as on the policies which are to merge the Germans into them.

In the volumes *Germany's Contribution to European Economic Life* and *Contrôle de l'Allemagne* the issue is whether dependence shall be placed upon a new political or a new economic pattern for Europe. Percy Bidwell, of the Council on Foreign Relations, and R. G. Hawtrey, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, argue in the first volume for the economic dependence of Europe upon the revival of German industry in its "prewar pattern of economic activity" and refer the consequent threat of German aggression to the coming European political federation, which would dispose of it "by a process of absorption". On the other side, Tadeusz Lychowski, of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, and J. Van Helmont, of the French

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Center for Studies of Foreign Policy, argue for a transformation of the European economy and the destruction of German hegemony through the limitation of German industry and the even distribution of industrialization throughout the continent; a politically united Europe plays no rôle in their considerations and by implication it is contingent upon prior economic and political arrangements. The volume *Controle de l'Allemagne,* which ostensibly concerns itself with the problem of security control, particularly of the Ruhr, actually boils down to the same issue on which the same positions are taken. This shift of the problem to a general plane is a testimony of the tremendous drawing power of national political values. Louis Aubert, of the French Center for Studies of Foreign Policy, is moved to emphasize the necessity of a special Ruhr authority for security purposes on grounds which have clearly more to do with his desire to use such a régime for changing the economic pattern of Europe than with military security in the narrower sense. William Diebold, of the Council on Foreign Relations, adroitly separates out these elements and argues in support of Bidwell's position.

Although the volumes *Education in Occupied Germany* and *Les Églises en Allemagne* are enlivened by no such open duel, the problem of re-education is posed in fundamental social terms, and the basic cleavage in approach emerges clearly enough. Helen Liddell's introduction to the volume on *Education* describes its appearance during the conference on the issue of intervention or nonintervention by the Allies into the German educational process. The essays by Edmond Vermeil of the French Center of Studies and by Bogdan Suchodolski of the Polish Institute, both in the interventionist camp, bring out the far-reaching implications of this issue. They argue that world society must intervene into the realm of the German spirit because that realm must be not only de-nazified but in a sense " de-Germanized ", and because this task will require the creation of a set of truly universal values, developed by the rest of the world in a process during which it purifies its own standards while applying them to Germany. Certainly the content of these values differs: for Vermeil it is humanism in the Western—and particularly the French—tradition, while for Suchodolski it is " the new spirit of social humanitarianism ", founded on a political and social agreement among the great societies of East and West—but this difference is reduced to a comparative unity as against the noninterventionist position adopted by the American, British and Dutch delegations to the conference, with its conservative implication of an organic development of the world order.

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What is striking about the presentation of these questions is the consistency in the points of view on the various issues which are adopted by the scholars of the respective nationalities represented in these reports. Not only this, but these national points of view parallel remarkably the principles of foreign policy asserted by the official foreign policies of the respective governments. Whether this be considered as an evidence of the representative nature of democratic diplomacy or as a manifestation of the *trahison des clercs*, some mavericking might well have been fruitful in a discussion of this kind. This is all the more the case since the books contain no indication of the progress of the discussion, so that we are left with the customary national views in their usual confrontations.

Nor does a genuine common ground exist in the technique of presentation. The character and aims of the analyses are variegated. Some of the essays are abstract analyses, reasoning from definite presuppositions to fundamental conclusions of general policy. K. J. Hahn's analysis of political Catholicism is an extreme example of the dangers of this approach. A second type presents interesting material in support of a definite policy. Most of the essays fall into this category. Their quality varies, but they usually contain valuable insights. A final group seeks to transcend the stalemate of national values by simple descriptive investigations which deliberately eschew any connection with policy. Gabriel Le Bras's attempt to apply statistical methods toward the judgment of the influence of the churches upon the German people is one species of this approach; Edmond Vermeil's able, though hardly original, historical treatment of German Lutheranism is another; Helen Liddell's field study on education in the various zones is still a third. It is a far cry from such studies to the ultimate questions which must be answered, but at least they do constitute a common language for scholars.

Clearly these volumes leave both the German problem and the creation of a pattern for international discussions far from solved, even in academic terms. Their contribution lies in the preliminary exploration of possible relationships between scholarship and international policy. A viable relationship is still to be established.

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The Twentieth Century: A Mid-way Account of the Western World. By HANS KOHN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949.—xi, 242 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Kohn has written a long historical essay on Western civilization at mid-century to prove the case for an Atlantic Union of the democracies. His purpose gives him a criterion for selection and rejection and his book a sense of form. It is no derogation of the author's achievement to point out that he set himself a limited assignment, but the cogent appeal for Atlantic Union with which the book closes does leave the impression that the political advocate overshadows the social philosopher. Dr. Kohn has, of course, written more massive works with wider perspectives, and here, too, the sweep of his intelligence inevitably reveals itself as in this account of what seems to him the most important conflict of the twentieth century:

> Assuming many masks and seizing upon various pretexts, it is the struggle between the two opposed patterns of reaction to the meeting of cultures—the liberal pattern of cooperation in tolerance and of an open society on the one hand, and the irrational pattern which, spellbound by the past, stresses isolationism and peculiarities of race or class above the fundamental likeness of all men as individuals, irrespective of social class or historical nationality, and which rejects individual liberty for the supposed necessities of an inevitable historical course.

In the view of some historians, the nineteenth century lingered on until 1914 and did not end until the outbreak of the First World War. They see us now in the grip of a new Thirty Years' War the end of which is not yet. We have lost the world of the nineteenth century; we failed to build a new one during the long armistice; what we can make of the world we have remains to be seen. To Dr. Kohn, on the other hand, the twentieth century began a hundred years ago in the revolutionary year of 1848. Already this century has brought forth two new secular religions, nationalism and socialism, which have shown more vigor than the eighteenth-century ideals of reason, liberty, democracy and individualism. Taking a still longer view, Dr. Kohn shows how both Germany and Russia have consistently set themselves Messianic, anti-Western goals. Bismarck, the Kaiser and Hitler followed one another in almost apostolic succession. Peter the Great proved himself a traitor and a heretic when he tried to open Russia's windows to the West. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Tsar Nicholas II, on the other hand, all believed in the unique mission of Russia to redeem

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the world. Stalin did not "betray" Lenin, as some of Trotzky's disciples have suggested; Stalin carried Lenin's anti-Western, anti-democratic ideas to their logical conclusions.

The Second World War scotched Germany, Japan, and the assorted fascist threats to Western civilization, but left Russia and communism stronger than ever. The democracies also became belatedly aware of the danger, especially the United States which has now outgrown the disillusionment and cynicism that followed the failure of Wilson. Dr. Kohn finds us too inclined at the moment to pessimism, but he prefers this mood to optimism because it leads us to take action that can logically result in Atlantic Union. He says Americans "know now why they fought the two world wars." We have learned, in the past twenty years, to free ourselves from "comfortable isolationism and easy illusionism." But we are

> sometimes too fond of clear-cut decisions, of crude alternatives. In 1949, facing Russia, Americans generally put the dilemma in the way of agreement or war, world order or chaos. Such an approach can only lead to illusions and ultimately to catastrophe. For in the present stage there can be neither agreement nor must there be a war. For some time Western mankind will have to live, without agreement and without war, side by side with a closely knit communist world.

If there is any flaw in Dr. Kohn's reasoning, it appears in his closing pages. Most of his book stresses the importance of beliefs, religions, cultures, ideologies. Finally he shows that in the mid-twentieth century two rival civilizations confront each other. Without dissenting from Dr. Kohn's conclusions and recommendations, this reviewer cannot resist expressing regret that Dr. Kohn ended his book so abruptly. In another twenty-five or fifty pages at most he might have drawn up a more detailed balance sheet of the spiritual resources of West and East and attempted a somewhat more detailed appraisal of the assets and liabilities on both sides of the iron curtain. He leaves no doubt that Atlantic Union meets the political, military and economic needs of the situation he has described. But he devotes so much attention to imponderables until his final chapter that it seems too bad he did not double its length by giving it the same philosophical depth that makes all the rest of the book so memorable and rewarding.

QUINCY HOWE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

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Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48. Lake Success, Department of Public Information, Secretariat of the United Nations, 1949. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.—xix, 1126 pp. $12.50.

When the United Nations was established, some enthusiasts for world organization cautioned that a too ambitious program of international collaboration in the economic and social as well as political fields might dissipate the energies of governments and complicate the solution of the more urgent problems. The second volume of the *Yearbook* series, which compresses between its covers an account of the organization's activities for 1947-48, provides ample evidence that this danger continues to exist.

Within the year's span covered by the volume, some or all of the fifty-eight member governments deliberated on such diverse issues as the partition of Palestine and a Declaration of Human Rights, full employment and the colonial conflict in Indonesia, principles of the Nuremberg judgment, control of armaments and the status of women. Other topics included the control of the world oil resources, technical assistance for underdeveloped areas, housing and town planning. And these are only a few of the many subjects considered by the United Nations organs, and summarized in this *Yearbook*.

These deliberations, it must be remembered, took place in a world suffering from a " cold war ", engaged in the struggle of the " Marshall Plan " v. the " Molotov Plan ", where some forces sought to " contain communism ", while others sought to prevent " capitalist encirclement ". Even if the world were ideologically more unified, and the compulsion for collaboration as great as at the height of the wartime alliance, it is extremely doubtful that international deliberations on so wide a front could be fruitful. Given the reality of the divided world, the value of deliberation on some of these matters may be not only nil, but negative. Since discussions between the United States delegates and Soviet delegates on human rights and freedom of the press could not result in agreement, they degenerated into harangues and diatribes which heightened political tensions.

That governments are concerned with the overambitious agenda for world collaboration is shown by the decision of the last General Assembly session, when the governments resolved that " the proliferation of activities and the multiplicity of projects and programmes may impair the effectiveness of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, impeding the necessary concentration on projects and pro-

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grammes of primary importance." The governments noted their lack of "technical and personnel resources" to keep up with the deliberations, and their "increasing difficulties in meeting the contributions and other indirect expenses" which membership in international organizations entailed. Accordingly, the members of the United Nations were called upon "to refrain from initiating new projects other than those which are urgently required and which can be effectively carried out." (A/1146, 25 November 1949.)

The proliferation of activities, however, has not prevented Secretary-General Trygve Lie's staff from undertaking the job of compressing into an intelligible and extremely useful volume the thousands of draft resolutions, verbatim records of sessions, corrections to these records, and notes from the Secretary-General. The extent of the compression can be gleaned from the fact that the *Yearbook's* 274 pages on the General Assembly reflect the verbatim records of some 648 meetings involving 1,212 hours and 54 minutes of debate over a period of sixty-five days! Where the Assembly of the League of Nations seldom met for longer than three weeks in the year, the General Assembly has found it impossible to cover its agenda in less than two months, and has twice adjourned for a short interval only to reconvene to take up remaining items. The political issues have called for such lengthy deliberations that, in addition to the standing political committee, an *ad hoc* political committee has been established at two sessions.

This issue of the *Yearbook* devotes 817 pages to the United Nations organs, and 116 pages to the specialized agencies. It includes a useful bibliography and a Who's Who of delegates and top Secretariat members. The discussion in the *Yearbook* is divided structurally, that is, on the basis of deliberations in the organs. Thus, the reader seeking the complete story on Palestine, for example, would have to turn from the discussions in the General Assembly, to those in the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council (on Jerusalem), and the Economic and Social Council (on the Economic Board under the Partition Plan). The two exceptions to this arrangement are the sections that consider Non-Self-Governing Territories, and Atomic Energy.

Since the annual reports of the organs to the General Assembly present the United Nations activities on a structural basis, the Secretariat might be well advised to have the *Yearbook* take up the activities of the United Nations functionally. After all, which organ considered a problem is of less importance than the full story of what was accomplished, and this can be better told by discussing subjects rather than

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the organs that dealt with the subjects. Should the Secretariat find this too laborious an undertaking, then the usefulness of the *Yearbook* would be greatly increased if the comparatively useless index which now is included was replaced by a detailed topical index.

With the *Yearbook* one of a series, introductory background material should be held to a minimum, since it can be assumed that earlier volumes will be consulted. Furthermore, lengthy quotations (such as the report of the Palestine Mediator, running to three pages of fine type) might be omitted. The *Yearbook* is a key to the United Nations documents, and gives document numbers for important materials. Since it can be assumed that those who wish the full text would turn to the document, a summary statement in the *Yearbook* would suffice. The graphic materials, the charts and flags, are of doubtful value. Good organizational charts are of great assistance to understanding the complex structures of the numerous international agencies, but the charts in the *Yearbook* are not good.

The format of the annual *Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly* might profitably become that of the *Yearbook*. In the *Report*, the decisions of the Council appear in italicized type to distinguish them from the debates and preliminary proposals. The arrangement in the *Yearbook* is confusing. Full texts of draft resolutions are presented, as they should be occasionally, but the adopted texts are also presented in the same type, so that at times it is difficult to distinguish between them.

The student of international affairs would be well advised to turn to the *Yearbook* as a useful guide to the voluminous records of the United Nations, but not as a substitute for them. Solicitous of not offending the sensibilities of member governments, the Secretariat has frequently toned down debates. Just as on reaching into the sands for a lost coin, the granules drop through the fingers but no coin appears, so also in condensations the heart of the problem may be lost.

The Secretariat has done a good job in compressing the lengthy deliberations of the numerous international bodies into a meaningful handy volume, in spite of its six pounds. Students of international affairs may well applaud this and the numerous other aids which Secretary-General Trygve Lie and his staff have placed at their disposal. The *Yearbook* is an indispensable tool in the quest for an understanding of the problems and processes of the United Nations system.

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The Commerce of Nations. By. J. B. CONDLIFFE. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950.—xi, 884 pp. $7.50.

This book deals with international relations from three points of view, economic history, economic theory and economic policy. The arrangement is partly topical and partly chronological. Part I, "Historical Origins", traces developments in trade, tariffs and economic thought up to the end of the old colonial system. The expansion of world trade and of foreign investment in the nineteenth century and the development of laissez-faire theory and policy form the subject of Part II. "Wars and Revolutions" is the title of Part III which begins with a chapter on "The End of Laissez-Faire" and concludes with a consideration of the United Nations and its economic agencies. In Part IV, "The Modern Problem", the author shows how the new concern of all governments with political and economic security complicates the task of policy-makers in the field of trade and finance. In these chapters Professor Condliffe reëxamines theories of international trade and payments in the light of new technological conditions, changes in business organization and new social objectives. The old "economic laws", he finds, are not strictly applicable—they probably never were—but still they furnish guideposts which policy-makers should disregard only at their peril. "It may be old-fashioned", the author says, "to insist that the classical economists laid hold of a vital principle when they enunciated the advantages of a territorial division of labor. It is certainly difficult now, in the absence of competitive tests, to clothe the theory of comparative advantage with any realistic and concrete meaning. But truth it remains that a country which ignores the principle that competitive efficiency should determine its economic organization has started down a slippery slope of political uncertainty and economic danger."

For the general reader, particularly one blessed with intellectual curiosity, this will prove an interesting book. Professor Condliffe has packed an amazing amount of information into it. His exposition proceeds at a leisurely pace. Never dogmatic himself, the author satisfies the inquiring mind by questioning the assumptions which underlie all dogma, both ancient and modern.

The introduction states: "This book is concerned with international economic questions that are vital at the present time and will be vital in the immediate future." But the European Recovery Program, first mentioned on page 648, is nowhere given systematic discussion. Similarly the fragmentary treatment of cartels and intergovernmental

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commodity agreements will be disappointing. If, however, we interpret "questions" more broadly, the author's claim is justified. Such matters as economic planning and the possibilities of developing freer international trade are dealt with at length. A competent instructor would find this book a useful teaching instrument, particularly in institutions where library facilities are inadequate to the demands of large classes.

A book of such wide scope in time and subject matter naturally lacks the cohesiveness of a monograph. But a measure of unity is nevertheless provided by a few dominant ideas, such as for example the relation of government to business. In dealing with this critical issue, the author's approach is not that of a philosopher concerned with natural rights but that of a historian interested in the evolution of social institutions.

A New Zealander by birth, Professor Condliffe has a strong interest in the development of colonial areas, particularly in Southeast Asia. For the present disturbances he is inclined to blame the negative character of laissez-faire economic policies. "The nineteenth-century trading system, organized by European commerical enterprise primarily to meet the industrial needs of the Western world, is probably at an end, but its consequences remain. In Asia not only are there vastly increased numbers threatened now with economic disaster, but a whole new series of conflicts is brewing between the Asiatic peoples themselves" (p. 318). And later, on the same page, "It was inevitable, in Asia and Africa as in early nineteenth-century England, that outworn modes of production and antiquated forms of government should be destroyed by the progress of the industrial and commercial revolutions. But failure to initiate the colonial peoples into the skills required in the modern world, and to provide new institutions of social protection, has brought and will continue to bring a vast reckoning, not merely for groups or classes but for whole great communities."

In his concluding chapter the author points out that investment of capital in the industrialization of Southeast Asia might accomplish a double purpose. It could be made the means of raising the living standards in the area itself, and through the process of multiangular trade be an effective instrument for restoring economic viability in Western Europe.

International economic relations is a broad, somewhat amorphous subject, difficult to treat in compact form. Nevertheless, my impression is that this book is too long. It would have been improved by judicious condensation of certain sections, as for example chapters

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x-xii and xv, dealing with economic policy in the inter-war period, which traverse the ground made familiar by the work of many authors, including Condliffe himself.

PERCY W. BIDWELL

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The Problem of Employment Stabilization. By BERTIL OHLIN. New York, Columbia University Press, 1949.—173 pp. $2.75.

This book is full of sound practical common sense and is remarkably free from the intricacies—as well as the niceties—of theoretical analysis. It presents the issues involved in employment stabilization in a clear and challenging way. If only the opponents of stabilization policies would or could state their arguments with equal clarity, progress toward agreement among economists would be furthered.

Who would have thought ten years ago that an economist writing in 1950 would devote his initial chapter to the question of overemployment rather than chronic underemployment? Professor Ohlin rejects the notion held by many economists in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia that the way to stablization should be to keep the economy under constant, but mild, inflationary pressure and to suppress that pressure, where necessary, by direct controls. I fully subscribe to Ohlin's predilections on this essential question and agree that employment stabilization must be approached in more subtle and less obvious ways. In fact, there may be a basic political contradiction in the suppressed inflation solution. Does it make sense to say that a state run on democratic lines can, as a permanent policy, permit the bulk of its citizens to receive more purchasing power than it permits them to use? I should like to know the political scientists' answer to this question.

Like the rest of us who reject the suppressed inflation solution, Ohlin cannot provide a neat or satisfactory answer to the inflationary dilemma. It must be conceded that employment stabilization may bring with it an inflationary wage-price spiral. If direct controls are eschewed, how is this to be prevented, or is it to be allowed to continue? The only effective method left is a restrictive credit policy, and Ohlin agrees that that would create unemployment. If credit restriction is to be used, that implies that governments will abandon employment stabilization if their policies turn out to be inflationary.

The inevitability of a wage-price spiral in which so many econ-

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omists believe rests on the traditional assumption of economic analysis that everyone attempts to maximize his income, usually from a short-run point of view. If this assumption is made, there is little prospect for stabilization of both employment and the price level without extensive use of direct controls with their political and economic consequences. Ohlin pins his hopes on the "social-liberal" type of economy in which business and labor groups will make their voluntary decisions with recognition that they are parts of an interdependent whole. He recognizes that there are "great risks for liberty in a society that aims at employment stabilization on a high level" (p. 107). But these risks are not as great, in his opinion, as the risks to liberty that attend prolonged depression. He adds that "some liberals of the Manchester type, who in practice want a return to the economic system of the period before 1914, have failed to appreciate this fact."

Ohlin gives a lucid account of the much-publicized recovery policies of Sweden in the 1930's, but with laudable candor attributes most of the recovery to the increased foreign demand for Swedish products. No one has yet devised a plan for insulating a dependent economy such as Sweden or Australia from a decline in the demand for its exports; and hardly any internal policy in those countries can prevent recovery when the demand for their exports increases. But economists in both Sweden and Australia have ridden to international renown on the back of rising export prices.

The last two chapters of the book consist, respectively, of accounts of the "Swedish" and the Keynesian theories of unused resources. The Swedish economists have felt, with reason, that Keynes himself ignored the achievements of the Wicksellian school in the same field, and that Wicksell's reputation has suffered in consequence. Ohlin discusses the Keynesian theory with generous impartiality.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY ARTHUR SMITHIES

On Understanding the Supreme Court. By PAUL A. FREUND. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1949.—ix, 130 pp. $3.00.

This well-written little volume contains three essays on the Supreme Court based upon lectures given at the Northwestern University School of Law. The first deals with major trends in the present court, and discusses especially the areas in which cleavages appear to be deepest. These are in the fields of civil liberties and of application of federal regulatory law. The author's appraisal is that the areas of agreement

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with respect to civil liberties are much more important and significant than those of disagreement. He finds three significant lines of conflict in the present opinions of the Court on civil liberties: (1) the privilege of "righteous peaceful aggression" which has tended to overshadow "security from intrusion", as dramatized in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases; (2) the overextension, in his view, of the "clear and present danger test"; and (3) the tendency to forget the virtues of federalism in these cases by making of the Court a "super-legal-aid bureau" under the Fourteenth Amendment. On the last point, however, he does make a strong plea for the right of indigent defendants in criminal cases to have counsel appointed as a matter of course—not because it is historically demonstrable that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth, but because it is indispensable to the even-handed administration of criminal law. The remainder of the first essay is devoted primarily to the question of how far the Court is free to reconsider earlier doubtful statutory interpretations when the legislature has not meanwhile changed the law.

The second essay is a short but stimulating appraisal of Mr. Justice Brandeis as the prototype of a liberal judge. Brandeis was a liberal, says the author, not because of the way he voted on the Court, but because of his "essential morality of mind", manifested in (1) an insistence on knowledge as indispensable to judging, (2) a rejection of opportunism, (3) an insistence on jurisdictional and procedural correctness, and (4) a rejection of sentimentality. The discussion of point (3) is especially penetrating. The essay is, on the whole, an admirable portrait of a liberal jurist, although this reviewer would reserve for fuller examination the author's conclusion that "in the ultimate test Holmes as a judge set a higher value on freedom of experimentation by the state, Brandeis on freedom of experimentation in ideas."

The concluding essay is of perhaps less general interest to the non-lawyer. It has to do with the importance of the lawyers, the lower courts, and indeed the whole structure and timing of the legal apparatus, in the making of the law. The author discusses the importance of the brief and arguments of counsel, the "private litigation" process of interpreting public law, the choice of a particular case to settle or avoid settling issues in dispute, the order in which cases are brought, and the like.

To the extent that there is a central theme underlying these three discourses, it is that the judge's task is an exceedingly complex one which, because of its close relationship to our basic political and social

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institutions, requires operation in more than one realm of values. Hence comes a plea that we appreciate the complexities of judging before criticizing the simplicities of voting. So strongly does the author feel this, in fact, that he reveals a recurrent irritation at those who attempt to throw light on the actions of the Court by analyzing how the various judges vote in certain categories of cases. Such irritation is fully justified, of course, if those who find this type of analysis useful do not at the same time have in mind the complexities and crosscurrents which Professor Freund so cogently describes. As one among several tools of analysis, however, this approach probably deserves somewhat more standing than is implied in the author's comments.

The book is, on the whole, a clearly expressed and eminently readable appraisal of factors at work in the judicial process. It will be of deep interest to those in the field, and should appeal also to a wider audience.

VINCENT M. BARNETT, JR.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603-1645. By MARGARET A. JUDSON. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1949.—xi, 444 pp. $5.00.

This is a scholarly and stimulating book which students of constitutional history will be using for a long time to come. In the great debate on impositions in 1610 Hakewill asked, "Who shall be the judge between the king and his people?" He flicked the basic constitutional issue and passed on. Thirty-three years later Philip Hunton expanded that question into a thesis of political theory, and during the remainder of the century the great English contributions to political theory were composed. But the first forty years of the seventeenth century belonged to lawyers and politicians, to prelates and puritans, to gentry and merchants, who were groping their way through political argument and political action and were laying the foundations of political thought for the theorists of the last half of the century. John Lilburne had not taken to drafting Agreements when he went to the pillory; Thomas Wentworth served his apprenticeship in the ranks of the opposition before he turned back to take up defense of that symmetry of the law which Bacon and Hooker had expounded; Edward Hyde did not discover the prosperous wickedness of the opposition until the very eve of the open declaration of parlia-

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mentary sovereignty; at Edgehill Sir Edmund Verney died defending the king's standard after having declared he had no faith in the king's politics; Pym, Coke, Phelips, Sandys, wrought parliamentary supremacy out of the very substance of the old monarchy. Professor Judson has analyzed the common denominator of political thought underlying the thrust and attack of both factions and then has described admirably the making of the political mind in the first half of the century. The men of the century were destined to tend to the unfinished business of the Tudor régime. Astir with the explosive ideas of the Reformation, but still indoctrinated with the mediaeval view of the constitution, they developed slowly a concept of the modern political state by a process of reasoning which we pretend was peculiar, though we are in much the same fix today with respect to the traditional concept of democracy. Royalists and parliamentarians drew upon a common stock of mediaeval concepts of the constitution. They contested for advantage, but within the balanced polity of the old constitution. It would not have been natural for those men to strike out into bold themes of experimental political theory or to try their hands at drafting written constitutions for a grand new political order. To their minds it was not new doctrine that was demanded but the discovery of the law which resided comfortably in the political heritage and experience of the state. They were fated not to find the solution in the traditional balanced polity. As Macaulay observed, in that situation it was beyond the control of human wisdom to preserve the ancient constitution. Search as they might, men would never find in the constitution of the balanced polity the answer to the question who should be judge when the responsible and powerful partners were locked in mortal conflict. Long before they were ready to admit it the royalists began to wrench from tradition and precedent the exaltation of absolute monarchy, and the parliamentarians were exploiting the hidden significance of fundamental law, representation, and responsibility to the people. This is the story of the birth of the concept of the democratic constitution in the minds of men who stoutly maintained their steadfast faith in mediaeval monarchy. They could not with one swift glance capture the vision of the modern state, but under pressure of political strife they could conveniently discover in the mediaeval constitution fundamental law and then go on to invent the liberal intent of that law as a public necessity.

HARTLEY SIMPSON

YALE UNIVERSITY

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The Elizabethan House of Commons. By J. E. NEALE. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.—455 pp. $5.00.

It is impossible within the limits of a brief review to give an adequate account of the life work of an industrious, impeccable and wise scholar, but any review of Professor J. E. Neale's *The Elizabethan House of Commons* is committed to just that impossibility. Yet at first glance the book seems to present little difficulty. Professor Neale indicates that he will seek to answer the questions: "Who were the members of Parliament? To what classes of society did they belong? How did they come to be elected? How were elections conducted?" (p. 16). And in addition, how did the House of Commons conduct its affairs, as a *corps*, an institutional body, a *Genossenschaft?* By a lifetime of piecing together bits and fragments of information Neale has answered those questions in such a way as to give the reviewer the rare satisfaction of saying, with respect to them, "This is *the* definitive work." We may be sure that further research will amplify without altering Neale's answers.

If *The Elizabethan House of Commons* provided only the technical answers to the ostensibly modest questions that its author begins by raising, it would be a solid performance, but it does much more than that. The House of Commons was inextricably involved in its own matrix, and that matrix was Elizabethan England. Who went to Parliament and how they got there depended largely on what Elizabethan England was like, and, courageous scholar that he is, Neale does not shirk the larger question in answering the lesser ones. Consequently a close reading of his study provides us with one of the best —perhaps the best—tableaux available of the Elizabethan world from a particular point of view. That point of view is right in the midst of the House of Commons; and one of the remarkable features of the book is the sense it leaves both of the adjustment of the House to its historical context and of the wisdom of Elizabethan statesmen (bar Essex and the younger Cecil) in refraining from tampering with that delicate adjustment. The character of the adjustment itself—so deficient in principle, so much the outcome of scarcely conscious experience, based indeed on a complete disregard of the reiterated letter of the law that made residence in the constituency the prerequisite of election to Parliament—will be the despair of the political dogmatist, who mistakes the shadow of neat tables of organization and administration for the substance of political life. The fact that emerges from Neale's study can perhaps best be made clear by falling back on Rousseau's terminology. No single Elizabethan political institution

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adequately represented the will of the individual Englishman, or the will of all Englishmen, or the will of the majority of Englishmen. But as it performed its work under Elizabeth, the institutional complex organized about the crown did in a remarkable measure reflect the general will of the English people. In general how Elizabethan governance was able to perform this feat, in particular how the House of Commons managed to play its intricate rôle in this very involved performance, come clear in detail for the first time in Professor Neale's fine study. The study remains a *mise en scène*, a living tableau, rather than a play. That play Neale has promised us—a history of the House of Commons under Elizabeth. For this historical treat we wait, confident of its excellence but impatient for its appearance.

J. H. HEXTER

QUEENS COLLEGE

James II. By F. C. TURNER. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1948.—544 pp. 21*s.*; $5.00.

No king in English history, not even Charles I, has been more variously estimated and interpreted than James II. Was he a religious fanatic or an enlightened champion of religious toleration, a servile dependent of Louis XIV who never failed to recognize his master's voice or a patriot king championing the true interests of his own country against the crafty machinations of a plutocratic oligarchy, the last of England's old despots or the last of her real kings, a voluptuary or such stuff as saints are made of? It is hard to recognize the same character in Macaulay's James II and Mr. Belloc's.

James's latest biographer was brought up, so he tells us, in the Protestant tradition, but he gives every appearance of having approached his subject with a desire to understand rather than to condemn or to justify. Mr. Turner deals of necessity with subjects on which controversy has raged, but his tone is not polemical, and very seldom does he make a statement that could be called intemperate. One wonders how he came to say that in none of James's reported words "can there be found a hint of a liberal idea" (p. 230) unless he meant to dissociate James personally from the authorship of his celebrated Declaration of Indulgence, and he says nothing to suggest such a meaning. His book is divided into two parts nearly equal in length, the first dealing with James before his accession to the throne, the second with the reign and its aftermath. It is based throughout on original authorities, a list of which, together with a list of refer-

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ences supplying documentation for the text, is given at the end. A useful feature of the work is its abundance of quotation from the sources. This supports the author's statements, adds detail that is often illuminating and colorful, and occasionally throws in a bit of humor, as when one of James II's former mistresses, on meeting simultaneously one of Charles II's and one of William III's, years after all three monarchs had gone to their repose, exclaimed, "Fancy we three . . . meeting like this."

No English king ever had greater opportunities than James did to learn the business of kingship before coming to the throne, but the history of his short reign suggests that he failed to make the best use of them. As heir to the throne he was for twenty-five years, except for short periods, in the inner counsels of his brother Charles, he learned soldiering in France under the great Turenne, he presided over the Admiralty for years, and he acted for a time, virtually if not nominally, as his brother's deputy in the government of Scotland. But inability to learn from personal experience or from history was, unfortunately for James, one of his salient defects. He had none of his brother's tact or sense of the practicable in politics and could generally be counted on to take the line of greatest resistance, he had no knowledge of men, he was impervious to argument and incapable of conceiving that he might possibly be mistaken. He showed by the threatening tone of his speech at the opening of the first session of his one and only parliament that he had learned nothing from his father's experiences with parliaments.

In spite of his Scottish and French descent James always thought of himself as distinctly English, and one of his most persistent, and pathetic, illusions was his unshakable belief that he understood the English people. Mr. Turner's book is a convincing commentary on his total failure to understand them. The Tuscan envoy to England showed prophetic insight when he wrote, early in James's reign, "God preserve the King when he realises that his troops will not be faithful to him, for they are English." Among the causes of the disaster that befell James II, default of Englishry on his part was surely not the least.

James was not merely a monarchical absolutist; he was an absolutist in all senses of the word. The whole bent of his mind and temperament was absolutist. As heir to the throne he was more royalist than the king, just as he was later, when king, more Catholic than the pope. His conception of loyalty is an illustration of his absolutism. He thought of loyalty as a fixed and immutable trait, like blue eyes. He failed *absolutely* to understand that it could not, in Mr. Turner's

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words, "survive more than a certain degree of rough treatment" and he therefore had no sense of the importance of conserving it. He failed pitifully to foresee the possibility of such a conflict of loyalties as arose in the Church of England during his reign.

Mr. Turner gives plentiful evidence to show that James was too stupid to be king of England—at any rate before the English monarchy became constitutional. A crowning proof of this, if it were needed, was his method of ascertaining, in advance of summoning a new parliament, how all his subjects—all of them, at least, who were in a position to influence elections or were qualified to take part in them—stood on the question of abolishing the penal laws and the tests against Catholics, of forwarding the election of persons who were in favor of abolishing them, and of supporting the king's Declaration of Indulgence. What he had in mind, as Mr. Turner remarks, was a "straw vote" of the whole country, and his method of "sampling" was more adequate and reliable, it must be granted, than those which have been followed on some occasions by some of our "pollsters". The result of the "questionnaire" was an unequivocal and decisive defeat for the king, the significance of which he entirely failed to understand. It is, indeed, Mr. Turner's opinion that James, by the time he came to the throne, at the age of fifty-one, was prematurely senile and very likely a victim of specific mental disease, though physically he remained vigorous till within a few months of his death, sixteen years later. There is much in the record to support this view.

James came to be looked upon by Catholic Jacobites as a Martyr to the Faith, and even before his death he had acquired something of a reputation as a saint. After his death his Queen, who had found plenty of occasion for just complaint against him as a living husband, habitually referred to him as "our holy King". (For a neo-Jacobite version of this thesis, see Hilaire Belloc's *James the Second.*) Our author's studies do not support the historicity of the Martyr theory. On the contrary, they have led him to the conclusion that James turned to the Lord, having, as it were, nowhere else to go—"it was not until, by the Peace of Ryswick, his hopes of regaining the crown of the three kingdoms were finally dashed, that he devoted himself unreservedly to the salvation of his soul." He was the nominal head of the Jacobites, but as the leader of a cause, even a lost cause, he appears to have been in fact a pathetic figure, though the legend of "our holy King" was long a-dying.

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The Great War for the Empire: The Victorious Years, 1758-1760. Volume VII of *The British Empire before the American Revolution.* By LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.—xlviii, 467, xxxvi pp. $7.50.

At this late date it is perhaps superfluous to state that *The British Empire before the American Revolution* has been planned upon so vast a scale and is being executed in so grand a manner that, if the work had no other claims to distinction, it would still stand as one of the great achievements of historical writing of this century.

The scope of this volume is the period during which the British put their war machine in high gear and set it successfully in motion against the seat of French power, the valley of the St. Lawrence. In it, Professor Gipson has poached, so to speak, upon the preserve Parkman made his own in his justly celebrated *Montcalm and Wolfe.* Professor Gipson has indicated in his Preface the chief difference between his and Parkman's contribution. He states (pp. x-xi) that he has treated the military events and related matters in a way "demanded by a generation of readers who have been made acutely aware of the fact that the waging of war is a science as well as an art and who expect far more from the present-day historian than narration with brilliant description of the setting of events." Nevertheless, this volume shows that the author can tell a story and tell it very well. Parkman will have to move over.

Of particular interest are the treatments of Lord Loudoun's hapless and misunderstood career in North America as Commander-in-Chief, the building of Forbe's Road, the fall of Louisbourg which is done in vivid fashion, and the military operations on Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario. The climax is reached with the struggle on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 and the capitulation of Montreal in the following year.

This splendid achievement contains, however, its controversial elements. Particularly open to criticism is the author's unbalanced treatment of the rôle of provincials and Britons in the contest. Professor Gipson believes that colonists relied to an almost scandalous degree upon Britain, that William Pitt supported the contest primarily to save colonials and that he has been unfairly treated by historians, presumably American, who have viewed him as an apostle of "British imperialism".

To this reviewer, it appears deficient in perspective to criticize colonials for a lack of unity and effective action at this stage of their development, as much so as to criticize the inhabitants of the British

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Isles for not standing shoulder to shoulder against continental foes until changing conditions made possible the unity achieved in the early years of the eighteenth century. It may be argued, as did the late Evarts B. Greene, that Britain's treatment of colonial military men was so unconducive to unity that it eventually became the cause of a growing feeling of Americanism. Also it may be argued, as did the Loyalist, Thomas Hutchinson, and the English historian, Ephraim Lipson, that Britain's provision for defense in part offset the restraints of mercantilism and was in a sense the true colonial pact. From this point of view, Britain did for the colonists only what it was her plain duty to do. Lastly, the disinterestedness of Pitt's motives may be questioned in the light of his subsequent statement that, if the Americans should engage in manufacturing, he would dispatch the British Fleet across the Atlantic to prevent it. Professor Gipson's failure to provide documentation for his interpretation of Pitt leads one to conclude that he is projecting into the eighteenth century a sentimental conception of empire which belongs more properly in the nineteenth century.

Since the Tudor Age a major source of Britain's increasing strength had lain in the colonial sphere. Pitt undoubtedly knew it and in acting upon it he displayed the wisdom of an enlightened self-interest. This interpretation of Pitt is in no way incompatible with a just and balanced recognition of his and his country's contribution to American colonial security and expansion.

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BOOK NOTES

This short book—*Germany: Key to Peace in Europe* (Claremont, Claremont College, 1949; ix, 109 pp. $2.75)—is a publication of a series of lectures on public affairs delivered by Dr. Karl Brandt of Stanford University, and sponsored by the Associated Colleges at Claremont, California. It offers one of the most informative and thoughtful analyses of the problems which have confronted Germany and the victor Powers since the end of World War II. The shortcomings of policies pursued by the Western Powers and the United States toward Germany prior to the war, the confusion of United States policy at the close of hostilities when Morgenthau's views were still strongly reflected in the basic policy directives governing our operations in Germany, the later development of a positive United States program, and the need for the incorporation of Germany into a federated Western Europe are reviewed by the author against the background of the vast destruction in Germany, Germany's new social, economic and political problems, the cold war with Russia, and the interdependence of Western Germany on Europe. Long an opponent of the Morgenthau Plan, Brandt argues cogently for the rehabilitation of Germany, which should be economically self-supporting, politically free and democratic, and accepted into the community of Western European states as an equal. Further, Germany should be integrated into a joint Western military organization, to which it should furnish an assigned quota of men. Leadership should be assumed by the United States to implement this program. The author is optimistic that the Germans are making progress in building a democratic state. Because the book deals with contemporary subjects, certain events have been superseded, and no corrections or criticisms will be offered on that account. In the opinion of the reviewer, certain conclusions and observations have been overdrawn. Too much significance has been ascribed to the magic of currency reform, June 1948, and too little credit given to constructive steps which preceded that event despite the preponderance of a negative occupation policy in the immediate post-war years. Currency reform is also given as the cause for Russia's blockade of Berlin. The more important fact that Russia sought to weaken the prestige of the Allies and extract important concessions such as preventing the establishment of a Western German government is omitted entirely. To say

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that most Germans prayed for an Allied victory is overstating the extent of the resistance movement to Hitler, especially in light of Roosevelt's unconditional surrender policy which Brandt elsewhere criticizes severely. In four years of association with Germans in the post-war years, I found little to support the conclusion that the Germans charged the brutality of the Russian troops to the account of all four occupying Powers. Except in isolated cases this would not be true, even in Berlin. Brandt's book nonetheless stands as an able and thought-provoking publication, which will be read with profit by those interested in the new Germany and Europe which are emerging from the shambles of World War II.—MILTON E. MUELDER, Michigan State College.

An interesting contribution to the discussion of how the German coal industry might be reorganized is the recent book by Frederick Haussmann, *Der Neuaufbau der deutschen Kohlenwirtschaft im internationalen Rahmen* (München and Berlin, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1950; xi, 182 pp.; no price given; English translation mimeographed). Haussmann proposes to restore the mines to purged private ownership and, at the same time, to establish a regulatory body along the lines of our National Bituminous Coal Commission which would administer the mines as a "public utility" (*sic*). In that way the German coal industry, while retaining the desirable features of private enterprise, would be sure to serve the public interest. This application of the "antitrust concept" (*sic*) to a primary industry should, in Haussmann's view, be coupled with an international coal agreement in the sense of Chapter VI of the ITO Charter. Haussmann does not give us the blueprint for a reorganization of the industry nor does he indicate how the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act could be translated into the German environment. But he has added to the 90 pages of text in the German version 85 pages of appendixes, including the two versions of the Bituminous Coal Act and translations of articles from *Time* magazine and the *New York Times*. The part of the book dealing with the international aspects of the coal problem is more satisfactory because Haussmann has been able to rely on the work done by the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe. He welcomes the Committee's "Six-Point Utilization Program" of June 1949 as a step in the right direction toward an intergovernmental coal agreement. But the type of agreement he is thinking of, in order to come within the purview of the ITO Charter, would necessitate a broadening of that instrument's stipulations regarding pre-existing or threatening burdensome surpluses and wide-

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spread unemployment. He also presents what seems to me an unfair appraisal of the operations of the nationalized British coal industry, in the course of which he quotes from the German edition of the *Readers Digest* and from Quentin Hogg's Pelican book, *The Case for Conservatism*. While Haussmann cannot be said to have done the job, his suggestions nevertheless are certainly worth thinking about, especially in discussions of the coal-steel pool plan recently advanced by the French.—OTTO R. REISCHER, Washington, D. C.

Georges Lasserre, a professor at the University of Lyon and a member of the *Conseil économique*, presents a socialist analysis of French economic problems in his recent *Socialiser dans la liberté: La Vocation de l'Europe* (Paris, Editions Albin Michel, 1949; 315 pp. 390 fr.). The author, writing with a fluency that we have come to expect of French intellectuals, argues that the operation of the free-market economy in the nineteenth century led to unrest among the workers and to monopolistic tendencies on the part of the capitalists themselves. At the present time, he continues, monopoly capitalism, unable to resolve its own crises, breeds antidemocratic and totalitarian movements. The only lasting solution for the economic ills of France is a planned economy, that is, the direction of economic activity by public authorities. At the same time, Professor Lasserre believes that the police state, as exemplified by the Soviet Union, has a disastrous effect upon the values of individual dignity and freedom. The task of Europeans, he feels, is to avoid both anarchic capitalism and a crushing totalitarianism. How are planning and democracy to be reconciled? Lasserre suggests that utilization of coöperatives will enable the popular sovereignty to be exercised directly on the economy without the intermediacy of the state, thus lessening the danger of a one-party dictatorship in the process of socialization. It is precisely the lack of adequate consumer representation, he concludes, that has led to the mismanagement of most nationalized industries. This conclusion (which is further developed in Lasserre's writings on the cooperative movement) is rather curious in the light of his admiration for the British Labor party, since the British socialists have clearly given priority to central planning by the state over all forms of workers' and consumers' control schemes. At any rate, given the political situation in France, it is highly unlikely that Lasserre's recommendations can be carried out. The Socialist party and the M. R. P. are the only two political groups sympathetic to democratic socialism, and the indications are that they are losing support to both the Left and the Right. If Professor Lasserre's analysis is correct (his com-

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ments on the inadequacies of the Monnet Plan and of the recent nationalization measures are certainly suggestive), and if the political situation in France continues to evolve in its present direction, then the consequences may well be tragic.—BERNARD E. BROWN, The City College of New York.

For scholars in international law Fritz Grob has produced an important contribution with his *The Relativity of War and Peace: A Study in Law, History, and Politics* (New Haven, Yale University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1949; xviii, 402 pp. $5.00). The greatest impression that remains after having finished the book is that the historical examples were given with clarity, exactness and interest. The author is seeking to describe the factors that make for war, that elusive will-o'-the-wisp. He accordingly describes in detail the historical, political and juridical aspects of these complex episodes: the American naval operations against France of 1798-1800, the battle of Navarino in 1827, the Boxer Expedition of 1900, German military operations against Italy, 1915-1916, French operations in Indo-China from 1882 to 1885, and Sino-Japanese conflict from 1931 to 1941. These are fascinating scraps from history and tease the legal mind with the question, " Were they wars, or not? " The second half of the book is an excursion into the theoretical aspects of that paradox, civilized warfare. Professor Grob's conclusion is that there is no such thing as war in the legal sense. Whenever a rule is offered he finds an historical incident that disproves it. His solution apparently is a functional approach with " war " interpreted according to the purpose it is intended to serve in each case, since no general " state of war " is demonstrably possible. That is the reason for the use of *Relativity* in the title of his book. Professor Pound in his foreword has hit at the heart of the matter. It is a problem of semantics and of " analytical jurisprudence ". The old words can no longer cover the complexity of modern life. We can remain rigid and abide with them—and the danger of a complete crack-up. We can invent legal fictions and accordingly confuse the issues. Or the whole structure, now that it has been so thoroughly exposed by Dr. Grob, can be redefined. Here is a worthy project in the codification of international law that can be undertaken by the United Nations, if that organization has time to do so during the current " cold war ". Now that Dr. Grob has produced this fine study on the borderlines of war, perhaps he can go even further with a study on psychological war, propaganda warfare—the war of nerves.—HERBERT MAZA, New York City.

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In the introduction to *Los Orígines de la ciencia política en España* (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1949; 413 pp. 50 pesetas) Professor Juan Beneyto Pérez, of the University of Salamanca, insists on the indispensability of a knowledge of political theory for the student of institutions, and observes justly that his subject has been very inadequately treated by writers on political science. Not only have foreign scholars ignored the Spanish contribution to medieval thought, or, like P. S. Allen, described Spanish writers as Italian, but their own countrymen have displayed ignorance of the nature of the writings they listed. In this book, in effect a companion to his valuable collection of source extracts published in 1944 (*Textos politicos españoles de la baja edad media*), Professor Beneyto sketches the setting and content of Spanish political thought, the joint product of the omnipresent ecclesiastical influence, the classical tradition, and the actual practices of Spanish government and politics. The two periods at which Spain influenced European thought most significantly were the eleventh century, when the schools of Barcelona and Toledo passed on to Chartres and Paris the traditions of Visigothic scholarship, enriched by the Indian, Persian and Alexandrian learning transmitted by Arab scholars; and the Conciliar period, when Spanish writers, of whom he ranks Torquemada first, rallied to the support of the papacy against secularists like Marsiglio. He examines the doctrines assumed, and not seldom formulated, in official documents such as royal charters or records of the Cortes, exemplifying the duties of the king in matters of peace and justice, and his relation to the law, the duties and liberties of the subject, the majority principle, the theory and practice of representation, and the organization of society in estates. He then discusses individual writers: jurists, pamphleteers, churchmen, and officials. The theme most fully developed in their works is that of kingship. Books of good counsel to the prince abound from the thirteenth century, and both the glory and the limitations of monarchy are elaborated by such writers as Alvaro Pelayo and Sanchez de Arevalo. The writings of Ramon Lull and Guillermo Cervera on the characteristic subject of chivalry are examined. Lastly come the "practical" men, who work from fact to theory and foreshadow the Renaissance: Tomás Mieres, the fourteenth-century apologist for common sense; the great Catalonian Eiximenis; Jaime Callis, exponent of the power of the Cortes; and the fifteenth-century jurist Belluga. The book, in short, is, for those unfamiliar with Spanish writings, a valuable addition to their political science texts.—HELEN M. CAM, Radcliffe College.

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Volumes IX and X of the *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949 and 1950; xxxii, 759 pp. $6.00; xxvi, 705 pp. $6.00), which cover 1947 and 1948, provide further evidence of the indebtedness of students of recent American diplomatic history to the World Peace Foundation. Comprehensive, rationally organized, and intelligently edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, the books in this series comprise the single best nonofficial guide to the conduct of American foreign policy in the immediate past. The introductory notes, which are both concise and informative, are models of their kind; and, whenever possible, the editors have refrained from commenting on those documents whose contents are self-explanatory. Although limitations of space have compelled the editors to summarize some documents and reproduce only excerpts of others, the range of these volumes is enormous. Economic, cultural and social relations receive as much attention as international political developments, and much valuable material is also included on the domestic origins of American foreign policy and on the day-to-day operations of those branches of the government that are directly responsible for the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs. To anyone interested in the rôle of the United States in the modern world, these volumes are indispensable.—HAROLD C. SYRETT, Columbia University.

To the growing literature on the history of prices has recently been added a valuable study by Aldo de Maddalena of prices at Milan during the seventeenth century—*Prezzi e aspetti di mercato in Milano durante il secolo XVII*. (Milan, Casa Editrice Rodolfo Malfasi, 1949; 212 pp. L. 1900). The author presents price series for wheat bread, rye, millet, rice, wine, and two qualities of woolen cloth from data in records of Milanese charitable institutions. He then proceeds to analyze these series, to determine correlations among the prices, to evaluate the effects of political events upon various changes, and to establish long-term price trends. Of incidental interest are the citations of recent and little-known works on the history of Italian prices. —SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, Columbia University.

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